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From Editor's Desk.....

D.Chakraborty

Editor

From the editor's desk.....

This time unfortunately the publication of this volume of the journal has been delayed because of a number of reasons beyond our control. We must therefore start with a word of apology to our valued contributors and readers who are patiently waiting for the volume. The brighter side is that majority of contributors to this volume belongs to the generation of young scholars and teachers from different regions of the country; and this gives the journal a national orientation. The effort these young scholars have made, indeed, is commendable.

About this issue, the first thing that needs mention is that the present volume is like a salad bowl which contains altogether ten articles on diverse themes and regions/countries, ranging from consequences of globalization to populist politics in West Bengal, Khap Panchayats, tensions in Assam etc. The volume also includes two articles which focus on developments in neighbouring Pakistan and Nigeria. The article by Sarabjit Kaur explores the issue of social foundations of fundamentalist political & military mobilization in Nigeria. The article though focuses on the Boko Haram in Nigeria may be of much relevance to recent developments in other parts Afro – Asia. The domination of military and bureaucracy over representatives of civil society is the concern of M.V. Georgekutty's contribution on Pakistan. This volume includes two articles on India's North- eastern region, of which Rubul Patgiri approaches ethnic assertion in Assam from the perspective of ethnicity as a reaction to exclusionary nation – building project in India. The other contribution on North – east by Tapan Das, interestingly re- examines the context of introduction of inner- line permit system there and its present utility. This article legitimately raises a few questions about inner-line system. Esita Sur's article on muslim question in neo- liberal India delves with the issues emerging out of exchanges between economic reforms and Community consciousness. Another contribution that focuses on consequences of neo- liberal economic reforms in the effort by Paromita Chakrabarty who addresses the politically sensitive issue of foreign direct investment in retail trade and public response in host country. N. Sukumar and Kamalakanta Roul in their article on Khap Panchayats address the on-going conflict between liberal – democratic values and practices of a traditional society in the political context of vote bank. Sumit Howaldar's attempt at understanding style of functioning of Mamata Banerjee in West Bengal is an effort to conceptualize the nature of populist politics. The last article of this volume by Tirthankar Chakraborty, explores the relationship between human rights and development discourse. In addition, the volume also includes two interesting book reviews by Dhritiman Chakraborty and Sana Salim.

I take this opportunity to thank all contributors of this volume for their effort and patience. I also thank my colleagues of the Department and the member of University Press without whom it would have been more difficult to publish this volume. I sincerely hope that our readers will find this volume of the journal worth waiting.

Thank you.

Dyutish Chakrabarti

The Problem of Poverty and the State in Odisha (2000-2010)

Anushuya Pal

Abstract

Odisha has been one of the poorest state's among the 29 (twenty-nine) states in India. Though the incidence of Poverty has come down from 47.15% in 1999-2000 to 39.90% in 2004-05, still the state remains the poorest state among all the major states in India. Various methodologies have been used for the estimation of poverty and from this we have come to deduce that poverty has declined. There are two important reasons that are responsible for the reduction of poverty. Odisha in recent years has experienced economic growth. There has also been intervention of the state through poverty alleviation measures. We argue in this paper that both the factors have contributed to the decline in poverty.

Keywords: Odisha, Poverty, Poverty Alleviation Measures

1. Introduction

Odisha has been one of the poorest state among the 29 (twenty-nine) states in India. It consists of 30 (thirty) districts. It is generally divided into 3 (three) regions; Northern region, Southern region and the Coastal region. A report of the Planning commission indicates that Odisha continues to be the poorest among all the major states of the country. Though the incidence of Poverty has come down from 47.15% in 1999-2000 to 39.90% in 2004-05, inspite of this Odisha still remains the poorest state among all the major states in India. The percentage of population below the poverty line at the all India level in 2004-05 was 21.8 percent as against 26.1 percent during 1999-2000. Thus what we notice is compared to many other states Rural poverty in Odisha is still very high, even though successive Governments have taken different initiatives to reduce the level of poverty (Government of Orissa, Economic Survey, 2008-09). In the state during 1973-74 the percentage of population below poverty line was 66.18% and it declined to 65.29% in 1983. But in 1977-78 it increased to 70.07%. During the period 1987-88 the percentage of population living below the poverty line was 55.58% and finally it declined to 39.90% in the year 2004-05.

The number and percentage of BPL population for the 61st NSS round (2004-05) based on mixed recall period (MRP) and uniform recall period (URP) for all the states and Union Territories, tells us that poverty has declined by 20.2 percentage points from 57.2 percent in 2004-05 (61st NSS round) to 37.0 percent in 2009-10 (66th NSS round). This clearly indicates that there is a welcome sign in drop in Poverty incidence during 2004-05 to 2009-10 (Government of Odisha, Economic Survey, 2012-13, p.263). The Planning commission has appointed so many committees for poverty estimation. But among the various committees there

are 2 (two) committees i.e. Lakdawala Committee formed in 1993 and the Tendulkar Committee constituted in 2005 which are the most important ones. These Committees have estimated the number and percentage of poor.

The estimates of poverty from 1973-74 to 2004-05 are based on Lakadwala Committee Methodology and those for the year 1993-94, 2004-05 and 2009-10 are based on NSS data and Tendulkar Committee Methodology. According to Lakdawala Committee the percentage of population living below the poverty line in Odisha has declined by 19.78 percentage points from 66.18 percent in 1973-74 to 46.40 percent in 2004-05. And the poverty estimates of the Tendulkar Committee for the year 1993-94 was 59.10 percent in comparison to 48.56 percent, as per the Lakdawala Committee Methodology. In the year 2009-10, the percentage of poverty as per the Tendulkar Committee was 37 percent. Hence an analysis of the estimates tells us that from 1993-94 to 2009-10, the percentage of population below the poverty line has declined. It is observed that the Lakdawala Committee used uniform recall period Methodology whereas the Tendulkar Committee used mixed recall period Methodology to find out the poverty ratios in Odisha. The table shows the percentage of population below poverty line in Odisha as compared to other major states in India.

Sl. No.	State	Head Count Ratio (percent)						
		1973-74	1977-78	1983	1987-88	1993-94	2004-05*	2009-10*
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1	Andhra Pradesh	48.86	39.31	28.91	25.86	22.19	29.9	21.1
2	Bihar	61.91	61.55	62.22	52.13	54.96	54.4	53.5
3	Gujarat	48.15	41.23	32.79	31.54	24.21	31.8	23.0
4	Haryana	35.36	29.55	21.37	16.54	25.05	24.1	20.1
5	Karnataka	54.47	48.78	38.24	37.53	33.16	33.4	23.6
6	Kerala	59.79	52.22	40.42	31.79	25.43	19.7	12.0
7	Madhya Pradesh	61.7	61.78	49.78	43.07	42.52	48.6	36.7
8	Maharashtra	53.24	55.88	43.44	40.41	36.86	38.1	24.5
9	Odisha	66.18	70.07	65.29	55.58	48.56	57.2	37.0
10	Punjab	28.15	19.27	16.18	13.20	11.77	20.9	15.9

11 Rajasthan	46.14	37.42	34.46	35.15	27.41	34.4	24.8
12 Tamil Nadu	54.94	54.79	51.66	43.39	35.03	28.9	17.1
13 Uttar Pradesh	57.07	49.05	47.07	41.45	40.85	40.9	37.7
14 West Bengal	63.43	60.52	54.85	44.72	35.66	34.3	26.7
All India	54.88	51.32	44.48	38.36	35.97	37.2	29.8

Based on MRP consumption of Tendulkar Committee Methodology (GOO, Economic Survey 2012-13, pp.265)

Given below is another table which shows the poverty lines and poverty Head count ratio using the Tendulkar Methodology and Lakdawala Methodology for the year 1993-94, 2004-05 and 2009-10 (GOO, Economic Survey, 2012-13, Odisha, Feb, 2013, p.263).

Committee	Methodology	Year	Rural	Urban	Combined
LAKDAWALA	URP	1993-04	49.72	41.64	48.56
		2004-05	46.80	44.30	46.40
TENDULKAR	MRP	1993-94	63.00	34.50	59.10
		2004-05	60.80	37.60	57.20
		2009-10	39.20	25.90	37.00

The incidence of poverty has declined during 2004-05 to 2009-10. There has been a significant or sharp decline in poverty from 57.20% in 2004-05 to 27% in 2009-10. Odisha still has a high incidence of poverty and the proportion is much higher than the national average. Still as noted earlier as per the report of the Planning Commission and also to other reports poverty ratio has declined in the State. There are several reasons that can be attributed for this decline. Two important reasons for the decline of poverty can be, first there is economic growth in Odisha in more recent times and second it is due to the adoption and implementation of several types of poverty alleviation programmes or measures. To improve the economic condition of the rural and urban poor, the Central Government as well as the State Government has adopted several poverty alleviation measures. Both the factors could have contributed to the decline in the incidence of poverty. We discuss below the rate of economic growth in Odishathen turn to

examine the poverty alleviation measures that have been adopted in the state and how far the measures have been successful in its desired effect.

Though poverty has declined in all the NSS Regions of the state but the extent of poverty in Southern and Northern Regions of Odisha is still high. According to Haan and Dubey (2003) though rural poverty in the Coastal and Northern Regions has declined but in the Southern Region the incidence of rural poverty has increased from 80.76% in 1983 to 86.16% in 1999-2000 (Shah, 2010, p.6). This is to some extent because the State has witnessed wide Regional and Social disparities in development more particularly economic growth. The development of all the Regions did not go hand-in-hand or simultaneously. According to NSS data, the Coastal Region has the lowest incidence of poverty while the incidence of poverty is the highest in the Southern and Northern Regions. During the early 1980s poverty in the Southern Region increased (Amit Shah, ODI working paper 325, 2010). From the analysis of NSS data, it is seen that the incidence of poverty has experienced a large fall from 45 percent in 1993-94 to 27 percent in 2004-05 in the Coastal Region. But in the Southern Region it increased by 4 percentage points from 68.8 percent in 1993-94 to 72.7 percent in 2004-05 and the Northern Region has also witnessed the biggest rise in the incidence of rural poverty by 13 percentage point from 46 percent in 1993-94 to 59 percent in 2004-05. Among the three regions, the percentage of poverty is higher in the Southern region than the Northern and Coastal Region. In the Southern region, the very bad condition that prevails is in Koraput (undivided district), where 92% of people lived below the poverty line (Panda, 2004:14). Poverty is chronic in this region. Thus in the Coastal region, the poverty ratio has declined, whereas in the Northern region and in the Southern region it has increased.

2. Odisha's Economy

We have argued in the previous section that there has been a decline in poverty in Odisha in the recent period even though Odisha remains one of the poorest states among all the major states in the country. The incidence of poverty has come down from 57.2 percent to 37 percent during the period 2004-05 to 2009-10. Several reasons can be attributed for this reduction in the rate of poverty. This has been possible because Odisha in recent years has experienced economic growth and this is likely to have affected different sections of the population in a positive manner. It must also be because of the intervention of the state through poverty alleviation measures. Let us first in this section turn to the story of economic growth in Odisha.

Odisha's economy has been classified into three categories which are; agriculture, industry and services. If we compare the Indian economy with the economy of Odisha, we find the economy of Odisha is more agricultural less industrial and less service oriented. But now in the recent period high growth have taken place in the industrial sector followed by the service sector and the agricultural sector. The growth rate in the agricultural sector has fluctuated over the years, due to natural calamities such as cyclones, draughts and floods. But the high growth in Odisha happens to be in the industrial sector. Odisha's industry is mineral based.

Let us first start our discussion of the Odisha's economy with the agricultural sector since it is this sector on which Odisha's economy largely depends. A large percentage of people depend on agriculture. Agriculture provided direct and indirect employment opportunities to around 64 percent of the total work force of the state as per the 1991 census. Agriculture and allied sectors contribute less than 30% towards the state's Gross Domestic Product and Agriculture and Animal Husbandry contributed 28.68 percent of the Net State Domestic Product of the State in 1997-98. The production therefore is low. It is generally held that low productivity in agriculture is because of the predominance of traditional agricultural practices, inadequate capital formation and low investment, inadequate irrigation facilities and because of the uneconomic size of the holdings.

Keeping the importance of agriculture in mind the State Government formulated a comprehensive Agricultural Policy in 1996. The main aim of this policy was to double the production of food grains and oil seeds, generation of adequate employment opportunities in the rural sector and to adopt agriculture as the main route for eradication of poverty. It stated its main objectives as: to give importance on agriculture so that young persons can accept agriculture as a means of Self Employment, to generate adequate employment opportunities, to create skilled labourers for management of modern agriculture, to help mechanization of agriculture to increase productivity, to increase area under tea, coffee, rubber, cashew and other plantation crops, to take up extensive training in the field of agriculture and related activities, to reorient agriculture towards export (GOO, Economic Survey, 2000-2001, p.4/2).

Despite of all this effort the growth in the agricultural sector declined due to super cyclone which hit Odisha in October, 1999. Agriculture and Animal Husbandry contributed 32.88 percent of the Net State Domestic Product of the State in 1999-2000. It contributed 28.13 percent to the Net State Domestic Product of the State in 2001-02. It contributed 22.09% of the Net State Domestic Product to the State in 2002-03 at 1993-94 prices.

Production of food grains in the State has also fluctuated over the years. In 1991-92 there was a bumper harvest of production of food grains. It was 72.3 lac tones. But during 1992-93, the production of food grains was very low. It was just 59.6 lac tones which was 17.56% less than the production during 1991-92 (GOO, Economic Survey, 2000-01, p.1/4). In 1993-94, the food grain production was 72.2 lac tones which were just below the level of Production in 1991-92. But production continuously declined during the next three years. In 1994-95, the production of food grains declined to 69.0 lac tones due to unfavourable weather conditions. It further declined to 67.8 lac tones in 1995-96. In 1996-97, low production was recorded; it was just 48.1 lac tones. During 1997-98 and 1998-99, production was 66.1 lac tones and 57.9 lac tones respectively. But during 1999-2000, the production of food grains was seriously affected by the cyclones which hit the 14 fertile coastal districts of the State in October, 1999. This cyclonic storm devastated four coastal districts of Odisha, namely Ganjam, Gajapati, Puri and Khurda. The economy of the State suffered a lot. As a result the Development of the State was seriously affected (Govt. of Odisha, Economic Survey, 1999-2000, p.1/13).

Food grain production declined to a very low level of 49.75 lac MT in 2000-2001 due to draught situation. Though it had taken a long time to come back to the earlier stage, but during 2001-02 there was a record production of good grains of 75.40 lac MT as a result of bumper production of rice. Again it declined to a very low level of 35.55 lac MT on account of severe draught in the State during Kharif, 2002 (Govt. of Odisha, Economic Survey, 2003-04, p.4/3). Due to increase in population, the State's per capita availability of cultivated land which was 0.39 hectare in 1950-51 declined to 0.17 hectare in 1999-2000 and in 2002-03, it declined to 0.16 hectare (Govt. of Orissa, Economic Survey 2000-01, p.1/5, 2003-04, p.1/6).

Let us now turn to Industry in the state. The State placed an important position on industries because of various reasons. The reasons are availability of vast mineral resources, abundance of raw materials and comfortable power situation. There are many important industries which were set up in the State during the different plan periods i.e. Rourkela Steel Plant, National Aluminum Company (NALCO) Indian Charge Chrome Ltd., Paradeep Phosphate and Coal based power plants at Talcher, Kaniha and Banharpali. The State has various large and medium industries and there are three nodal agencies which are engaged in promoting these industries (GOO, Economic Survey, 2003-04, pp. 1/11). The three nodal agencies are Industrial promotion and Investment Corporation Ltd. (IPICOL), Industrial Development Corporation Ltd. (IDICOL) and Odisha State Electronics Development Corporation (OSED) etc. By the end of 1998-99, Odisha had 334 large and medium industries with an investment of Rs.1, 841.99crore and employment potential for 81,188 persons (Government of Odisha, Economic Survey, 1999-2000, p.1/9). In the same way during the year 1999-2000, the State had 339 large and medium industries with an investment of Rs.1,880.36crore and employment potential for 82,533 persons. Similarly by the end of 2002-03 Odisha had 358 large and medium industries with an investment of Rs.3, 584.71crore and employment potential for 85,777 persons (Government of Odisha, Economic Survey, 2003-04, p.1/11).

To improve the industrial sector, the State Government reformulated its industrial policy in March, 1996. The emphasis of the policy were as follows: harnessing Orissa's vast natural resources and the potential for accelerated industrial growth consistent with the protection of environment; attracting and facilitating large investment in infrastructure and industries both from within the country and abroad; generating employment on a large scale in industrial/commercial activities; development of backward areas/ regions of the State through industrial / mining ventures, stimulating and strengthening local entrepreneurial base/ talent, development of Skills/ expertise etc. (Government of Odisha, Economic Survey, 1999-2000, p. 9/1).

The State Government later on reformulated the industrial policy in December, 2001. The main objectives of Industrial Policy, 2001 are: to create a business climate conducive to accelerate investment in industry and infrastructure projects, to raise income, employment and economic growth in the State, to reduce regional disparities in economic development, to balance utilization of the natural resources for sustainable development. To fulfill the above objectives the state Government aimed to: encourage private initiative and restrict Government intervention in

such areas where it enjoys a distinct comparative advantage; invite Private Investment for development and operation of quality infrastructure; promote the image of Odisha as an attractive destination for investment and tourism; encourage the creation of small scale industries (SSI) clusters in similar lines of business(Government of Odisha, Economic Survey,2003-04, p. 9/1).

During 1999-2000, four large and medium industries have been set up with an investment of Rs.10.54 crore and employment for 968 persons. Nine large and medium industries has been set up earlier namely – Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. unit at Sunabada, Rourkela Steel Plant at Rourkela, Indian Rare Earth Ltd at Chhatrapur, Carriage Repair Work Shop at Anugul, Fertilizer Corporation of India (FCI) Units at Talcher, Heavy Water Project at Talcher, National Aluminium Company units at Angul and Damanjodi and Paradeep Phosphate Ltd at Paradeep have been set up in the State in the Central Sector. These are the Units which were set up prior to 1990-91(Government of Odisha, Economic Survey, 2000-2001, p.9/3). As a result the contributions of manufacturing sector in NSDP have been going up over the years. The net value added by manufacture in the State at constant (1980-81) prices was Rs.358.14 crore in 1980-81 which went up to Rs.726.99 crore in 1997-98. The share of the manufacturing sector in the NSDP was 10.40% in 1980-81; 11.20% in 1990-91; 7.37% in 1993-94; 5.31% in 1997-98; 4.57% in 1998-99; 4.30% in 1999-2000 and 7.88% in 2002-03(Government of Odisha, Economic Survey, 2003-04, p.9/2).

For rapid industrialization in the State, emphasis was given and is being laid on infrastructure development. It has been realized that economic growth depends on infrastructural development. Adequacy of infrastructure in the transport and communication sector is crucial for attracting investment. The Industrial Policy, 1996 accorded special priority to infrastructural development so that more and more funds will be used for large investments in the industrial sector. Development of transportation infrastructure is also important for marketing of agricultural products and enabling the farmers to get a fair price.

It is very much important to improve the quality of life and economic conditions in rural areas in every village. To develop the agricultural condition, rural connectivity is necessary. Improvement of the rural economy is important and for that the State Government has accorded high priority to the development of rural connectivity. According to estimates available with the Planning Commission, about 40% of villages in Odisha have all weather connectivity as compared to 60% at the national level. During 2000-01, the state realized that funds are necessary for development of Rural Roads and Bridges. Rural connectivity has been given highest priority within the PradhanMantriGramodayaYojana and Rs.175.00 crore has been earmarked for the purpose. The State Highways, Major District Roads and other District Roads have been constructed and maintained by the Works Department of the Government of Odisha. It also maintains 2,752 km of National Highway and 30 km of Express Highway on behalf of the Government of India (Government of Orissa, Economic Survey, 2000-2001, p.12/2).

The Central Sponsored Scheme i.e. PradhanMantri Gram SadakYojona (PMGSY) has been implemented in the State. During 2000-01, Government of India sanctioned an amount of Rs.179.70 crore under this scheme for construction/ improvement of 574 roads (GOO, Economic Survey, 2003-04). The State Government proposed to implement various projects to improve the road communication between the State Capital and north-western Districts of the State. There is another project i.e. Bhubaneswar Integrated Road Net Work Project (BIRNWP) on Build Operate Transfer (BOT) basis with an estimated cost of Rs.170 crore has been implemented to remove congestion on NH 5 in the vicinity of Bhubaneswar(GOO, Economic Survey,1999-2000,12/3).

The contribution of the tertiary sector i.e. transport, communication, trade, storage etc. to the Net State Domestic Product of Odisha at Factor cost at 1993-94 prices was 17.97 (Economic Survey 2003-04). The contribution of the tertiary sector i.e. Transport, communication, trade, storage etc. to the Net State Domestic Product of Odisha at Factor Cost of 1993-94 prices was 17.97 (Government of Orissa,Economic Survey 2003-04).

The Gross State Domestic Product (GSDP) of India increased from Rs.18,612.73 crore in 1993-94 to Rs.23,417.98 crore in 1998-99 at 1993-94 prices, showing a compound annual growth rate of 4.70% over the period (Govt. of Orissa, Economic Survey, 1999-2000, p.1/4). The Net State Domestic Product (NSDP) commonly known as State Income increased from Rs.15, 861.30crore in 1993-94 to Rs.19, 329.31 crore (Quick estimate) in 1999-2000 at 1993-94 prices. The increase in NSDP in 1999-2000 over the corresponding figure for 1993-94 is mainly attributable to the increase in SDP of Tertiary Sector as well as Finance and Service/ Sector (Govt. of Orissa, Economic Survey, 2000-01, p.1/4).

The Gross State Domestic Product (GSDP) at constant prices (1993-94) of Odisha has increased from Rs.18,536.66crore in 1993-94 to Rs.25, 539.01 crore (Quick estimate) in 2002-03, registering an annual compound growth rate of 3.62 percent over the period. The Net State Domestic Product (NSDP) commonly known as State Income increased from Rs.16, 184.88crore in 1993-94 to Rs.21,861.91crore (Quick estimate) in 2002-03 at 1993-94 prices. During 1999-2000 the GSDP at constant (1999-2000) price of Orissa has increased from Rs.42, 909.62 crore to Rs. 73,542.26 crore (as per the advance estimate) in 2007-08 registering an annual compound growth rate of 6.97 per cent over the period. It has been found that the growth rates of the agriculture sector are not always the same followed by industry and then services. It is because of natural calamities such as cyclones, droughts and floods which Orissa faced frequently. As a result the agricultural sector wasbadly affected. During 2008-2009 the growth rate of agriculture has remained low whereas the industrial sector has shown a tremendous growth (GOO, Economic Survey, 2009-2010, p.14).

3. The Programmes

We have stated earlier that the decline in poverty ratio can be attributed also to the implementation of poverty alleviation programmes. Hence let us look at the programmes in this section. There are several programmes that were implemented and are being implemented like the Swarnajayanti Gram Swarojgar Yojana (SGSY), Sampurna Gramin Rojgar Yojana, Rehabilitation of Bonded Labourer's, Drought Prone Area Programme (DPAP), Swarna Jayanti Sahari Rojgar Yojana (SJSRY) several housing programmes etc. We will discuss some of these programmes of poverty alleviation.

3.1 Gram Swarojgar Yojana (SGSY): The scheme named 'Swarnajayanti Gram

Swarojgar Yojana' came into existence on 1st April, 1999. It is a centrally sponsored scheme and it is jointly funded by the Govt. of India and the State Government in the ratio of 75:25. There are various programmes which were in operation in the rural areas till the end of 1998-99, they were Integrated Rural Development Programme (IRDP), Development of Women and Children in Rural Area (DWCRA); Training of Rural Youth for Self Employment (TRYSE); Supply of Improved Toolkits to Rural Artisan's (SITRA), Ganga Kalyan Yojana (GKY) and Million Well Scheme (MWS) etc. These programmes it was realized were not sufficient to remove the poverty level in Odisha in a coherent manner. For this reason these programmes were merged into a single scheme called 'Swarnajayanti Gram Swarojgar Yojana'.

Its objective is to bring the assisted poor families (Swarozgaries) above the poverty line by ensuring appreciable sustained level of income over a period of time i.e. increasing the income level of families (Swarozgaries) above the poverty line (with income of Rs.2,000/- p.m. in three years by providing them income generating assets through a mix bank credit and Govt. subsidy (Govt. of India, Ministry of Rural Development and Economic Survey, 2008-09, Government of Odisha, p.8/4).

The Scheme helps the rural poor through the Self Help Groups (SHGs). It emphasizes skill development through well designed training courses. It also provides for marketing of the goods produced by the Swarnajayanti Gram Swarojgar Yojana Swarozgaries. It gives importance on the vulnerable groups among the rural poor. During the 2003-04, its target was to assist 54,348 Swarozgaries, but it has assisted 59,289 Swarozgaries. During 2006-07, 68,687 Swarozgaries have been assisted under Swarnajayanti Gram Swarojgar Yojana scheme against the target of 66,250 Swarozgaries in Odisha. During 2007-08, the target of SGSY programme was to assist 81,656 Swarozgaries but it has succeeded to assist 87,171 swarozgaries under the scheme which showing an achievement of 107 per cent (Government of Odisha, Economic Survey, 2007-08, p.8/4). The State Government has encouraged self-help groups (SHGs) and it has described it as an important tool for removal of poverty particularly for women living below the poverty line. The Swarnajayanti Gram Swarojgar Yojana mainly concentrates on those exploited groups in the rural areas who have been deprived. In the 2000-01 Economic Survey we find that the

Swarnajayanti Gram Swarozgar Yojana was to cover at least 50% beneficiaries who belong to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes etc.

In October, 1999 Odisha had faced a critical situation, a Super Cyclone had devastated the rural economy in 14 districts. The worst hit districts were Ganjam and Gajapati districts. In these 2 districts and also other coastal districts the economic condition of the people was terrible. To tackle this situation, a number of individual oriented schemes were implemented in these districts. For this reason the total expenditure during 2000-01 upto 04.11.2000 under Swarnajayanti Gram Swarozgar Yojana was Rs.6.84 crore (Govt. of India, Economic Survey, 2000-01). In the Gajapati district the percentage of women Swarozgaries was 67% and 5% in the Nawarangpur district.

3.2 Sampoorna Gramin Rojgar Yojana

Lack of employment is one of the main reasons for rural poverty. The Sampoorna Gramin Rojgar Yojana came into existence with effect from 25th September, 2001 for the reduction of unemployment in rural areas. The two wage employment generating schemes, namely JGSY (the Jawahar Gram Samiridhi Yojana) and EAS (Employment Assurance Scheme) have merged with Sampoorna Gramin Rojgar Yojana scheme which is a centrally sponsored scheme with funding pattern of 75:25 of the cash component between the Central and the State. The main aim of this programme is to provide additional wage employment in all rural areas and thereby provide food security and improve nutritional levels. There is another objective of this programme i.e. the creation of durable community, social and economic assets and infrastructural development in rural areas. Its programme strategy is 5% of the fund and food grains under the Sampoorna Gramin Rojgar Yojana will be kept in the Ministry for usage in the rural areas affected by Super Cyclone and flood affected.

During 2006-07, the Scheme was used in 11 (eleven) districts; Angul, Balasore, Baragarh, Bhadrak, Cuttack, Jagatsinghpur, Jajpur, Kendrapara, Khurda, Nayagarh and Puri. In 2006-07, the target of man day's employment was 183.60 lac but it created 183.61 lac man days employment. The expenditure in these circumstances was Rs.132.23 crore and it showed 100% achievement (Government of Odisha, Economic Survey, 2007-08, p. 8/5). During 2007-08, the scheme was used in 6 districts i.e. Cuttack, JagatSinghpur, Kendrapara, Khurda, Nayagarh and Puri. In 2007-08, the target of man day's employment was 88.27 lac but it created 74.17 lac man days employment. The total expenditure in this field was Rs.68.65 crore and it showed an achievement of 84%. When Odisha was in a bad condition, the programme helped the rural landless agricultural labourers through the supply of food grains (Government of Odisha, Economic Survey, 2008-09, p.8/6).

Though Sampoorna Gramin Rojgar Yojana programme emphasizes or lays stress on wage employment and food security to poor rural wage seekers, the Government however have given more emphasis on development of village infrastructure like market complexes, village roads

with drains and improvement of village water bodies under the title of 'Bazar', Sadak and Pani'(Government of Odisha,Economic Survey,2008-09,p8/6).

3.3. BijuGramin Bazar Yojana (BGBY)

BijuGramin Bazar Yojana has been launched during 2003-04. It creates self-employment through the development of village structure 3,378 shopping complexes have been constructed during 2003-04. During 2004-05, it has been planned to build 15,700 shopping complexes and 314 model tanks/ ponds.

3.4. GopabandhuGraminYojana (GGY)

GopabandhuGraminYojana is a new scheme, which hadbeen launched by the State Government during 2006-07. It provides additional development assistance to the targeted 11 (eleven) districts. They are – Angul, Balasore, JagatSinghpur, Kendrapara, Khurda, Nayagarh and Puri.

The Main objective of the scheme is to provide additional development funds. It also provides infrastructure facilities like, Bijli, Sadak and Pani to the targeted districts and every revenue village in the identified eleven districts. Government has allotted Rs.10.00 crore per annum for a period of 6 (six) years i.e. from 2006-07 to 2011-12. It has been increased from Rs.10.00 crore to Rs.15.00 crore per district effective from the year 2008-09. Panchayat Raj Department has played an important role for the purpose of administration of the GopabandhuGraminYojana.

Odisha Rural Housing Development Corporation has allotted an amount of Rs.646.59 crore in favour of 1,62,458 cases under different schemes. After 2006-07 no proposal has been sanctioned (Government of Orissa, Economic Survey, 2007-08, p. 8/14).

4. Housing

Like food, cloth, housing is one of the basic necessities for human survival. A house is very important for any normal citizen, because it gives economic security and dignity to a citizen in Society. There are some problems for some of the people who do not get any support to build houses. For this reason the Central Government announced a National Housing and Habitat Policy and its objective is to provide 'Housing for all' by the end of the Tenth Plan period. The scheme was meant for people in the rural and urban areas, people who live below poverty line.In the rural areas the Housing scheme is implemented by Panchayat Raj Development and in the urban areas the Housing schemes are implemented by Housing and Urban Development Department. Now let us turn to these programmes.

4.1 Rural Housing Programme

There are various programmes which are being implemented in the rural areas, like Indira AwasYojona Normal and Upgraded and PMGY etc.

Indira AwasYojana (Normal)

Indira AwasYojana Scheme was launched during 1985-86 as a sub-scheme of RLEGP, IAY and its sub-scheme was JawaharRojgarYojana (JRY). It is a centrally sponsored scheme funded on cost sharing basis between the Government of India and the State in the ratio of 75:25. The objective of the Indira AwasYojana is primarily to help construction/ up gradation of dwelling units of members of Scheduled Castes/ Scheduled Tribes, Freed bonded labourers, minorities in the below poverty line category and other below poverty line non SC/ ST rural house-holds by providing them a lump sum financial assistance. The beneficiaries under this scheme are selected by Gram Sabha/ PalliSabha and houses are constructed by the beneficiaries themselves. During 2003-04, the Target to build houses was 66,026 and the total fund in this field was Rs.135.25 crore, 58,996 houses have been constructed in the state by utilizing Rs.126.36 crore with an achievement of 89 per cent (Govt. of Orissa, Economic Survey. 2004-05, p.8-11). During 2007-08 about 90,627 houses were completed against the target of 1,11,431 houses with an expenditure of Rs.23,371.67 lakh. However the achievement under the IAY (Normal) was 81 Per cent.

Indira AwasYojana (IAY) (Up Gradation)

During 1999-2000, there are some steps which have been taken to improve the Rural Housing (RH) Programme. The objective of this scheme is to upgrade the kutchha houses to pucca one with fire proof roof. The unit cost of each unit is Rs.10,000/- only.

Additional Indira AwasYojana (out of 5% allocation for Natural Calamities)

As per this scheme, the Govt. of India has sanctioned 4923 numbers of additional Indira AwasYojana for Flood victims out of which 5% allocation is earmarked for Natural Calamities victims. By 2006-07, the number of houses completed was 4651 and the total expenditure in this area was Rs.930.51 lac (Government of Odisha, Economic Survey, 2007-08, p.8/13).

Additional Indira AwasYojana (for Cyclone, Flood victims)

In 1999 the Super Cyclone severely devastated most of the houses and it affected the people severely for this reason, the Govt. of India has allotted 6 lac additional Indira Awas house to Cyclone victims. For the Cyclone victims, Govt. of India has sanctioned Rs.165 crore to construct the one lac Indira Awas Houses in 24 districts which were affected by the flood in 2001. During 2006-07, the Indira AwasYojana Schemes have acquired a good result. It shared an achievement of 99.85% (Government of Odisha, Economic Survey, 2007-08, P8/13).

Mo KudiaYojana

The scheme 'Mo Kudia' has been introduced on 1st April, 2008. Its aim is to provide dwelling houses to the needy rural poor those who are living below the poverty line. It shall also improve the resources under Indira AwasYojana and increase the availability of housing for the rural poor. As per newspaper reports the achievement under the State sponsored Mo Kudia Scheme in the year 2010-11 is comparatively better than the 2009-10. During the 2009-10 only 223 houses were completed against the target of 28,355 whereas about 4280 houses were completed during 2010-11 against the target of 40,677 with utilization of Rs. 12 crore(Express News Service,July 2010)

5. National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme

NREGS came into existence in 2005. Its aim was provide for livelihood security in rural areas. The programme came into operation in 19 districts of the state during 2006. The states are Gajapati, Ganjam, Jharsuguda, Kalahandi, Kandhamal, Kendujhar, Koraput, Malkangiri, Mayurbhanj, Nabarangpur, Nuapada, Rayagada, Sambalpur, Sonepur and Sundargarh etc. since 1st April 2007, in 5 districts namely Angul, Baleswar, Bargarh, Bhadrak and Jajpur the NREGA programme is in operation and since 1st April, 2008 the programme was implemented in the remaining 6 districts namely Cuttack, Jagatsinghpur, Kendrapara, Khurda, Nayagarh and Puri etc (Ray,2010,pp.199). Its main aim is to provide employment opportunities to the rural households by guaranteeing at least 100 days of wage employment in a year. It is used for the upliftment of the poor people from the hunger and distress (GOO, Economic Survey 2007-08 pp. 8/7). Its other objectives are to provide or generate productive assets, protect the environment, empower the rural women, reduce the rural urban migration and foster social equity (AICTE, 2009, pp.2). The NREGA provides the necessary safety-net for job seeking rural poor. The main features of NREGA are:

- 100 days unskilled wage employment to a rural family in a financial year
- Equal wage for men and women
- Ban on contractors and labour displaying machines
- Participatory planning and identification of works through panchayat
- Payment of wage on weekly basis but not later than 15 days
- If it fails to provide work to job seeker within 15 days of application unemployment allowance will be provided to the job seeker
- Social audit by Panchayat/ Gram Sabha
- The participation of Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) in planning and execution of NREGS works
- Registration and providing the Job Card in Gram Panchayat (GOO, Economic Survey, 2008-09, pp.8/8)

The Gram Panchayats therefore play a pivotal role for the implementation and execution of this programme. Since 2009 NREGA which was later renamed as MGNREGA like the other wage employment programme it has generated employment for the poor rural households but only for about 35 to 40 days of wage employment during 2007-10. However it is found that during 2006-07 the performance of MGNREGA in 19 districts was comparatively better. During this period the average days of employment that had been provided to the poor wage seeking households was 35 to 40 days which was lesser than the previous years. It is also found that out of the total registered households about 90 per cent have been issued job cards. During 2007-08 in 24 districts 48.95 lakh households have come under the programme out of which 42.69 lakh job cards were issued (Meher, Padhi, 2010, p. 85).

When the programme was implemented in 19 districts of Orissa in 2006-07, it is seen that about 14.07 lakh (54.26 per cent) households had demanded employment under the MGNREGA and interestingly more than 99 per cent of them were provided wage employment under the programme. But during 2009-10 the picture was different. In these years in 30 districts only 14.13 lakh households had demanded employment under the programme and 99 per cent of them could be given employment for about 40 days during the year. So it can be said that though there is poverty and lack of employment opportunity the programme has failed to attract the wage seeking households in large numbers in recent years (Meher, Padhi, 2010, p.86). During 2008-09 Ganjam district (59.94 days) recorded highest average days of employment generated per household and the lowest was in Puri district (10.92 days).

Though MGNREGA has been implemented to reduce the acute poverty of the poor in the rural areas by providing minimum 100 days of wage employment to every wage seeker but it has failed to provide the desired outcome. There are several reasons for the failure of this programme till the year 2010. It has been found that:

- i) Projects at the village /GP level are not planned properly
- ii) Though the job cards are issued to every wage worker family to generate at least 100 days of wage employment but the problem relates to the design of the job cards, their distribution and maintenance. The job cards should be reader friendly and maintained properly (AICTE, 2009, PP. 3).
- iii) Many poor people do not want to work under MNREGA programme because of unusual delay in payment of wage
- iv) Lack of adequate administrative and technical manpower at the block and GP levels. For this reason it has hampered the preparation of plans, scrutiny approval monitoring, and measurement of works and maintenance of stipulated records at the block and GP level.
- v) Many people are not aware about their entitlements under NREGA such as work on demand, unemployment allowance, worksite facilities, and minimum wages

and so on. So it is necessary to make them aware about their entitlements under NREGA otherwise the demand-driven nature of NREGA will be weakened.

6. Assessment of Poverty Alleviation Programmes in Odisha

Kishore C Samal in one of his article is of the opinion that development is not enough to reduce Chronic Poverty and hunger in Odisha. There are various rural development programmes which are in operation in Odisha like IRDP, JRY, IAY, MWS, EAS, GKY, DWCRA, TRYSEM, DPAP, DDP, RWSS, NSAP but the poor have not got any fruitful result of these programmes. There are flaws in the implementation of these programmes. Most of these programmes have failed to reach the correct beneficiaries. There is another reason for the bad implementation of these programmes and these are; the leakages of benefits and inflation of mandays of employment generated. To him there is one more reason which is responsible for this-the absence of structural change in society. In Odisha the KBK districts is considered as a mostly backward and poverty stricken areas. To remove poverty in this region the State Government has launched Revised Long Term Action Plan during 1998-99 in consultation with the Govt. of India. Since this is an important programme hence let us discuss the RLTAAP programme in Odisha in brief.

The Revised Long Term Action Plan was launched by the state government in consultation with the Govt. of India in 1998-1999 for the speedy development of the KBK districts. The undivided districts of Koraput, Bolangir, Kalahandi(KBK) is considered as one of the most backward areas in Odisha. They suffer from multi-faceted backwardness. So the RLTAAP has been adopted since 1998-99 to remove disparities in these districts. It has eleven components which are agriculture, horticulture, watershed Development, Afforestation, Rural Employment, Irrigation, Health, and Emergency Feeding, Drinking water supply, Rural Connectivity and welfare of the ST/SC etc. The objective of this RLTAAP is several like droughts proofing, speeding up the socio-economic development of this region, poverty alleviation and improved quality of life. RLTAAP envisaged a total outlay of Rs.6251.06 crore over a period of 9 years from 1998-99 to 2006-07. The funds were to be utilized for the development of all these components. In spite of this the percentage of families living below the poverty line still remains the same. Not only that, it has shown an increasing trend.

The Special Area Development Programme i.e. RLTAAP has been implemented in all the eight districts of undivided KBK districts. The eight districts are Kalahandi, Nuapada, Bolangir, Sonepur, Koraput, Malkangiri, Nawarangpur and Rayagada etc. These districts are the most underdeveloped and the most backward districts with perpetual poverty. There are some indicators of these districts for that reason KBK region is regarded as the most backward and under-developed districts. The indicators are low level of literacy rate and female literacy rate, high morbidity on account of under nutrition, endemic malaria and other local diseases, scarcity of food, starvation deaths, lack of awareness about the use of family planning methods etc.

About 82.60 percent of families live below the poverty line in KBK districts as per the 1992 census, which was conducted by Panchayati Raj Department, Government of Orissa. For the development of KBK districts different departments of the state Government are implementing several developmental and welfare oriented programmes/schemes. These are watershed Development Project, Rural Electrification, infrastructure, health, rural development, tribal development etc. Its fund is to be shared between the central government and the state government in the ratio of 86.6% and 13.4%. The programme has different activities like dairy and backyard poultry. The objective of this programme is to increase the income source of rural households so that they can improve the quality of life of the people. The state government has been allocated 1008.84 lakhs during the financial years 2002-03, 2003-04, 2004-05 and 2005-06 for utilization under different activities in the KBK region under the plan.

The Kalinga Centre for Social Development of KIIT conducted a study and found (nd) that the scheme was implemented in all districts of the KBK region in a top-down and target oriented manner. The beneficiaries of these programmes are those people who have cows and buffaloes. For their treatment they need Veterinary Dispensaries/ Livestock Aid Centres. But lack of infrastructure facilities did not provide health care services to the livestock owners. The organization found that there are a number of VDS/ LACs that are functioning in rented houses in KBK districts but the buildings are not well structured. And they are not suitable for treatment centre. It was observed that among the districts Nawarangpur district spent the highest percentage of its funds for the construction of LACs. The least amount has been utilized in Bolangirdistrict.

Veterinary health camps have been organized in different health, deworming, heat induction camps in KBK districts under RLTAAP programme. The main aim of these camps is to provide facilities to the beneficiaries for health check-up, investigation, treatment, deworming and supply medicines for infertility of the animals at their localities. The allocation of funds for these camps was 100%. Though there are some disparities in the districtwise allocation of funds. In this field Koraput have got the highest amount of allocation while the Nawarangpurdistrict have got the least amount of financial allocation.

These camps helped the beneficiaries a lot even though the percentage of attendance of the beneficiaries in different camps was not equal. But most of the beneficiaries were in favour of frequent organization of camps. For the continuation of these camps they conducted training programmes for SHG members and unemployed youth as PashupalanSahayak so that the beneficiaries can get the opportunity about animal health check-up investigation, type of disease of the animals, vaccination, animal feed for enhancement of milk production etc. But the percentage of attendance of the beneficiaries in the training camps was very poor because of lack of communication and awareness of the beneficiaries. In most of the districts like Rayagada, Nawarangpur, Malkangiri, Subarnapur and Kalahandi they do not take part in any training camps. From the animal sources milk is used for the purpose of trade. OMFED i.e. Odisha State

Co-Operative Milk Producers Federation have worked in this field. They used it in the domestic markets as branded, packed liquid milk as well as milk products.

The RLTAAP programme has given more importance on institutional development in KBK districts. Ninety two VDS and of LACs have been constructed during the year 2002-06 for the expansion of the animal husbandry of farmers. The department of animal husbandry has been shifted from animal health care services for the prevention and control of animal diseases.

The study by the Kalinga Centre for Social Development also found that there are some problems of implementing agency and service provider. They focused on the guidelines, allocation of funds, utilization of funds etc. They have found that lack of clear guidelines is one of the problems in this programme. Most of the beneficiaries are deprived from the benefits from of the scheme due to inadequate resources. The expenditure for the construction of LAC building is quite low in all the districts. In the camps the supply of medicine is very limited. Though there are various problems in the implementation of the scheme of RLTAAP but it has been reported by most of the beneficiaries that the programme RLTAAP is satisfactory. The KIIT have given some suggestions in the implementation of RLTAAP programme on the basis of some relevant primary and secondary data. They have given more reliance on the development of dairy and poultry in the KBK districts. The following suggestions were made:

- i) Release of funds need to be at regular interval
- ii) Adequate modern instruments and medicines should be provided for different diseases
- iii) Adequate number of vehicle should be provided at the field level for morbidity in remote areas
- iv) More and more number of new Milk Producers Cooperative Societies needs to be formed in the remote areas and the existing one needs to be expanded in order to increase the market accessibility as well as collection of milk
- v) A good number of staff is to be provided for better delivery of services at the doorstep of the farmers

The New Indian Express in 2008 however noted that the Revised Long Term Action Plan for the eight KBK districts has failed(The New Indian Express, Nov, 2008). Though the state government has tried to improve the socio-economic condition of the rural poor through the Revised Long Term Action Plan but a quarter of the beneficiaries it is a complete failure. There are no noticeable changes seen in the KBK region. The programme has failed in the KBK region due to corruption and maladministration which was shown in drought-proofing works. The watershed project was not fully implemented. There are some records which show that implementing agencies have failed to provide one time meal ranging from 28 days (Nawarangpur district) to 186 days (Kalahandi district) per annum. The quality and quantity of

food was very bad and almost 38 percent beneficiaries were not satisfied with them. There are some villagers in this region who have migrated from one place to another due to lack of employment opportunities (Patro, Nov, 2008).

It is from The Indian Express dated Feb 21, 2004 we come to learn that there is low utilization of RLTA Funds in the KBK region. It is reported that out of a total allocation of Rs.377 crores only 111 crores has been spend by the state government of Orissa which is less than one third allocation for the financial year 2003-04(Dash, Social Change, June 2007, Vol. 37 No.2).

Health and medical facilities in the KBK districts is very poor. There are many medical and health posts that had remained vacant. So it can be said that shortage of doctors remains a major problem in the region. The KBK districts are malaria prone. State Government is trying their best to wipe out this disease and also diarrhea or water borne disease. Two more health related problems are seen in the KBK districts i.e. malnourishment and anemia (Social Change, June 2007, p. 90).

Kalahandi district is one of the poverty stricken districts. Cholera often spreads in this district. Hunger still remains a major concern in this district. A newspaper report reveals that many of the tribal people in Kalahandi district do not have food all through the year and are compelled to eat poisonous mango kernel in order to meet hunger. In this district the monthly per capita expenditure for the Scheduled Tribes has declined in the state whereas the monthly per capita expenditure of scheduled castes has increased. As a result it is found that the deprived have become more deprived in Orissa (Express News Service, 15th July 2010). Government has failed to provide adequate potable drinking water facilities, lack of medical facilities and communication network in the remote areas. The people of this region especially various tribal communities suffer from high morbidity due to under nutrition (Frontline, Jan, 12, 2007, p.44). These starvation deaths shook the conscience of the nation. It still remains a serious concern in the KBK districts. Crores of rupees are spent on poverty alleviation and development schemes but poverty have not disappeared from this area/region (The New Indian Express, 16th May, 2012). The newspaper reported that it is well known to all where the money disappeared. Lot of money was spent on development but the schemes are not implemented due to corrupt politicians, officials and contractors. As a result the region becomes poorer than it was in 1980. The developmental and welfare schemes cannot improve the condition of the poor people in this region and change the situation which they face in everyday life (The New Indian Express, 11th Sep, 2009). Not only that, the communication system is a major constraint. For that reason the people of this region cannot have access to markets, health care and educational opportunities or institutions (Frontline, 12th January 2007, p.45).

Though the Government has implemented so many development policies but the policies alone is not enough. It needs proper and appropriate follow-up action/execution. It is also to be pointed out that lack of awareness among the people in the KBK region about the government schemes or programmes is another reason for the backwardness of this region. This can be eradicated by

increasing the levels of 'functional literacy' and educational opportunities (Social Change, June 2007, p.92). So it can be said that the Government has tried to perform well for the upliftment and development of the people in the KBK districts specially the disadvantaged groups (Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes) but for some reason the development of the people in the KBK districts still remains a dream. The reasons are lack of dedication, sincerity, integrity, on the part of the officials and official/staff absenteeism etc. (Social Change, June 2007, p.89).

From the above discussion it can be said that the State Government has tried to reduce poverty through a number of poverty alleviation measures in collaboration with the Government of India and its own. Though it can never be denied that poverty has declined in the state inspite of these we find till now poverty remains a serious issue in the state especially in the underdeveloped region. Government has implemented so many programmes but whether it reaches the grassroots level or not government should look after this matter. Many people in the backward region are unaware about the Government programmes. So awareness campaign in rural areas is must. And the Government must look after the proper execution and implementation of these programmes so that the poor people can get all facilities which are mostly essential and the Government programmes must reach every nook and corner of the state.

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State, Religion and Civil-Military relations in Pakistan: A Historical Outlook

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Abstract

This paper attempts to analyze the civil-military relations in Pakistan through a historical narration. The typical structure of the Pakistani state gives the military and the bureaucracy dominance over its polity and society since its birth. An attempt has been made to explain the civil-military relations during the democratic period and military regimes separately. The Pakistani military is viewed as important for the security and survival of Pakistan. Long years in power enabled the military to influence civilian institutions of the state and society and established presence in all sectors of the society.

Key Words: Civil-military Problematique, Overdeveloped State, Military-Bureaucratic Oligarchy, Islamization

1. Introduction

The study of civil-military relations is imperative for understanding the nature and dynamics of politics in post-colonial states in Asia, Latin America, and Africa in general and Pakistan in particular. After the end of the Second World War many states got independence from the colonial masters. Many newly independent states were politically unstable and fell in the hands of military dictators, one party rules and autocratic regimes. In twentieth century armed forces became the integral and inevitable part of nation's political system and it no longer remains aloof from politics in any nation (Kukreja, 1991:18). In post-colonial states, military became pre-occupied with domestic political stability rather than external insecurity.

In post-colonial societies military either assumed political power or exerted significant influence in collaboration with political elite and bureaucracy. In many post-colonial Asian states, there have been successful military regimes in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, South Korea, South Vietnam, Thailand and Turkey. The case of post-colonial African states is not different but similar. There were successful military takeovers in Algeria, Burundi,

Central African Republic, Chad, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Libya, Nigeria, Sudan, Togo, Uganda and Upper Volta. The military intervention in Latin America became one of perennial issues and made lasting imprint on the state and society. Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay and Peru are amongst Latin American countries affected by military coups. In Europe, Greece and Portugal have undergone military coups (Rizvi, 2000:15-16). The role of military in politics in post-colonial societies is a unique feature in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The special position of military often coupled with bureaucracy has become too common phenomenon in post-colonial societies.

The post-colonial states had weak democratic traditions and limited experience of running democratic institution. They inherited the administrative structures developed by their colonial masters. The priority for the colonial state was to build up the military and bureaucracy for the maintenance of law and order in the colony rather than developing representative political institutions. In this process the military and bureaucracy naturally occupied dominance. The elite sections of the society were inculcated into the military and bureaucracy. This led to the formation of mutual interest among military, bureaucracy and elite sections of society to continue the colonial structure in the post-colonial era. Mathew Joseph C says that,

The Pakistan state is a fine example of a typical Third World/post-colonial state. Colonialism has not allowed any particular social class to develop independently and stake claim on the institution of the state at the end of the decolonization process....The inability of the social classes to stake a claim independently on the state resulted in the domination of the bureaucratic –military oligarchy in Pakistan (Joseph C, 2007:81).

In Pakistan, military is the most powerful institution which is capable of influencing major policy decisions and to hold the country together in crisis situations. Pakistan underwent four military coups in 1958, 1969, 1977 and 1999. Military generals attempted coups by invoking ‘national interest’ as the primary reason for military takes over. A major section of Pakistani people also believes that military is the only capable institution that can give stability to the country. Civilian institutions are very weak and are not capable to assert its control over the military.

Pakistani society is facing two grave dilemmas when it comes to civil-military relations. Civilian authority wants to exert effective control over the military to avoid coups and to ensure the strengthening of democratic institutions. **If the military is**

weakened in order to ensure that it will not turn on society itself, it may face defeat on the battlefield. Especially Pakistan considers India as the foremost threat to territorial integrity and invoking security threat from India to consolidate military power in Pakistan. The dilemma Pakistan society is facing how to minimize the power of the military and thus make civilian control more certain without sacrificing protection against external enemies (Owens, 2010:271).

This paper will try to examine the ‘Civil-Military problematique’ (Ibid: 263), in Pakistani society. During crisis situation Pakistani military increasingly getting involved to stabilize the situation as it is the last resort that people can trust. In Pakistan, military is already well established and will again try to protect their vested interest. It is famously said about Pakistan that, “Every state is having an army, but in Pakistan, army is having a state”. This paper contains two parts. The first part is divided into six sub-parts according to the chronological order and included, the theoretical aspects of civil-Military relations, Pakistani state structure and colonial legacy, civil-military relations under democracy and military regimes. Conclusion forms the final part.

2. Military and State: A Historical Development of Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan

2.1 Civil-Military Problematique

Civil-military relations broadly refer to the interaction between armed forces of a state and the society. The basis for the study of civil-military relations is a fundamental dilemma for all states called “civil-military problematique”. The states must create a strong army to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity from external security threats as well as ensure that this same military establishment will not turn against the state itself. The theories of civil-military relations are arising out of this fundamental dilemma, how to overcome this? What are the effective means to ensure civilian control over military establishment? What is the appropriate role of military in a society? What degree of military influence is appropriate for a given society? (Owens, 2010:264).

Three parties are involved in ‘civil-military problematique’: the citizens, the civilian governmental authorities and the uniformed military. They bargain each other to get

its due share in the given polity. In liberal democracies the bargaining is more or less balanced due to the apparently equal representation given to three parties. But in reality in liberal democracies the bargain is an outcome of an ‘unequal dialogue’. However in liberal democracies civilian supremacy over the military establishment is unquestioned (Ibid.). Unlike democratic states, in authoritarian states, the role of the people is minimal and the bargaining is highly tilted towards the military. National stability is one of the major goals of the political systems of authoritarian states.

2.2 Colonial Legacy and the Structure of Pakistani State

The Pakistan’s ‘overdeveloped’ administrative and military institutions can link to the colonial practices of emphasizing the requirements of law and order rather than popular representation (Talbot, 1999:54). This tradition of ‘Viceregalism’ that was prevalent in the North West India and British approach towards the region as a security state further adds to the conservative pro military nature of the Pakistani society (Ibid: 55). Ian Talbot says, “In sum, in much of what was to become Pakistan, a tradition of bureaucratic authoritarianism or Viceregalism was deeply rooted. Its hallmarks were paternalism, wide discretionary powers and the personalization of authority.” The special relationship existed between the peasantry and the army in the rural Punjab holds the key to military dominance in independent Pakistan (Ibid: 64). The post-colonial Pakistan state has maintained the main features of the British administration in North West India.

The typical structure of the Pakistani state gives the military and the bureaucracy dominance over its polity and society since its birth. The military and bureaucratic dominance in Pakistan is explained differently by scholars. “There are three narratives on Pakistani state” (Joseph C, 2009:55). The Pakistani state as a ‘migrant state’ forms the first one and advanced by Boris Wilke, Mohammad Waseem and Christophe Jaffrelot. According to these scholars the initial phase of Pakistani state was dominated by the *Muhajirs*.¹ Due to their numerical inferiority the *Muhajir* dominated state elite preferred a vice-regal form of political structure over a democratic one. Due to their higher education standard, *Muhajirs* dominated the civil bureaucracy and on the other hand, the Punjabis and Pakhtuns monopolized the military in Pakistan

¹ Muhajirs are the Urdu speaking Muslims who migrated to Pakistan from the Muslim minority provinces which became part of India during the time of Partition of the Indian Subcontinent.

(Ibid:56-57). Boris Wilke observes that, “As a class of traders, industrialists and civil servants, the *Muhajirs* needed a functioning state apparatus which was able to maintain the monopoly of the legitimate use of violence and give some degree of predictability to social and economic life” (Ibid:56).

In the partition exigencies and war with India over Kashmir, the political leaders and bureaucracy highly leaned towards the military to settle the question of national stability and territorial integrity. The co-optation of Punjabis and Pakhtuns into the migrant state, transformed the power structure. The *Muhajir* dominated bureaucracy was marginalized by the Punjabi dominated military (Ibid:57). The initial dominance of Punjabi and Pakhtun dominated military continued in the Pakistani politics and society.

The second narrative forwarded by Pakistani Marxist scholar Hamza Alavi and supported by Hassan N. Gardezi and Feroz Ahmad. According to this narrative Pakistani state is an ‘overdeveloped state.’ The colonial masters created highly efficient bureaucracy and military system for the administration and exploitation of the colony. Colonizers prevented the growth of indigenous bourgeoisie and used the bureaucracy and military to suppress the anti-colonial struggles (Joseph C, 2007:73). At the time of independence the colonies had three propertied exploiting classes, the indigenous bourgeoisie, the metropolitan neocolonialist bourgeoisies, and the landed classes. Alavi observes that,

A weak and underdeveloped indigenous bourgeoisie is unable at the moment of independence to subordinate the relatively highly developed colonial state apparatus through which the metropolitan power had exercised dominion over it. However a new convergence of interests of the three propertied classes, under metropolitan patronage, allows a bureaucratic-military oligarchy to mediate their competing but no longer contradictory interests and demands. By that token it acquires relatively autonomous role and is not simply the instrument of any one of the three classes. Such relatively autonomous role of the state apparatus is of special importance to the neocolonialist bourgeoisies because it is by virtue of this fact that they are able to pursue their class interests in the post-colonial societies (Alavi, 1973:145).

The inability of any particular social class to control the state resulted in the domination of the bureaucratic-military oligarchy in Pakistan. This highly developed system of bureaucratic-military oligarchy was the by product of colonialism, and the neocolonial metropolitan bourgeoisie control the state by using the same system.

The third narrative on Pakistani state tends to view it as a classic example of a Bonapartist state.² The Bonapartist state functions “as independent from, and superior to, all social classes, as being the dominant force in society rather than the instrument of the dominant class” (Ibid:146). The state in Pakistan is a good example of Bonapartist state where no social class is capable enough to assert itself and control the state. The state “assumes the character of an umpire or mediator between the conflicting class interests of various social classes” (Joseph C, 2007:73).

2.3 Ascendency of Military-Bureaucratic Oligarchy and Destruction of Democracy

Due to the exigencies of its formation, military in consonance with the bureaucracy assumed important role in Pakistani politics and society. The Pakistani state came into being through extremely difficult conditions and faced serious domestic and external pressures. Ayesha Jalal observes that,

While India inherited the colonial state’s unitary central apparatus without seriously rupturing its links with the lower rungs of the administration, Pakistan had to construct an entirely new central government before it could begin coordinating the affairs of the provincial, district and local levels of society (Jalal, 1995:18).

The imperative of state security and a strong state apparatus were given importance over the need to create participatory political institutions. The military was the major benefactor in this situation because it provided an organized system to solve the internal and external security problems. The senior military officers became powerful actors in the decision making process and a key determinant of national priorities in consensus with senior bureaucracy (Rizvi, 2000:1-2). It gave military an opportunity to exert effective control on the state machinery and sidelining the civilian institutions. The opportunistic alliance between military and bureaucracy stalled the constitution making process and tried to hold on power without seeking a mandate from the people. Stephen P Cohen observes that, “The Pakistan Army is a hostage to its origins” (Cohen, 1983:1). Rizvi also observes that,

The military was integral to state-building from the beginning and it was viewed as central to state survival. This strengthened the position of the military in the polity and its senior commanders began to perceive themselves as the guarantors of state survival, a self-image that

² Marx devised the concept of Bonapartist state to describe the state established by Louis Bonaparte in France after the coup in 1851. He had taken control of the French state not as the representative of the bourgeoisie; on the contrary, he acted against its immediate interests. In the process, the state presided by him acquired considerable political autonomy.

was reinforced over time as the civilian governments, overwhelmed by the problems of governance, increasingly sought the military's support for administering the state (Rizvi, 2000:6).

National stability is the primary objective of Pakistani rulers and military which override their commitment towards the establishment of representative institutions and political processes. Since independence, political elite in Pakistan found it difficult to evolve a broad based consensus on the fundamental features of the political system. The federalism and autonomy of provinces, the Islamic state, the national language, and the electoral system and several other constitutional issues delayed the drafting of effective constitution (Rizvi, 1989:55). This gave the basis for the role of military in Pakistan in collaboration with senior bureaucracy. State survival became the primary objective of Pakistani rulers and military, which tried to create strong and assertive federal government, high defense expenditure, and emphasis on monolithic nationalism which alienated other regions (Rizvi, 2000:1).

The death of Mohammad Ali Jinnah in 1948, barely thirteen months after the creation of Pakistan, the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan in 1951 created leadership vacuum. The absence of mass based political parties aggravated the situation. The Muslim League, which served as the vanguard of the freedom struggle, utterly failed to transform itself from a nationalist movement into a national party. Due to political fragmentation and absence of democratic process, the bureaucratic-military oligarchy successfully gained control over the state machinery. On the other hand the bureaucratic-military oligarchy increased control over state machinery due to fear of losing the already gained supremacy, by hampering the political parties and politicians, to deter potential challenges from the political class. Jalal observes that,

It was the interplay of domestic, regional and international factors during the last forties and fifties – particular, the links forged with the USA – that served to erode the position of parties and politicians within the evolving structure of the Pakistani state by tipping the institutional balance towards the civil-bureaucracy and the military (Jalal, 1995:54).

In the post Jinnah-Liaquat period, the appointment of Ghulam Muhammad, a former bureaucrat belonging to Indian Audit and Accounts Service, as the Governor General in October 1951, who was succeeded by another bureaucrat-cum-military man, Iskander Mirza, in August 1955, set the stage for the ascendancy of the bureaucracy-military oligarchy in Pakistan (Rizvi, 2000a:5). General Ayub Khan was appointed as the defense minister by Ghulam Muhammad in 1954 and offered to take over the administration of the country and he refused (Rizvi, 2000:71). This bureaucratic-

military alliance engaged in making alliance with feudal, industrial and commercial elite to derail the democratic process, and manipulated the rivalries among political leaders. In 1954, the then Governor General dissolved the first constituent assembly and dismissed the government and this act was legitimized by the Federal court blocked the fate of democracy in Pakistan (Rizvi, 2000:5). Alavi observes that “In the first phase politicians and political parties, who provided a facade of parliamentary government, were manipulated by them and were installed and expelled from office as it suited the bureaucratic-military oligarchy” (Alavi, 1973:150).

After the inauguration of the constitution in 1956, to the suspension of it by general Ayub Khan in 1958, Pakistan had four Prime Ministers. The bureaucratic-military oligarchy changed governments at their will and installed unpopular individuals in the office. The military and the bureaucracy were almost controlling the entire affairs of the state and the political class was marginalized. Due to the fear of losing the gained supremacy after the elections in the affairs of the state, the bureaucratic-military oligarchy decided to take the direct control over the state apparatus. The facade of parliamentary democracy ended in Pakistan in October 1958. Until 1962 the regime governed under martial law with Ayub as commander-in-chief, chief martial law administrator and president of Pakistan at the same time (Jalal, 1995:55). Ayub followed the British colonial policy of co-optation and collaboration of the Punjabi federal bureaucracy and army and turned towards local propertied classes in provinces, by extending state patronage in return for their tacit support for military rule (Ibid:56).

For the legitimization of military dictatorship, “Ayub Khan resorted to planned disengagement and a careful transition to civilianize his military rule” (Rizvi, 2000:10). In 1962 Ayub formally withdrew martial law, allowed certain parties to function in restricted domain of his new political order. Alavi says that, “the bureaucratic-military oligarchy needed politicians, who fulfill a complementary role, and by 1962 the politicians were put to work again in a parody of democratic politics under Ayub Khan’s system of ‘Basic Democracy’.” (Alavi, 1973:153). The political and constitutional arrangements of Ayub Khan reflected the army’s organizational ethos of hierarchy, order, discipline and neglected democratic and participatory considerations (Rizvi, 2000:9). He tried to legitimize military rule through the introduction of Basic Democracy system and civilianization of the military rule by co-

option of the political elite. The careful construction of political system through constitutional and political engineering, exclusion of dissenting voices, holding of non-contested referendums, local bodies election, and non-party elections at the provisional and national level, Ayub continues to rule as a civilian president (Ibid:10).

The socio-economic changes brought by Ayub in Pakistan were even more destructive. During Ayub, the military was able to extend its influence to other sectors of the society. His policies gave senior military and civilian officials privileged access to agricultural land, urban property, business and industrial licenses and top posts in public corporations. It created another intermediate class who is dependent on the state apparatus (Jalal, 1995:58). In the mid 1960s, the Ayub regime policies of inequality increasingly came under attack from the political parties. In May 1967, four political parties – the East Pakistani based Awami League, the Council Muslim League, the Jamat-i-Islami and the Nizam-i-Islam – formed the Pakistan democratic movement and demanded reintroduction of parliamentary system, direct elections, and federal structure with devolution of powers to the provinces (Ibid:60). The agitation led by Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and Awami League continued until Ayub's resignation and handing over the power to General Yahya Khan in March 1969.

General Yahya Khan displaced Ayub and declared martial law in the wake of political crisis in 1969. He promised to conduct free and fair elections and restore the powers to elected representatives. The military and the bureaucracy in Pakistan had no intention in transferring power to political class, especially to the demand of Awami League for more provincial autonomy. He abandoned the One Unit scheme and conducted the Pakistan's first national election based on universal suffrage in December 1970. In the aftermath of the elections, Awami League led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the Bangla Bandho (Brother of Bengal) emerged the largest party in East Pakistan, and in West Pakistan, the PPP led by Bhutto, the Quaid-i-Awam (Leader of the Masses) emerged victorious (Talbot, 1999:185). The military and the bureaucracy were resisting to accept the peoples democratic verdict and delayed the transfer of power to elected representatives and led the country to bloody civil war that culminated in to the break up of Pakistan (Rizvi 2000a:9).

In this first phase of military-bureaucratic ascendancy and the sidelining of political class that subsequently led to the destruction of democracy in Pakistan. The absence of effective political class and parties to dominate the affairs of the state were occupied by the military and bureaucracy. General Ayub Khan changed the state and societal system that manages to retain the dominance of non-elected institutions that constantly make hindrance to the emergence of effective political class in Pakistan. The military-bureaucratic system that enjoyed the fruits of power was not ready to devolve it in the wake of elections. That led to the destruction of Pakistan's territorial unity and underlined some basic fallacies of military rule.

3. Glimpse of Democracy and Islamization of the Polity

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto emerged as Pakistan's president on 20th December 1971, replacing General Yahya Khan. After the military debacle in East Pakistan, the military had no option but transfer power to elected representatives of West Pakistan. The Pakistan military increasingly came under attack for the failure in East Pakistan and its reputation lowered into the lowest ranks since independence. The strong political base was the major source of strength for the new PPP government. Unlike Ayub Khan's military take over, the Supreme Court of Pakistan declared that the Yahya Khan's assumption of power on 25th March 1969 was illegal and unconstitutional (Rizvi, 2000:209). It was a historic moment conducive to assert the civilian supremacy over military and bureaucracy.

Bhutto had tried to curb the power of the military and the bureaucracy. He instituted number of measures to reduce the long term influence of both the unelected institutions. He restructured the military high command and reduced the tenure of chief of staff to three years. He created a Federal Security Force (FSF) in October 1972 to assist police in the maintenance of internal law and order. The 1973 constitution contained a number of clauses to discourage any future military intervention. The third schedule included an oath which serving members of the military were to take forswearing any political activities. Article 245 defined high treason for any attempt to subvert the constitution 'by the use of force or show of force or by other unconstitutional means' (Talbot, 1999:223). But the radical change to the civil-military configuration of power in Pakistan was never happened rather Bhutto relied more on army and civil service to run the state and keep the law and

order. To quell the riots over the Urdu-Sindhi controversy in 1972, Bhutto used the military. Again to suppress the Baluchi insurgency over the suspension of provincial governments of Baluchistan and North West Frontier Province (NWFP) in 1973, he called on Army. It gave the military a new opportunity to assert its influence on the state (Malik, 2008:166).

The Pakistani state and the defense establishments concern over security and the territorial integrity was more or less similar to the earlier period. Given the post-1971 security concerns, Pakistani state was bound to maintain a strong and efficient military. Pakistan's defense expenditure rose by over 200 percent during the Bhutto era. With the huge money spending on the military modernization and the use of Army in Baluchistan from 1973-77 to deal with the tribal insurrection returned the Army to a political role (Talbot, 1999:224). The use of military in Baluchistan to quell the uprising eroded Bhutto's power vis-à-vis military. Once again, like his predecessors, Bhutto and his PPP failed to make the transition from a popular movement to a modern party of government. The weak institutionalization of PPP was a crucial factor in the regime's inability to provide a counterweight to military and bureaucracy. The absence of viable independent democratic institutions and parties resulted in the re-emergence of military and bureaucracy with the support of Bhutto's opposition coalition (Ibid:244).

In the chaotic situation that undergone after the elections, the PPP was accused of rigging the elections by the nine party coalition, Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) formally launched in January 1977. The protest against the malpractices in the elections transformed into a country wide agitation against Bhutto government. In response to the agitation Bhutto called on military and imposed martial law in Karachi, Hyderabad and Lahore. The Army was given wide powers to restore law and order. The Army chief was invited to cabinet meetings and the military high command was briefed regularly by the government regarding the course of negotiations between government and PNA (Rizvi, 2000:236-37). By leaning heavily towards the military for the survival of the government, it was well understood by the military high command that, Bhutto government's popular appeal has eroded.

In the political deadlock between PPP and PNA, in July 1977, General Zia-ul-Haq, Chief of Army Staff declared martial law throughout the country and took over as

Chief Martial Law Administrator. The popular leader, Bhutto was accused in a criminal case and finally hanged by the Zia regime. Zia suspended the 1973 constitution, federal and provincial cabinets were dissolved. He ruled for eleven years-the longest tenure of military rule in Pakistan's history. He is often identified as the person most responsible for turning Pakistan into a global center for political Islam. He made Pakistan an Islamic state and nurtured the jihadist ideology that now threatens to destabilize much of Islamic world (Huqqani, 2005:131).

The martial law regime of Zia-ul-Haq also showed the limits of military rulers to create viable and representative political institutions and socio – economic justice (Rizvi 2000a: 9). After assuming power he made a statement that “My sole aim is to organize free and fair elections which will be held in October. Soon after the polls, power will be transferred to elected representatives – a solemn assurance that I will not deviate from the schedule” (Ibid: 28). He succeeded in consolidating the power and presided over longest martial law in Pakistan's history from July 1977- December 1985 (Ibid: 28-29). He tried to meet the legitimacy crisis through islamization by gaining the support of Islamist parties like Jamaat-i-Islami. It further intensified the already deteriorated social and economic disparities among ethnic and religious sectarian groups.

The Zia regime initiated the process of Islamization to get legitimacy for the continuation of military regime. Joseph C writes, the Islamization process in Pakistan was a “response of the military-bureaucratic oligarchy which controls the Pakistan state towards the legitimacy crisis precipitated by the military coup in 1977” (Joseph C, 2010:21). The Zia's Islamization process was in a way, the extension of his predecessor. The 1973 constitution reiterated Pakistan's identity as an Islamic Republic and for the first time recognized Islam as the state religion of Pakistan. Bhutto formed the Council of Islamic Ideology to give advice to the national and provincial governments to keep their legislations in accordance with Quran and Sunna (Shaikh, 2009:95). The appeasement of the Islamic right wing political parties by the Bhutto regime prepared the ground for the rightward shift in Pakistani politics under Zia.

The Zia's Islamization process affected four areas, economic policies, judicial reforms, the introduction of an Islamic penal code, and a new educational policy

(Joseph C, 2010:23). Due to the Islamization process, militarism and sectarianism became more entrenched in the Pakistani society. Zia was an ardent believer of Islam, the Islamization of the military was his mission and adopted Islamic teachings as its guiding principals (Ibid:34). He welcomed the Islamic organizations like Tableeghi Jamaat and the Jamaat-i-Islami “to make in-roads into the Army, something anathema in the past” (Rizvi, 2001:207). The Islamic Revolution in Iran (1979) and Soviet occupation of Afghanistan was also influenced in radicalizing the Pakistani military. Like his predecessors, Zia leaned towards other power centers to counter the constitutional sources of legitimacy. Unlike Ayub who relied on civil bureaucracy, Zia appealed to Islamic parties and Islamization of polity as the counterweight against the political class. In due process, he installed military officials in key positions within civilian administration, semi-government organizations and autonomous organizations and there by militarizing the polity (Bose & Jalal, 2004:195). Mohammad Waseem says, “The political context is shaped by the continuing crisis of civil-military relations, which helped bring Islamic parties and groups onto the political stage as a counterweight to the constitutional sources of legitimacy” (Waseem, 2007:147).

The cold war politics in general and the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 in particular are watershed events in the history of Pakistan. The United States supported and aided the Zia’s military regime which in turn strengthened him in domestic matters. Pakistan became a frontline state in the U.S strategy to contain the Soviet expansion. It gave Zia’s military regime to continue to derail from the promises of holding elections and transfer of power to political class. The renewed American economic and military aid and international support for the regime enhanced the power of Zia *vis-à-vis* political class (Huqqani, 2005:140).

Zia’s parliament in exchange for lifting of martial law passed the eighth amendment which empowered the president to dismiss an elected prime minister and parliament without any obligation to senate or Supreme Court. Since 1985 the Eighth Amendment was used five times to oust prime ministers and dissolve elected national and provincial assemblies (Bose & Jalal, 2004:195). Zia vanished into air in August 1988, leaving a militarized polity and sectarian society. He cultivated orthodox and conservative Islamic forces as a counterweight to political adversaries. He succeeded in perpetuating the existing ethnic, linguistic, religious-sectarian divisions in society

which fragmented the political class (Rizvi, 2000:273). These divisions among political class and the society at large made transition to democracy difficult.

4. Democracy in the Shadow of military: 1988-1999

The election process and democratic institutionalization was constantly hampered by the military-bureaucratic system. The Eighth Amendment was continuously used for dismissing the elected governments. Zia's legacy of divided polity, Islamization, sectarianism, and regional disparity haunted the successor elected governments. Syed Vali Reza Nasr observes that the Zia's legacy of the 'gradual sacralization of the national political discourse...did not favor the PPP whose myopic emphasis on secular politics and the polemic of democracy restricted its maneuverability in a religiously charged polity' (Nasr, 1992:523). From 1988 to 1999, the Pakistani military was playing the role of an umpire in highly polarized and divided political and social classes. The Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif's regional and economic policies are constrained by the priorities set by the military during the Zia era. The sectarian and religious forces unleashed by the Zia, the influence of Islamic political parties in Pakistan, regional disparity... increasingly came to trouble the democratic regime's stability. Both the governments endorsed the use of irregular forces in Kashmir and Afghanistan to endorse the military objectives. The political space achieved by the Islamist parties under the patronage of Zia, was continued by both Benazir and Sharif (Shaikh, 2009:168-169).

The power of the political classes was largely limited by the unelected institutions. On matters which concern the national security such as Afghan crisis, defense expenditure and service conditions Army exerted a veto on government policy (Talbot, 1999:293). Jalal observes that,

A state structure geared to high defense expenditure and dominated by the non-elected institutions – namely the military and civil bureaucracy – cannot easily concede the ascendancy of the elected institutions – parliament in particular. Despite the holding of general elections in 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997, the recurrence of dismissals of prime ministers and dissolutions of the national assembly showed that the institutional imbalances within Pakistan's state structure were resilient (Bose & Jalal, 2004:197).

The post-Zia military elite were acted as a remote control and exerted power behind the scenes and brokered a deal that ensured the unity of anti-PPP political forces under the leadership of Sharif. The anti-PPP political forces quickly regrouped to form Islami Jamhoori Ittihad (Islamic Democratic Alliance IJI) to put up a formidable

challenge to PPP in the 1988 elections. The military's Inter Service intelligence (ISI) was secretly involved in creating an alliance of right-of-center and Islamic parties to prevent PPP to sweep the 1988 polls (Nasr, 1992:523). The marginal victory of the PPP in 1988 elections reduced the Benazir's political space to effectively curtail the already dominant military and bureaucracy. The defense budget was sacrosanct and the army retained a veto in vital foreign policy and security matters. The armed forces were able to enforce this veto through their allies in the bureaucracy led by Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Zia's successor in the office of the president who enjoyed the power to dismiss elected government through eighth amendment (Talbot, 1999:292). The structural crisis of the Pakistani state continuously retarded the development of elected political institutions. The bureaucratic and hierarchical non-democratic institutions were heavily influenced Pakistan's democratic transitions. S Akbar Zaidi analyses the democratic interregnum of 1988-1999, he says,

The Power to decide who was worthy of being in government throughout the 1990's, rested with groups and forces who had no tradition, experience or interest with democracy. This charade of who held real power in Pakistan came to an unambiguous end on October 12, 1999 (Zaidi, 2005:5176).

In the democratic period between, 1988 to until the military coup by General Pervez Musharraf, the Army and Bureaucracy retained their predominant influence in the policy making and constantly retarded the political class from coming to power. The 'overdeveloped state' structure of Pakistan is a constant impediment in the institutionalization and development of democratic institutions in Pakistan.

5. The Last Military Rule? 1999-2008

The October 1999 military take over justified by Musharraf, as averting the deliberate attempt by the civilian government to undermine its professional and corporate interests. Soon after the military coup he proclaimed that 'the armed forces have moved in as a last resort, to prevent any further destabilization. I have done so with all sincerity, loyalty and selfless devotion to the country...This is not martial law, only another path towards democracy' (Kundi, 2003:31). He succeeded in consolidating the power and ruled Pakistan for many years. The creation of National Security Council in 2004 was an attempt to cement the constitutional role of military. He tried to civilianize the military rule by careful constitutional and political engineering and co-option of the political elite (Rizvi, 2000:31).

During his regime the individual and corporate interests of the military further entrenched and consolidated in Pakistani state. This era witnessed hundreds of retired military personnel filling in key positions in bureaucracy, semi-governmental organizations and educational institutions. The supremacy of civil-military alliance ‘in the form of successive military regimes transformed them from a state institution into a ‘political class’ with significant economic interests ties especially to the acquisition of agricultural land....a trend that intensified under General Zia’s government and later vigorously encouraged by Musharraf’ (Shaikh, 2009:139).

The United States war on terror has greatly influenced the Musharraf government’s foreign and domestic policies. Like his predecessor, Musharraf obtained legitimacy and stability through the US military and economic aid. Unlike previous military regimes, Musharraf’s regime was supported by large sections of middle classes and political actors. His policies alienated the religious sections of the society and they distanced themselves from the government on account of supporting the US foreign policy (Zaidi, 2005:5177).

The national and provincial elections of February 2008 in Pakistan’s rejected the Musharraf’s one man rule and once again reiterated the promises on parliamentary sovereignty, independent judiciary, media and political dialogue with dissidents. In the elections, PPP and PML-N became victorious and pro-Musharraf factions suffered significant losses. On March 2008, the PPP leader, Syed Yusuf Raza Gilani unanimously elected as the country’s prime minister. Once again people of Pakistan rejected the supremacy of unelected institutions and reiterated their faith in democracy and parliamentary sovereignty.

6. Conclusion

The long years of direct and indirect military rule enabled them to penetrate the major sectors of the state and society. It is no longer an army that functions only to protect sovereignty and territorial integrity but an army which desires to re-shape and re-establish Pakistani politics. Farzana Shaikh says,

By ignoring the implications of Pakistan’s unresolved national identity and the lack of consensus over the role of Islam, they fail to explain how the military emerged as a major force attempting not only to determine the national interest but to define the very meaning of Pakistan (Shaikh, 2009:147).

The conventional notion of healthy civil-military relation is characterized by the separation of civil and military domains for minimizing the power of the military to make civilian control more certain and at the same time strengthening the military for state survival from external enemies. This traditional way of analyzing civil-military relation is no longer possible in the case of Pakistan. Any analysis of Pakistan's civil-military relations should start from the notion that, military is a powerful component of the decision making process, it no longer completely aloof from politics, serve as the guardians of the idea of Pakistan. The organizational strength, internal cohesion, discipline, the Punjabi – Pakhtun composition of the army all add to the strengths of Pakistani army. The civilian government is increasingly dependent on army for keeping internal law and order, above all survival of the state.

The military penetrated the major sectors of the state and the society, government and semi-government institutions, the private sector, industry, agriculture, education, communication and transportation. Unlike civilians, military's discipline, internal cohesion and professionalism strengthened its attributes. The military's professional and corporate interests, the socio-economic background and orientations of the officers all are important factors that provided strength to military. The interaction across boundaries, the international connections enable the military to influence and gain strength. Above all it gains strength from the organization and its significant presence in all sectors of government and society. The Pakistan army's strong regional cohesion, the Punjabi-Pakhtun composition of the army has been a source of power. The already existing institutional imbalance further eroded due to the acquisition of modern technology and organizational skills by the army and weak, incoherent political institutions.

The Pakistan experience clearly shows that, it is easy to take political power from fragmented and infighting civilians by a professional and disciplined army, but there is no guarantee that military will heal the economical, social and political problems that haunted their civilian counterparts. In all four occasions – 1958, 1969, 1977, and 1999 army moved out of bar racks and displaced civilian governments without facing any serious challenges. Once military rulers came to power, they were successful in restoring the law and order situation but later they confronted the serious socio-economic issues which faced by civilian predecessors. The political dilemma faced by the civilians and military regime is identical in nature. The organizational skills and

mighty coercive power at their hands further give confidence to expand the goals of the military coup. In the post-coup period, military rulers have to seriously think about civilianizing their regime through careful constitutional and political engineering with civilian political elite. Rizvi says about the paradox military ruler's face,

Pakistan's military rulers face a paradox. On the one hand, the military is gradually acquiring most, if not all, of the features of a "ruler-praetorian" military by its repeated interventions in politics since the 1950s. On the other hand, the emotional and ideological commitment to democratic process and civilian supremacy over the military is still strong in society (Rizvi, 1984:537).

The military stands out as a distinctive institution having highly organized and disciplined, more accessible to modern technologies and control over coercive apparatus comparing to the civilian institutions. Unlike any other state institution it operates in an international context. The professionalism, internal cohesion, and discipline distinguish it from the society. A strong military is viewed as important for the security and survival of Pakistan. Long years in power enabled the military to influence civilian institutions of the state and society and established presence in all sectors of the society.

Any analysis which ignores the importance of military and the historical and cultural conditions of Pakistan will be narrow and unlikely to yield good results. The analysis needs to be historicized, contextualized and explained according to the changing dynamics of internal and external political, regional, economical and social conditions which forms the core of the nature and behavior of the civil-military relation in Pakistan. The solution for civil-military problematique should come from an equal dialogue between civil and military institutions. Only a gradual and steady process can result to stabilize the civil-military relations.

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Khaph Laws, Cultural Violence and the Challenges to Individual Liberty

N. Sukumar & Kamalakanta Roul

Abstract

For the past many years honour killings have grabbed national headlines. The raging debates on what is first degree have exposed the uncivil nature of the Indian 'civil' society. The statement made by the paternal uncle of Shubha (a victim of honour killing in Ashok Vihar, Delhi), Mr. Dharmaveer Nagar "apneap me khoongalathosaktahai, par samajkeliyeyeh murder zarooritha.... is kaam se in larkon ne saahi me ek achcha udaharan pesh kiya hain (you may consider killing of an individual is wrong, but for society, it was necessary. These youngsters have set a good example)"¹ (TOI, 2010) epitomizes the clash between the constitutionally ordained rule of law, citizenship and civil liberties and the chains of tradition and customary law. What is more appalling is that the political class has bent before the violators of the constitution in order to retain their traditional vote banks. This paper attempts to reflect on cultural violence and its implications for gender justice and individual rights in India.

Key Words: Khaph, Custom, Community, Individual, Constitutionalism

1.Introduction:

The erosion of the socialist economy has catapulted the Indian state into the vortex of a swiftly globalizing world wherein the only deity worth worshipping is the free market which promises untold prosperity. The state and the ruling oligarchy quickly latched on to the neo-liberal policies of corporatizing vast segments of the economy while scant attention has been paid to inclusive growth. The lopsided development is evident in the social disequilibrium prevalent in the society. The regressive social traditions are not keeping pace with the rapidly changing consumerist society. The trends are evident in the increasing violence against women and other marginalized sections of the population. On the one hand, the state passes liberal and progressive laws to safeguard the rights of the citizens while on the other hand, the very institutions whose duty is to uphold the law-the police, the civil administration and the judiciary fail in their constitutional mandate, peopled as they are with the same regressive ideology.

The contemporary Indian society is not growing as fast as the economy is. This clash of ideologies is very evident in the state of Haryana which enjoys all the parameters of conventional

¹ The Times of India, Thursday 24th June, 2010, Delhi

growth but where young people meet a gory end when they exercise their individual choice. The state is second in the per capita income in the country but it also enjoys a low sex ratio (820 in the 0-6 age group (Census India, 2011)².

The shortage of females has led to a paradoxical situation wherein the people have to 'shop' in other parts of the country for eligible brides. One would imagine that a low sex ratio would enhance the status of girls but on the contrary, the manacles of a patriarchal society have tightened. The only silver lining is the increasing reportage in the print and electronic media about such 'killings for honour' which come as a rude shock for a 'civil' society not used to murders invading their drawing rooms. As long as such honour killings which are a euphemism for cold blooded murder were relegated to some back of beyond village, not much attention was paid. Only when the killings came closer to the national capital, occurring in middle class homes to 'people like us' that society woke up to the chilling reality about the everyday violence in its underbelly.

2. Theorising Violence

Violence is an act of illegitimate, unauthorized or immoral use of force against the will or desire of others which causes injuries or destruction etc. Hannah Arendt³ (Arendt, 1999) rightly matched violence with power which is obviously in the khap ruled villages. The powerful dominant group uses violence as a means against the inferior caste in the name of custom and tradition for enforcing their socio-political supremacy. In this sense, custom is also used as an instrument of violence. Customs are the long established social habits and usages accepted by the people to do the things collectively in personal contact and co-operation. As Maclver and Page stated that the "groups, institution or associations sustain their formal order by means of an intricate complex of usages or practices"⁴ (Rao, 2001) of customs. All customs are not irrational, non-utilitarian and unethical in character. But still some customs are found illogical, undemocratic and inhuman practices which create violence and violate human rights, dignity and choice. In the contemporary times, khap killings or honour killings by the khap panchayats falls under such a category of inhuman practice

2.1 Conceptualising Customary Violence

Both tradition and modernity in India have been carriers of brahmanical patriarchal ideologies. The fundamental principal of the Hindu social organization is the creation of a closed structure to preserve land, women and ritual quality within it (NurYalman, 1962)⁵. These three are structurally linked and it is impossible to maintain all three without stringently controlling

² http://censusindia.gov.in/Data_Products/Library/Provisional_Population_Total_link/PDF_Links/chapter6.pdf

³ Arendt Hannah, *Excerpt from on violence, in the edition of Steger, B. Manfred and Lind, S. Nancy, Violence and Its Alternatives: An Interdisciplinary Reader, Macmillan, London, 1999, pp.9*

⁴ Shankar Rao, C.N, *Sociology: Primary Principles, S. Chand and Company Ltd, New Delhi, 2001, pp 452*

⁵ NurYalman, 'On the Purity of Women in the Castes of Ceylon and Malabar', *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland*, 93, 1962, pp.25-28

female sexuality. Neither land nor ritual quality, that is, the purity of caste, can be ensured without closely guarding women who form the pivot of the entire structure. The upper caste woman is the object of 'moral panic'. There are repeated invocations of the need of the lower castes and women to conform to brahmanical injunctions, which was sought to be institutionalized in the texts and enforced by state power. The upper caste women are literally points of entrance into the caste system⁶ (Charavarty, 2006).

No wonder that an effective system of surveillance prevents the association of lower caste men with upper caste women, thereby institutionally safeguarding the purity of upper caste men. Despite the modern discourse of rights and legal entitlements, every attempt is made to prevent the subversion of this ritual quality. To cite but one illustration, Babu Bajrangi in Ahmadabad, has made it his life's mission to 'restore' forcibly the girls of his community (Patel community) back to their family if they have the temerity to marry outside their caste (Bunsha, 2006)⁷.

Thus the essential nature of women came to be identified by their sexuality. Not surprisingly, for Manu, 'the wife' constituted the most important category. "By carefully guarding his wife, a man preserves his family, his lineage, the purity of his offspring and his means of acquiring merit." (Chakravarty, 2006)⁸ Hence, surveillance of women is the corner stone of brahmanical patriarchy, which has allowed the principle of inequality to become embedded in Hindu culture. Such gendered stereotypes propagate the belief that women are not only inferior but also their sexuality has to be patrolled, so that it is legitimately accessible to some men and inaccessible to others. These notions of female sexuality were reinforced by colonial modernity. By its very functioning, colonial rule created a disjunction between the public and the private realm, the latter left outside the purview of the colonial state. This was especially in the case of law, wherein each community was left to abide by its traditions of marriage, inheritance and divorce. This enabled the state to manage dissent in the public sphere for the men of the subject population were given the family sphere to rule. The control over women's bodies (witness the heated debates over the age of consent) was substituted for control over other aspects of daily life (Sarkar, 2003)⁹. The self respect that was eroded in the daily encounter with the racial hierarchy of the outer world could be built up again by the experience of secure kingly rule in the family sphere.

No wonder that women still are subjected to customary violence to protect the 'purity' of the clan and lineage. If women strictly follow their 'stridharma', they will enjoy the rewards not only in this world but also in heaven. If the 'stridharma' is not upheld by the women, retribution is swift and brutal. The mother of one of the victims of honour killing in Delhi, Shubha, observed that her brother gifted her with a mobile worth Rs. 7000. But when she eloped with her lover, the humiliation was too great. There is no remorse at the death of a daughter but relief that the 'bad

⁶ Uma Chakravarty, *Gendering Caste Through a Feminist Lens*, Stree, 2006, p.67

⁷ Dionne Bunsha, 'The Serial Kidnapper and his Mission', *Frontline*, 25, December 16-29, 2006

⁸ Uma Chakravarty, *Opp Cited*, p.67

⁹ Tanika Sarkar, *Hindu Wife, Hindu Nation Community, Religion and Cultural Nationalism*, Permanent Black, 2003, pp. 226-249

influence' is contained (TOI, 2010)¹⁰ Thus dishonourable conduct on the part of a daughter which ruins the family forever, leaving the parents unfit to show their faces to the 'biradari'(community), justifies in their eyes the extreme step of even killing her. This concept of honour is explained by sociologist Veena Das, to operate at the expense of human sentiments and values. According to her, it demands a sacrifice of the natural ties created by biology, and kinship morality stresses their transcendence (Das, 1994)¹¹.

As society is modernizing and urbanizing at a rapid pace, many traditional practices are being challenged. One of the most visible manifestations is the increasing attempt of the younger generation to choose their life partners. As marriage provides the structural link-up between kinship and caste, a closer surveillance is accorded to the marital alliances. Kinship linkages provided by marriage, and relations established through marriage, give a caste group its strength, recognition and leverage in wider society and polity. Any breach in these caste linkages brings down the status of not only the immediate family but also the clan and finally the entire caste group. This factor was and remains a most potent consideration behind the enforcement of strict caste and sexual codes (Choudhury, 1997)¹². For the people of India the law of exogamy is a positive injunction even today. Indian society still savours the clan system, even though there are no clans; and this can be easily seen from the law of matrimony which centers round the principle of exogamy, for it is not that sapindas (Blood-kins) cannot marry, but a marriage even between sagotras (of the same class) is regarded as a sacrilege (Ambedkar, 1989)¹³. Those marriages or associations which activate this interconnection between 'honour' and violence relate not merely to inter-caste factor but also to intra-caste which infringe certain traditional prohibitory taboos. They essentially breach customary rules which are subject to the 'gotra' or 'got' (as it is known in rural north India) rule of exogamy (gotra is an exogamous patrilineal clan whose members are thought to share patrilineal descent from a common ancestor). For purposes of marriage certain prohibited degrees of kinship have to be avoided. As a rule three or four got exogamy is followed by most caste groups, upper or lower (Chaudhury, 1997).

3. Understanding Khaps

Khap is the conglomeration of clans and caste communities of villages in a geographical territory for the purpose of social administration. The origins of such social organizations can be traced to the Vedic times in the present day regions of Haryana, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh. The system of government was constituted with the council of five which was called a panchayat during this time. The parallel term of the khap is "Pal, Ganasangha, Janapada or Republic" (www.wikipedia.org). The sarvakhap (all khap) panchayat represented all the Khaps. Each khap sends

¹⁰ The Times of India, 24th June, 2010, New Delhi

¹¹ Veena Das, 'Masks and Faces: An Essay on Punjabi Kinship' in Patricia Uberoi (ed), Family, Kinship and Marriage in India, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1994, pp 198-224

¹² Prem Choudhary, "Enforcing Cultural Codes: Gender and Violence in Northern India, EPW, Vol 32, No.19, May 10-16, 1997, p.1019

¹³ Ambedkar, B.R, 'Castes in India', in 'Dr Babasaheb Ambedkar Writings and Speeches Vol-1', Compiled and edited

by Vasant Moon, Education Department, Government of Maharashtra, 1989, Bombay, pp-9

their delegates to the sarva khap sammelan where they represent their own khap on different issues. “It was a political organization, composed of all the clans, communities and castes in the region. The republics of the 'Yaudheyas' who dominated this region from 600 B.C.E (conventional dating) to 400 B.C. preceded it. They had there a similar system of governance and their coins and seals are found in this whole region. Rohtak of Haryana was one such capital” (YuadheyounKaIthihasa, <http://en.wikipedia.org>).

The Khap panchayat was utilized by the land owning Jats in the 14th century to consolidate their domination. The main rule of the khap is that all boys and girls within the periphery of a khap are considered 'siblings'. Ideally a man is the guardian of honour of any woman who is related to him as 'sister' whether real or classificatory and therefore both sex and marriage are taboo between them. All men and women of the same clan, same localised clan and same village are talked of as being bound by the morality of brother-sister and therefore both sex and marriage are prohibited between members of any of these units (Hershman, 1981)¹⁴.

Love marriage, same gotra marriage or even in any gotra from the same village are considered taboo in the areas administered by the khap panchayat. “The women in our village are treated as sisters. How can there ever be a marriage between a man and his sister? If my daughter follows in Monica’s footsteps (a victim of honour killing in Delhi) I will kill her. I will not let her defy tradition” (TOI, 2010)¹⁵. To abide by the khap rules, the villagers try to keep their young children apart from each other as per the biological division. Even some schools are forced to arrange separate timings for the boys and girls. Most of the parents marry their daughters at an early age fearing that they will go astray. Social ostracizing and excommunication are the weapons used to coerce people to follow the khap diktaks. In a predominantly land owning society, people had no alternative but to surrender before such undemocratic organizations as it was a matter of life and livelihood for them.

Women form the edifice on which the entire notion of honour is structured. Undoubtedly, if she exercises her free choice in matters of heart or livelihood the custodians of this structure feel extremely threatened. The violence unleashed on such women is proportional to the threat perception. The entire baggage of siblinghood is carried by the girls. Sometimes rules and punishment of the khap panchayat bend down for the boys but in the case of girls the reprisal is rapid. If a couple elopes then their entire family would face the social boycott and hefty fines running to lakhs of rupees. Many a time, other women members of the family also become a victim of violence. According to S. Viswanathan, "In the Haryana-Rajasthan- New Delhi region, an estimated 100 young men and women are killed every year on the orders of Khap panchayat" (The Hindu, 2010)¹⁶ for not adhering to traditional norms and more than twenty cases are filed in the courts everyday relating to these brutal activities. This is also evident from the increase in petitions, almost fifty per day that are filed by the couples in the Punjab and Haryana High Court seeking protection and legal intervention (TOI, 2010)¹⁷. Recently, the khap maha samelan

¹⁴ Paul Hershman, Punjabi Kinship and Marriage, Hindustan Publishing Corporation, Delhi, 1981, pp 133-34

¹⁵ Times of India, 24th June, 2010, New Delhi

¹⁶ Vishwanathan, S., ‘Honour killings’: What needs to be done, The Hindu, April 26, 2010, New Delhi

¹⁷ The Times of India, 22nd June, New Delhi, 2010

demanding a ban on same 'gotra' marriage (TOI, 2010)¹⁸ by the amendment of the Hindu Marriage Act 1955 and strongly came out to provide legal support to the convicted killers of Manoj-Babli honour killing case (ibid) with a stiff objection to the judgment of the court. In order to enforce its version of custom and honour, the khaps have issued an ultimatum to the elected representatives to support its decisions. In the Manoj-Babli honour killing case, when state institutions failed to uphold the rule of law, the only support to the lone crusader fighting for justice, Manoj's mother, was provided by civil society organizations.

All these demands, decisions and practices of khap panchayats are undemocratic, unlawful, and patently against the "basic structure" of the Indian constitution. Interestingly, a male cousin of one of the accused in the honour killing of his sister preferred to have the British back. "The foreigners never tried to play with our traditions. This government has scant regard for our indigenous culture" (TOI, 2010)¹⁹.

Customary violence blends religion, morality and customs into a deadly cocktail where individual liberty has no space to exist. The only exit for the victims of such violence is either to surrender or pay with life. In a patriarchal society, women are considered expendable since they do not enjoy any rights over and above what is conferred upon them as a surety for their 'good behaviour'. What is paradoxical is that if the protagonists can afford to ignore the khap diktats either due to their social status or wealth, they can lead their individual life. The victims belong to families who are marginal land owners, own petty shops in the village, daily wage earners etc who are unable to opt for alternative sources of livelihood due to their socio-economic conditions.

Such feudal social organizations like the khaps obviously disregard the rule of law. This inhuman practice comprises of the following elements. These are rejuvenating the regressive caste system under the ploy of custom and tradition, intermesh caste gender relations to downsize women's rights under the clout of gotra marriage, gain the prevalence of class power domination through the structures of custom, coercion and medieval feudal justice to bulldoze the young people in the name of ensuring brotherhood who may be a threat to their hegemonic power structure, domination of class within the caste and undermine the individual rights and liberty to enforce the community rights.

4. Class Configuration of the Khaps

The nature of the existence of khap panchayat is a class within caste. The traditional feudal leaders of the rural society from the landowning castes, having hegemony over the socio-political power structure of the area, found it difficult to accept the increasing political and economic clout of the marginalized groups. They perceived it as a menace to their political authority and socio-economic supremacy. As a consequence, these traditional and neo-feudalist elites uphold their authority over the whole caste in the name of social customs and caste honour. The socio-economic capital of the Jat people divided them into dominant and dependant class. This

¹⁸ The Times of India, April 14, 2010, New Delhi.

¹⁹ The Times of India, 24th June, 2010, New Delhi

influential, affluent and capitalist class unilaterally intervenes in the privacy, personal life and liberty of the young people for their vested interests.

The lower class, middle class and lower middle class people ranked lower than the Jat caste hierarchy in terms of socio-economic status are the subjects of khap panchayat over which their diktats thrive. Their structures of domination are based on the compulsory consent of the hitherto deprived communities which legitimized their supremacy. This monolithic hegemonic power structure of the Khaps is under increasing threat by the newly emerging conscientized groups.

Such threats are met with increasing violence against the dalit communities. The incident of burning alive a physically challenged girl and her father and torching over a dozen of dalit houses of Mirchpur village in Hisar district is the outcome of class conspiracy for reasserting socio-political supremacy. This violence was also an outcome of a khap decision. The khap comprises of educated and professional people like army officers, police officials, lawyers and local party leaders. This class configuration can be treated as a class-in-itself. It means a social group whose members share the same relationship to the forces of social and economic means of production. It is significant to note down that these class men of the khap panchayat are silent about their khap rules. Same gotra marriage is a common practice in the patriarchal village of Om Prakash Chautala (HT, 2010)²⁰ who firmly stands with the cause of khap for the political gains. In the same tune, Ashok Tanwar (ibid), an influential dalit congress leader had married an upper caste Brahmin girl and the khap had has nothing to say so far. No one makes an issue of Chander Mohan, former deputy chief minister of Haryana, who was able to marry and divorce at whim. Similarly, many youngsters of Haryana who have achieved success in the glamour world never have to bother about khaps. Their economic gains insulate them from the murky world of honour killings. To illustrate, the popular actress, Mallika Sherawat is a subject for the glossy magazines but no khap will dare to pass judgement against her. In short, there exists a premeditated power alliance among the politicians, police, corporatists, and the bureaucracy to protect the Jat dominated caste and clan hierarchies in Haryana and controls the young who challenge and unsettle it. No wonder that the Haryana state chief minister Mr. Bhupinder Singh Hooda reiterated that the 'Khaps were more akin to non-governmental organizations which had been doing social work for centuries and people were by and large happy with their functioning'. Further he stated that 'in his personal view it was wrong to blame the khap panchayats for inciting Honour Killings' (The Hindu, 2010)²¹. One of the rising stars of the Congress party, businessman-politico Naveen Jindal (currently Congress Member of Parliament) justified the acts of khap panchayats in the name of local traditions. Later, under public ire, he retracted his statement.

²⁰ Hindustan Times, May 9, 2010, New Delhi, pp13

²¹ The Hindu, 21st June, 2010, New Delhi.

5. Confronting Constitutional Law

The words, 'we the people' is testimony to the fact that the Constitution of India is promulgated in the name of the people. It asserts the principle of popular sovereignty which is founded on the authority of the people 'who hold the power to conduct the government through their representatives'. The constitutional provisions have a primacy over all other rules, customs or laws within a community.

All rules and laws repugnant to the constitution are null and void to the extent of their repugnancy to the constitution. The constitutional law i.e. rule of law as A.V. Dicey (Dicey, 1986) observed stands for 'equality before the law' which implies the equal rights of all the citizens before the law.

The khap panchayat's challenge to the Karnal court verdict is a violation of the principle of the rule of law. The latest demand of the khaps is to change the Hindu Marriage Act 1955 to suit their ruling is entirely invalid as they do not represent all the various communities of Haryana. In a significant move, the Punjab and Haryana High Court expressed anguish over the honour killings while hearing a PIL on prohibition of intra-gotra marriages. The same-gotra marriages were affirmed valid and legal way back in 1945 by the Bombay High Court much before Hindu personal law was codified. The two judge Bench that gave the notable judgment comprised Justices Harilal Kania and P.B. Gajendragadkar, who both rose to occupy the highest post of the Chief Justice of India.

Khap's claim of legitimacy is a false notion of arbitrariness. Legitimacy does not mean forcefully propelling people to carry forward the despotic principles with compulsory consent underlined with the subtle menace of violence and atrocities. The legitimate power or authority comes from the permission of the constitution and free and informed consent of the people. The legitimate use of coercion based on law in a democratic state is derived from the constitution to express the sovereignty of the people and guarantees the legality of the law. The unilateral imposition of undemocratic rules, writ and verdict of khap panchayat reveals the blatant violation of the rule of law.

6. Challenges to the 'Basic Structure' of the Constitution

Under Article 368, the basic structure of the Indian Constitution cannot be amended. Since the observations in the case of the Golak Nath case, culminating with the Keshavananda Bharati case, the Supreme Court has clarified that there are certain 'basic' features of the constitution which were immune from the power of amendment under Article 368²². On the basis of verdicts, concerning different cases, the Supreme Court has reemphasised the 'basic features' of the constitution. These are threatened by the oppressive laws of the khaps which mete out vigilante justice.

These include the supremacy of the constitution, rule of law, objectives specified in the preamble, the sovereign democratic structure of the republic, freedom and dignity of the individual, principles of equality, fundamental rights, social and economic justice, judicial autonomy, citizen's access to the judiciary, and secularism. As P.M. Bakshi observed, "the theory of the 'basic structure' is the very heart of the constitution as noted by the Supreme Court

²² Dicey, A.V., Introduction to the study of the Law of the Constitution, Liberty Fund, Indiana, 2010.

in the case of State of Bihar V. Balmukund Sah, 2000 (Bakshi, 2010)²³. The criminal acts of the khaps challenge the constitutional legality of the rule of law. It is possible to contextualize the constitutional infringements of the khaps.

7. Formation, Existence and Continuance of the Khap Panchayat

Article 19(1) (c) ensures the right to form associations or unions for a lawful purpose. The right to continue the association are subject to reasonable restrictions in the interest of "sovereignty or integrity of India, public order and morality". The khap made rules directly thwart this article as it is an undemocratic organization, contrary to the constitutionally formed democratic republican state. The Supreme Court of India has very clearly stated the essence of registration of any organization, association, union or society in case of Uttar Pradesh V.C.O.D. Chheoke Employees Co-operative Society Ltd, 1997 (C/m, Management, D.C.BANK Ltd. Thru' Its Chairman & Others. vs. State Of U.P Thru' Secretary (cooperative) & Others. - WRIT - C No. 23736 of 2004 [2004] RD-AH 344 (22 July 2004) High Court of Judicature at Allahabad). The khap panchayat has not been recognized as per the Registration Act or Co-Operative Societies Act. It is an unregistered organization. Their aims, objectives, executive body, rules or principles have not been enshrined anywhere as a written document. So, illegal authorization of any undemocratic and illegitimate rules, writs, law verdict is a crime according to the provisions of Indian Penal Code.

7.1 Pronouncements of Death Penalty

The separation of power between the legislature, executive and the judiciary is the corner stone of democracy. It is essential for the smooth functioning of democracy that there is no encroachment of the powers of any authority. Only the judiciary has the power to authorize death penalty and the final court of appeal is the executive. The khap's ruling in this regard is a gross violation of Article 21 of the Fundamental Rights. It is the breach of Article 20 and 21 which establishes that "no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to the procedure established by law". Killing is the last stage of the criminal act against any living organism. The khap men do it in the name of brotherhood and honour which tarnish the human rights of the individual.

7.2 Congregation and Conference

The congregation of khap panchayats at the khap maha sammelan on 13th April 2010 in Jat Bhawan (TOI, 2010) in Kurukhetra was the breach of article 19(1) (b) which provides the right to assemble peacefully and without arms, while ensuring the sovereignty and integrity of India and public order, including the maintenance of traffic in the area. Though the leaders and delegates of khaps were not dressed up with instrumental arms, they were fully prepared with moral arms to execute khap decisions and to fight against the state's legal machinery. The khap maha sammelan was a clear infringement of the constitution.

²³ Bakshi, P.M, The Constitution of India, Universal, 9th edition, Delhi, 2009, pp 1

7.3 Contempt of Court

The public demonstration against the Karnal court verdict is a contempt of court of a court of law whose guidelines are clearly suggested by the Supreme Court in the case of Mulgaonkar 1978. Taking account of the severe threat of violence which hovers like a Damocles sword on young couples exercising their individual autonomy and liberty, Shakti Vahini, a non-governmental organization filed a Public Interest Litigation before the Supreme Court on June 21st 2010. The apex court took cognizance of the matter and issued notices to both the Union government and eight other states i.e., Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, Punjab, Rajasthan, Jharkhand, Bihar, Himachal Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh seeking their response on the steps taken to protect young couples from the deadly wrath of khap panchayats. The Public Interest Litigation also categorized the crimes that are inflicted by the khap panchayats against the married couples which includes physical assault, torture, mutilation, rape, forced marriage, imprisonment within the home and murder to protect the honour of the families (TOI, 2010).

7.4 'Sexist' Attitudes and Negative Discrimination

The sexist attitude of the khap leaders violates all established norms of gender justice. It is a clear violation of Article 15(1), 15(2), 16(1) and 16(2) which ensures the removal of negative discrimination, that is, discrimination against a person on the basis of race, religion, sex and place of birth, or any of them. The arbitrary acts of the khaps also violate Article 15(3) that empowers the state to make any special permission for woman and children.

7.5 Threatening the Pluralistic Culture, Religion and Secularism

Indian secularism is based on the principles of 'composite culture' and 'sarav dharma sambhava'. The pluralistic nature of the Indian culture reflects variations across regions and communities. The khap demands to ban same gotra marriage and amend the Hindu Marriage Act is a threat to the pluralistic culture and secularism of India. As a belief system, the heterogeneity of Hinduism leads to a catholicity of practices. The attempt to homogenize any cultural practice and norms is at the cost of individual autonomy and liberties. Consanguinous and same gotra marriage is a wide practice among many communities of South India and some parts of the Eastern India too. No fundamentalist organization like the khaps can make a unilateral decision amend the Hindu Marriage Act. What is clearly evident is all constitutional norms are flouted by the khap panchayats and yet the perpetrators of such cold blooded murders go scot free. The state institutions are unable or rather unwilling to prosecute these criminals as per the rule of law. The conspiracy of vote bank politics is a fertile breeding ground for such bigoted organizations. Instead of the lofty ideals of the Preamble, "we the people", it is the terrorizing rule of a miniscule minority which holds state institutions to ransom. The defiance of khap diktats shows their inflexible stand against the sovereignty, unity, dignity and democratic nature of the Indian republic. The principles of natural justice are non-existent and only the norms of a patriarchal brotherhood reigns supreme.

7.6 Discourse on Rights and Community

Rights denote 'ones due' as being a member of a community. The basic rights and freedom i.e. right to life and liberty, freedom of individual choice, thought and expression, individual privacy

must be guaranteed by the community, society and the state. The imposition of khap panchayat's decision over individual choice raises a serious academic debate over the supremacy of individual and community rights. The khap diktats impose their verdict and writ over the community which they claim to be the legitimately ordained by the consent of the entire community members. The possibility of obtaining consent through fraudulent means, coercion and compulsion always exists as is evident from the threats of boycott, excommunication and imposition of hefty monetary fines on the young couples, exercising their individual rights and their families who fail to comply with the khap verdicts. There is no possibility of 'informed consent'. Individual choice forms the basic tenets of any discourse on liberty.

The khap panchayats ruling on same gotra marriages are nothing but an incitement of murder in the name of safeguarding community interests. The communitarian theorists note that the individual is a unit of the community. They emphasize the liberty, equality, justice and universalism of the individual but within the ambit of the community. For them, the individual is not an abstract category but is deeply embedded with his/her culture and community. "Once we recognize the dependence of human beings on society, our obligations to sustain the common good of society are as weighty as our rights to individual liberty" (Kymlicka 2002:212)²⁴. In totality, communitarian theorists insist that each of us as an individual develops an identity, talents and pursuits in life only as a member of the community. MacIntyre, a communitarian theorist argues that individuals flourish only within an atmosphere of socially established co-operative human activity (MacIntyre, 1980)²⁵. The community must promote and protect this activity and thereby encourage the development of human excellence. Hence, individuals can realize their good only through co-operation in the pursuit of the 'common good'. Community must understand the value of social goods. A community is just if it acts in accordance with the 'shared understanding' of its members. Hence, in community an individual has the choice of option to exercise his rights, liberty and consent.

The khap panchayats 'understanding of community' is based on hierarchical patriarchal social norms which deny any value to women and other marginalized groups. A community which remains a mute spectator to the killing of unborn female foetuses and has to 'shop' for brides elsewhere to make up for the shortfall in the sex ratio cannot be expected to champion individual rights.

This begs the question as to what would be the 'caste' or 'gotra' of the children born of such relationships between Jat men and women from other regions across the country. The khaps will have to look for solutions to such questions of 'identity' and 'community honour' once this generation grows into adulthood.

Human rights are the international axioms which aspire to protect the life, liberty and dignity in short to safeguard every aspect of human life from any kind of discrimination. Similarly, the Indian constitution is also fully committed to defending personal liberties under Articles 14, 15 (1), 16, 17, 19 (1), 20, 21, 22, 23, 24 and 32. The Articles from 25 to 30 guarantee the rights of communities and groups. The fundamental rights are justifiable and any violation can be challenged in the court of law

²⁴ Kymlicka, Will, *Contemporary political Philosophy: An Introduction*, OUP, Delhi, 2002.

²⁵ MacIntyre, A, *After Virtue*, University of Notre Dame Press, London, 1980.

8. Conclusion

The defiance of the khap panchayats against every procedure established by law has led to a clamour for a new law to deal with customary violence. What is horrifying is that the incidents of honour killings have increased, breaching even the insularity of the national capital. Such killings are regularly hogging media headlines. The National Commission for Women had to request the media to stop glorifying such honour killings and instead to label them as cold blooded murders (TOI, 2010)²⁶. The scholars are divided over the issue as Indian government has proposed to amend the Indian Penal Code to include honour killings a “distinct offence”. This proposed amendment has sparked a row among the intellectuals and lawyers. The people who supported Veerappa Moiley say it will attract everyone’s attention to this social evil and obscurantist mentality committed to killing people to save the honour of the community, caste or family.

However, there is no requirement of a separate law and the menace could be fought if the existing laws are effectively implemented. The existing laws for criminal conspiracy under section 120(b) of the Indian Penal Code, to kill with a common intention, Section 34 and 36 of the Indian Penal Code are strong enough to prosecute and bring to trial the khap panchayat members as conspirators. What is essential is to cultivate the political will to look beyond vote banks and generate a social momentum which will ensure rights not only to the elites but also the marginalized groups. As B.R Ambedkar observed, political democracy is ineffective unless it is accompanied by social and economic democracy and for this he relied heavily on the state and its duly constituted agencies which will ensure the safeguarding of the individual’s life, liberty and pursuit of happiness. Though, absolute liberty for the individual in the society, the state exists to create the conditions conducive for the expansion of individual liberty. The state institutions do not operate in a vacuum but constitute an inseparable part of the social milieu. If the law enforcement agencies and the judiciary give primacy to obscurantist laws over their constitutional duties and what is more reprehensible enjoy state support at the taxpayers’ expense, justice will remain blindfolded. The former DGP of Haryana, Mahender Singh Malik is a self-styled defender of khap diktats and “went on record threatening khap critics” (The Hindu, 2010)²⁷.

But it is unfortunate that he is getting support from the state through “hefty perks and pension out of the public exchequer” (ibid). Apart from enforcing a zero tolerance policy against such murderers of innocents whose only crime is to exercise their individual choice, the societal voices struggling for justice need to be supported and strengthened. When young couples elope, their families are left with no alternative but to submit to humiliation-both social and economic. The state should step in to fulfil its constitutional obligations and help such families to cope with the societal crisis. The need of the hour calls for some solemn introspection on the dichotomy

²⁶ The Times of India, June 25th 2010

²⁷ Jagmati, Sangwan, Khap Panchayat: Signs of Desperation? The Hindu, May 8, 2010, New Delhi

between the glitter of consumerism and the violence in our homes. As long as society turns a blind eye to the demands of individual autonomy, honour killings will continue to be a festering sore on our social fabric.

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Foreign Direct Investment, Multibrand Retail and Policy Debates in India

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Abstract

FDI as a policy is an important aspect for analysis. There were major changes that the FDI policy of our country underwent after liberalization. FDI in multibrand retail as a policy initiative has also been clouded in controversies. In addition there are also certain debates about this policy on its stakeholders such as the farming sector and the unorganized retailers of our country.

Hence one can say that through the FDI in multibrand retail policy one can gain an interesting insight on how the reform process in general and the FDI policy in particular has evolved.

Key Words: Foreign Direct Investment, Liberalization, Multibrand Retail, Policy Making

1. Introduction

As the eminent economist Sukhamoy Chakravarty stated ‘issues that bear upon India’s developmental prospects are inevitably very complex. Moreover, they cannot be devised by technocratically inclined civil servants.’ If one looks at the study of the policy process of the country we find that it has largely skipped the attention of various scholars in the academia today. During the planning era one did analyze the economic policies but the discipline remained focused primarily on designing choices and less so in the way the choices were arrived at. Hence there was little understanding on how the state institutions actually functioned and what are the values which underlined the public policy perspectives. What was lost in this approach was the attribute that policy is an arena of

bargaining and compromises; in short it is about politics. Taking forward from this notion one can say that the FDI multibrand retail policy in India is also marked by political dynamics and contestations (Mathur, 2013, Introduction).

The India story, since the 1991 liberalization has been well scripted and discussed in various quarters. Similarly, what happened from 1991 onwards has been vociferously dissected and, depending on which side of the debate one stands, there are intense views on the management of the economy. In this backdrop, there was also a refreshingly different approach adopted in the 12th Five-Year Plan the Plan which clearly mentions FDI should be a key policy imperative to help achieve the desired growth. One clearly senses urgency on the government's part to attract FDI in sectors like telecom, defense and retail. However the FDI policy hasn't offered comfort to foreign investors due to lack of transparency and consistency. (Kapadia, 2013)

Before I proceed to the issue of FDI in multibrand retail I will briefly look at how various political regimes approached and molded the FDI policy of our country.

2. FDI policy in India

It is generally believed that foreign capital has played an important role in the development of most of the countries of world. Nearly every developed state has had the assistance of foreign finance to supplement its own paucity savings during the early stages of its development. Though it is true that every country in its early phases of development needs foreign capital resources, however the sectors in which they are used, the purposes for which they are used, are important factors for consideration. (Nayak, 1991, p.2) During the pre-liberalization era in India it was also insisted that FDI should be accompanied by technology transfer agreements. However in striking contrast in the liberalization policy it is was not necessary that FDI is accompanied by foreign technology agreements. Today FDI is given in the automatic approval up to 51% per cent

foreign equity in the listed priority industries, which cover most manufacturing activities including software development and those related to hotels and tourism (Nayak, 1991, p. 36).

2.1 FDI Policy in India Pre-1991

If one looks at the beginnings of foreign direct investments in India it cannot be traced with any degree of precision. Even in the colonial period, there were a few cases of companies resident in India owning or controlling other companies abroad. The Indian government policy had since evolved over time in tune with the requirements of the process of development in different phases.

If one looks at the Nehruvian regime centralized planning was the dominant development strategy of the government. The planning commission also played an important role in framing and formulating policies, and little criticisms were made of its decisions. Regarding the FDI policy, Nehru's lofty disdain for it was not born out of a lack of faith in its potential to transfer technology and know-how, but of his resolve to shield the economy from the grip of foreign interests; science and technology formed the centerpiece of the prime minister's development strategy for India. Hence driven by Nehru's desire for a planned economy within a socialist climate (since 1951), rigorous regulations were implemented in order to achieve self-reliance, eradicate poverty, promote the development of indigenous technology, and protect the local private sector and small firms. Even so, foreign enterprise participation in the economy was not shunned; its spheres of activity and the form it took were highly regulated. Foreign capital was barred from specified industries and technical collaboration agreements or technology licensing agreements between Indian owned and foreign firms were preferred to FDI.

During the 1970s and the 1980s, India's policies towards foreign capital started reflecting a concern for selectivity. The government continued with the policies of not preventing the TNCs from entering and expanding in areas where indigenous enterprises were capable of delivering the goods. From 1973 onwards the further activities of foreign

companies (along with those of local large industrial houses) were restricted to a select group of core or high priority industries. The Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, (FERA) of 1973 required all foreign companies operating in India to register under Indian corporate legislation with up to 40 per cent foreign equity. In response to the regulation which required foreign firms to dilute their equity holdings to less than 40 percent many major multinationals such as IBM and Coca Cola chose to close down their operations in India (Athreye and Kapur, 1999, p.8)

During Indira Gandhi's governance, due to the foreign exchange crisis of 1980's India had to seek a loan from the International Monetary Fund. Some of these loan conditions however called for certain local reforms. Hence certain de facto changes were later announced, an example of it is the extension of the number of DE licensed categories in the industrial area and the encouragement of joint ventures such as Maruti Suzuki for instance, in 1984 (Belhoste and Gasset, 2008, p. 7/37).

However it was after Indira Gandhi's assassination that there was a major softening of the regulatory regime which was primarily spearheaded by Rajiv Gandhi. More export and import licenses were liberalized, credit facilities were encouraged and tax policy streamlined. In an attempt to modernize manufacturing industry, restrictions on technology transfers and royalty payments were relaxed and, where attempts to acquire technology through licensing had failed, foreign equity participation was permitted again (Belhoste and Gasset, 2008, p. 7/37).

2.2 FDI policy post 1991

It was the year 1991 which constituted a significant plank of the relaxation of controls over FDI. During the Gulf War foreign exchange remittances fell. The real possibility that India might default on its external obligations led to a downgrading of India's credit rating. To counter this crisis in 1991, P.V. Narasimha Rao Government approached the World Bank for external assistance. The Bank stipulated the globalization agenda recorded in the "Anderson Memoranda" to be followed by India. The then Finance Minister, Dr Manmohan Singh, adopted it and christened it as "New Economic Policy".

The reforms were adopted to avert impending international default in 1991 (Uttam and Kumar, 2013, p.3).

A series of changes took place in the country as a result of this. Industrial licensing was abolished in all but a handful of industries. Foreign direct investment was invited in a wide range of industries, including consumer goods. The limit on foreign equity participation was also raised to 51% for most industries, and even 100% in some cases (Atherye and Kapur, 1999, p.8). FDI was allowed in several sectors, but not in the retail sector.

Today the Government approvals regarding foreign investments are accorded on the recommendation of the Foreign Investment Promotion Board (FIPB). In the following categories:-

Categories:

- 1) Cases in which FDI is allowed without government approval i.e. Automatic Route¹.
- 2) Cases in which FDI is allowed with government approval
- 3) Cases in which FDI is not allowed

2.2 (a) Sector wise FDI distribution in India

However if one looks at FDI in other sectors the government after 1991 had allowed the TNCs to manufacture and supply larger electronic exchanges of 10,000 lines and above (Chaudhuri, 1995, p.1001). In November 1991, the government allowed the increase in foreign equity to 51% in existing companies. (Chaudhuri, 1995, p.1001).

The value added services, e g, cellular mobile telephone, radio paging, etc., was opened up in 1992 to private firms including those with foreign equity(Chaudhuri, 1995,

¹ Most of the sectors fall under the automatic route for FDI. In these sectors, investment could be made without approval of the central government. The business areas included in this FDI category are manufacturing, infrastructure development, hotels and tourism, hardware and software and venture capital funds.

p.1001).The international oil companies which were ousted two decades back were being induced to participate in the entire hydrocarbon sector comprising exploration, production of crude oil, refining and marketing.

Similarly the foreign investors were welcomed to participate in all types of power plants - thermal, hydel, gas based, solar, wind, etc.(Chaudhuri, 1995, p.1001). Between 1993-94 an electronic hardware technology park scheme was set up to allow 100% equity participation and duty free imports of capital goods and tax holiday. The ceiling on foreign equity participation in Indian companies engaged in mining activities was also hiked to 50% (Bhati, 2006, p.26).

During 1997-98 foreign direct investment was allowed into sixteen non-banking financial services through the foreign investment promotion board (Bhati, 2006, p.26). Also from the year 2000/2001, a long list of “high-priority” industries was replaced by the short list of limited FDI industries and regulation allowing up to 100% FDI in a number of industries was introduced (Bhati, 2006, P.64).

The ceiling for FDI under the automatic route in oil refining was also being liberalized to 100% from 49%. 100% FDI was also allowed in telecommunications sector for internet service providers not providing gateways, infrastructure providers, providing dark fiber, electronic mail and voice mail (Bhati, 2006, p.32). FDI up to 100% was permitted in airports worth FDI above 74% requiring for prior approval of the government. The defense industry sector is also opened up to 100% for Indian private sector participation with FDI permitted up to 26% subject to licensing. FDI up to 100% was permitted with prior approval of the government in courier services. FDI up to 100% was placed on automatic route in drugs and pharmaceuticals (Bhati, 2006, p.26). 100% FDI was also allowed in infrastructure services such as highways, roads, ports, inland waterways and transport, urban infrastructure and courier services(Bhati, 2006, p.100-102).

Thus all these new policies substantially liberalized the economy since 1991 with a view to bring rapid and substantial economic growth and move towards the globalization of the economy. In view of further liberalization, apart from relaxed restrictions on foreign

investment, industrial licensing and foreign exchange, the capital market was also opened to foreign investment and controls on banking sector were eased.

I will briefly look at certain sector specific guidelines for FDI in India.

These are as follows:

- Advertising and films- 100% FDI with automatic approval is allowed, but certain conditions apply in the film industry.
- Agriculture- no FDI is permitted in farming nor would foreigners own any farmland. FDI upto 100% is permitted in tea plantations, but proposals require prior government approval.
- Airport infrastructure- FDI is allowed upto 74%. The airport authority of India will hold 26% equity, while the remaining 25% is reserved for Indian private investors.
- Alcoholic beverages-No FDI limit is applicable but prior government approval is required.
- Atomic energy-FDI is limited to 74% for mining and mineral separation. FDI beyond 74% is approved on a case to case basis.
- Automobiles-FDI of 100% is allowed with automatic approval.
- Banking-the GOI increased the FDI limit for private banks to 74% in March 2004, but the reserve bank of India has not issued implementation guidelines. For state owned banks the FDI limit remains at 20%. The 74% cap includes all foreign portfolio investments. The foreign institutional investment remains at 49%. Foreign banks in India have the option to operate as branches of their parent banks or as subsidiaries.
- Broadcasting-FDI is limited to 20% in FM terrestrial broadcasting. For direct to home broadcasting and up linking hubs, foreign investment from all sources is

limited to 49% again with prior governmental approval. In satellite broadcasting FDI is limited to 49% with prior governmental approvals.

- Cable network- FDI is limited to 49%.
- Cigars/cigarettes of tobacco-there are no FDI limit but prior government approval is required.
- Civil aviation- in November 2004, the GOI India increased the FDI limit to 49% from 40% and permitted automatic route investment. No foreign airline however may make either direct or indirect investment in an Indian domestic airline. India also has not opened its state run international airlines to outside investment.
- Coal-lignite-FDI is allowed up to 100% in coal processing power plants/projects but limited to 74% for exploration and mining for captive consumption. Proposals for up to 50% of FDI in private sector companies are approved automatically. FDI is limited to 49% in state owned units.
- Construction-construction and maintenance of roads, highways, vehicular bridges, tunnels, ports and harbors is allowed at 100% FDI, with up to a ceiling of 345\$ million dollars. FDI is limited to 74% with automatic approval with construction and maintenance of waterways, rail beds, hydroelectric projects, power plants and industrial plants. FDI is not allowed in housing or office construction.
- Defense and strategic industries- FDI is limited to 26%, subject to license from the defense ministry.
- Drugs/pharmaceuticals-FDI is allowed up to 100% for drug manufacturing.
- Food processing-FDI is limited to 51% with automatic approval for most products.
- Health and education services-FDI is limited to 51% with automatic approval. Higher equity proposals need FIFB approval.

- Hotel, tourism and resources- FDI at 100% is allowed with automatic approval.
- Housing/real estate- no FDI is permitted in the real estate housing sector. FDI up to 100% on prior government approval is permitted for projects such as the manufacturing of building materials and the development of integrated townships including housing, commercial premises, resorts and hotels.
- Information technology- FDI at 100% is allowed with automatic approval in software and electronics except in aerospace and defense sectors.
- Insurance-FDI is limited to 26% in insurance and insurance brokering.
- Lottery, gambling and betting-no form of FDI is allowed.
- Manufacturing-FDI at 100 is allowed with automatic approval in the manufacture of textiles, non-metallic mineral products, metal products, ship building, machinery and equipment. FDI is limited to processed category reserved for small scale industries.
- Mining- FDI is limited to 74%, with automatic approval, for diamond and precious mining. FDI at 100%, with automatic approval, is allowed for exploration and mining metallurgy, and processing of gold, silver and other minerals.
- Petroleum-FDI limits vary according to the sub sector. Foreign investment promotion board approval is required for all activities for all activities other than private sector oil refining.
- Pollution control-FDI up to 100% is allowed with automatic approval for equipment manufacture and for consulting and management services.
- Ports and harbors-FDI up to 100% with automatic approval is allowed in construction and manufacturing of ports and harbors.

- Postal services/courier services-FDI is permitted in courier services, subject to prior government approval. FDI in letter delivery is not allowed.
- Power-FDI up to 100% is permitted with automatic approval in projects relating to electricity generation, transmission and not distribution, other atomic reactors and plants.
- Print media-in 2002, the government opened up the sector to foreign investment with a 26%equity cap for news publications, and 74% for non –news publications.
- Professional services- FDI are limited to 51% in most consulting and professional services with automatic approval.
- Roads, highways and rapid transport systems- FDI up to 100% is allowed with automatic approval for construction and maintenance.
- Satellites-FDI is limited to 49% for the establishment and operation of satellites.
- Shipping-FDI is limited to 74% with automatic approval for water transport services (Bhati, 2006, p.92-93)

However many sectors have opposed greater foreign equity stakes. The foreign ministry for example recently proposed to hike the FDI in the defense sector. However the defense ministry wants the foreign investment cap in the sector to remain at 26%. The department of pharmaceuticals has also firmed up its decision to oppose 49% FDI in brownfiled pharma projects through the automatic route. The civil aviation ministry, ALSO does not want to raise the foreign direct investment cap in scheduled airlines to 74% from the current 49%.

3. FDI in Multibrand Retail Policy

The FDI in multibrand retail policy was an executive decision taken by the central government which according to our constitution does not entail any voting in the house. But this policy was voted upon in parliament and eventually passed. However the policy compounded the problems of the government by its coalition partners. The UPA's principal ally Trinamool congress withdrew support from the government. Other allies also managed to ruffle the feathers of the government including the DMK, SP and the BSP. The icing on the problems of the government was the principal opposition party namely the BJP who screamed after the passage that it will reverse this policy decision after they came to power. In the end the UPA II government won the Parliament vote in favor of FDI in retail in the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha.

Before I proceed let me begin with the definition of some basic words associated with this area. FDI as defined in Dictionary of Economics (Graham Bannock et.al) is investment in a foreign country through the acquisition of a local company or the establishment there of an operation on a new (Greenfield) site (Harish Babu, 2012, p.2). The word "Retail" is derived from a French word "Retailer" which connotes "to cut a piece off" to "to break bulk". The person/s who is/are involved in such activities is/are called retailer/s. "Retailing" also means a distribution channel function where one organization/enterprise buys products from supplying firms or manufactures products themselves and then sells these directly to the consumers (Uttam and Kumar, 2013, p.3). Organized retailing on the other hand refers to trading activities undertaken by licensed retailers i.e. those who are registered for sales tax, income tax etc. These include the corporate-backed hypermarkets and retail chains and also the privately owned large retail businesses. It also refers to businesses employing more than 10 persons. Unorganized retailing on the other hand refers to the traditional formats of low-cost retailing such as the local kirana shops, paan/beedi shops, convenience stores, handcart and pavement vendors etc. (Harish Babu, 2012, p.2).

If one looks at the Indian retail industry it plays an important role for the economic growth of our country. The retail sector is important in Indian economic perspective as it contributes around 15% of GDP and employs more or less 7% of the labor force. It is the largest private sector in India and employs a large amount of population after agriculture. The important point to remember is that the Indian retail sector is basically of unorganized nature (Uttam and Roy, 2013, p.3).

When the Manmohan Singh government finally announced the much-awaited policy on foreign investment in multi-brand retail, in September 2012, it introduced a caveat stating that it was up to the states to implement the policy. In India previously, foreign retailers were allowed only in the wholesale, or cash and-carry, business, which Wal-Mart took advantage of to enter India however in this policy foreign retailers were set to enter the front-end retail format too.

Regarding this policy the government also introduced several regulations. A foreign company initial investment must be at least \$100 million. Investors will have to source 30 percent of their products from "micro and small" industries (this was later changed to 20%). A fixed percentage of FDI in the sector is also obligatory to be spent on building back-end infrastructure, logistics or agro-processing units so as to ensure that the foreign investors make a valid contribution to the development of infrastructure. The government also ensured that at least 50 percent of the jobs in the retail outlet are reserved for rural youth and a certain amount of farm produce is required to be procured from poor farmers. The respective state governments would put in place frameworks to monitor compliance with these conditions. The Industry Ministry also proposed to allow foreign direct investment (FDI) in multi-brand retail trading or in simple terms large-format retail stores like Wal-Mart in a calibrated manner and these could be limited to larger cities with a population of more than 10 lakh.

However this plethora of regulations did generate some amount of confusion over the retail FDI policy. Wal-Mart Asia head Scott Price cited stiff entry barriers, including a 30%

mandatory sourcing from local small enterprises, as stumbling blocks for foreign retailers to enter India. (Seth, 2013). Sourcing norms were hence later reduced from 30% to 20%.

However the policy on FDI in multibrand retail has been clouded in controversies since the day one. One of the major flashpoints of this policy is however the sheer politics surrounding it. As far as this policy was concerned the political parties caused tremendous obstruction. The FDI in multibrand retail policy was an executive decision taken by the central government which according to our constitution does not entail any voting in the house. However stating that this policy was not in the interest of the nation the opposition parties insisted to the government for a parliamentary vote and not merely a debate. Controversy also erupted in the houses when after the Opposition motion against allowing foreign supermarkets was defeated in the Lok Sabha and the BJP claimed the 'real verdict' was reflected in views expressed during the debate with 14 parties opposing the decision. Many opposition leaders also indicated that the victory of the government was not due to the strength of the numbers of the ruling party but due to sheer floor management.

As stated earlier in the FDI in multibrand retail policy allowed in September, the Manmohan Singh government introduced a caveat stating that it was up to the states to implement the policy. Not surprisingly the state governments which are allied to the UPA have voiced their support for this policy and the NDA allied states have opposed it. So far nine states and two union territories such as Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Maharashtra, Uttarakhand, Jammu & Kashmir, Manipur, Daman & Diu and Dadra & Nagar Haveli have already shown support to FDI. Many states including Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat, Tamil Nadu and West Bengal and more recently New Delhi and Rajasthan have said no to FDI in multi-brand retail.

A major uproar also started in parliament started when Wal-Mart India also found itself in the midst of an internal probe to check possible violations of the anti-bribery law. In December, Wal-Mart's disclosure that it had spent money on lobbying activities that

were partly related to India made it the target of Opposition attacks in Parliament, forcing the government to start an inquiry.

The judiciary also stepping in and stated “Is FDI in retail a "political gimmick"?", this was basically the question the Supreme Court asked the Government and sought its response on how it intended to safeguard the interest of small traders after the government announced the opening up the retail sector to foreign direct investments (FDI). Favoring regulatory framework to protect small traders, the bench said that the big companies can bring price of commodity down through unfair trade practices forcing small traders to shut their shops and the companies thereafter can increase the price and monopolize the market.

Hence one can say that it will be interesting to see how the next government will approach this policy decision, and whether this will have an effect in the investor confidence in the country. Though one can say that is quite clear that political considerations have overpowered economic policy decisions as far as this policy is concerned.

3.1 Inputs and Responses of FDI in Multibrand Retail Policy

Regarding the multibrand retail policy one can see that there are various interests, conflicts and stakes of various parties that are at play, which play an important role in understanding the impact that this policy will have in the future. There are primarily three stakeholders of this policy. One is the corporates (both domestic and foreign), second are the farmers and the unorganized retailers and the third are the political parties of our country. Hence one can say that the views of these stakeholders stated above need to be taken into account to draw a comprehensive sketch of this policy.

There are certain advantages and disadvantages that are projected as a result of this policy.

3.1(a) Advantages

The corporate sector has unanimously supported the issue of FDI in multibrand retail. The CII supporting FDI in retail states that foreign investment can help SMEs (small and medium enterprises) supply in large volumes, enhance their quality and become a vendor to international players and increase the quality of products and become cost competitive in global arena. Allaying fears that the global retail chains would severely impact small stores in the country, it said traditional trade will continue to have its own place and should not decline as stated by many others. (PTI 13th august 2012)

There are also various reasons why the issue of FDI in retail is supported by the farming sector. One of them is because it will eliminate the middlemen from the agrarian process. Though it is true that the farmers do suffer as the middlemen provide the farmers with the price which is sometimes even below its cost of production. The entry of the largest corporate houses will ensure that the farmers get better prices for their produce, through the guaranteed purchase of the MNE'S. The MNC'S also will provide the much needed technical assistance to the farmers, and develop the agrarian infrastructure of this country.

Another reason is also because of the technological innovations that it will bring in the agrarian sector. The case of FDI in retail is often made on the basis of the need to develop modern supply chains in India, in terms of the development of storage and warehousing, transportation and logistics and support services, especially in order to meet the requirements of agriculture and food processing industries. Lack of adequate storage facilities causes heavy losses to farmers in terms of quality degradation and wastage of produce in general, and for fruits and vegetables in particular. Hence many advocates of this policy state that FDI in retail will bring much needed cold storage infrastructure in the country which will benefit the agrarian sector in the long run. Hence the entry of FDI in multi-brand retail is likely to have a significant positive impact on the modernization of the agricultural sector.

3.1(b) Disadvantages

However there are certain disadvantages that are projected as a result of this policy. If one looks at the farming community many scholars state that if the multibrand retail policy is operationalized the farming community will mercilessly fall into the hand of the foreign corporate retailers, it will also lead to the introduction of a market mode of agriculture, for which the relevant market intelligence and logistics will benefit the rich farmers, as the small farmers of our country lack resources as well as financial assets as well as inadequate knowledge of the markets.

Also, while dealing with the large MNE'S the farmers will be left without a redressal mechanism if supermarkets pull out of procurement deals in the last minute, thus exploiting the lack of binding contractual agreements between them. Supermarkets also might resort to unethical practices such as delay in paying invoices and passing on unexpected costs back to suppliers for transport, packaging and food wasted at the stores.

Regarding the fears with the corporatization of Indian agriculture if one looks at internationally for example in the country of Guatemala, the supermarkets like Wal-Mart now control 35 per cent of food retailing, and their sudden appearance has also brought unanticipated and daunting challenges to millions of struggling small farmers, these supermarkets also lack binding contractual agreements, and reward the farmers only if they consistently meet new quality standards (Mcmichael, 2007, p.221). Hence the entry of giant MNCs into agricultural procurement might make the problems worse for the farmers.

On the other hand if one looks at the unorganized retailers it is might be unlikely that they will be able to withstand competition from prolific retail stores like Wal-Mart, who not only have better infrastructure but also can offer discounted prices to the consumers which can lure away customers form our traditional kirana stores.

It is also stated that the foreign retail majors will hurt domestic players with the practice of predatory pricing and become monopolies. It will also be a serious blow to the basic

structure of small traders as encouragement of foreign investment in big shopping markets and super stores will ruin their businesses. Generally if one looks at these push cart vendors and kirana stores, they are generally mobile in nature and are endowed with single items. Most of these stores are profitable but cannot offer the discounted prices that the big retail stores will offer. This fact explains their fear of the big retailers, which do possess this bargaining power since their purchase volumes are huge.

4. Conclusion

Regarding the reforms of 1991 the intent was, apart from deregulation of the internal economy, to increasingly integrate the Indian economy with the world that is, to globalize the Indian economy. However, after a decade of experience with the reforms, economic liberalization has come under increasing criticism, indeed virulent attack. The changes in government policy have also had an important bearing on the FDI position of India.

The issue today is whether India should embark on further liberalization and adopt a wide open doors policy which would include further relaxation of limits on foreign equity participation, autonomy to state governments over policies towards FDI, promotion of export processing zones and presumably fiscal incentives of various sorts to foreign firms. However proponents of openness argue for further liberalization of the economy, and for altering the economic regime to attract foreign capital. Large inflows of foreign capital, they claim, are necessary for transforming India's stagnant economy. Critics of liberalization point to the dangers of excessive openness.

Regarding the reforms of 1991 the intent however was, apart from deregulation of the internal economy, to increasingly integrate the Indian economy with the world. However, even after two decades of experience with the reforms, economic liberalization has come under increasing criticism both from the left and the right there had cries about the alleged surrender of national sovereignty to foreign interests and the international financial institutions.

It is clear that foreign direct investment (FDI) today is now widely perceived as an important resource for expediting the industrial development of developing countries in view of the fact that it flows as a bundle of capital, technology, skills and sometimes even market access. It is also looked at as a mean of technology inflows and a way of establishing interfirm connections in a world of multinational companies operating on the basis of a network of global inter connections. However still the main question is: Is the cost of foreign capital to the host economy too high?

The FDI in multibrand retail policy was also indeed a part of the big bang reforms which were ushered in by the government but stringent policy conditions and lack of political support for reforms have discouraged investors. One can say that it is still too speculative to state whether FDI in multibrand retail can benefit the country or not. However one needs to understand that the retail FDI policy should be formulated and implemented with the interests of various stakeholders in mind, and like any policy this also need to be stable and proper regulations also needs to be in place so that any detrimental effects of this policy could be nullified.

In summation one can say that the 1991 reforms was indeed a watershed in India's development strategy. It can be said that the reforms of 1991 did help to open various sectors to foreign investment, and helped increase the FDI inflows into the country. However many scholars stated that, from the perspective of Indian industry, the liberalization was introduced too suddenly and too quickly, without local business having been prepared adequately for competition over a period of time. What this illustrated was that while the new policy of 1991 had brought in a dramatic increase in investment activity, however there is still no clear understanding of FDI as a proper mechanism for development or its future role (Singh, 2005, p.6).

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Nationalist Project and Ethnic Response in Post Colonial Assam

Rubul Patgiri

Abstract: Recently a link is increasingly being drawn between the nation building process and the ethnic assertion to explain the ethnic movement in the post colonial societies. Similar framework of analysis can also be applied to understand the ethnic assertion in post colonial Assam. The nationalist project of Assam because of its partial and exclusive nature, it is argued, has led to the marginalization of ethnic groups of Assam. As a result they have expressed strong resentment against the nationalist project of Assam and have come up with a set of demands to protect their interests. In view of this the present paper seeks to examine the nature of nation building process and to explore the link between such nation building process and ethnic assertion in Assam. This paper argues that such ethnic assertion has raised serious question on the desirability of nation state model in multi-ethnic societies like Assam.

Key words: Nation-state, nationalist project, ethnic assertion, multi ethnic societies.

1. Introduction:

The closing decades of last century have witnessed the rise and proliferation of ethnic resentment and conflict all over the world and more particularly such ethnic unrest has become perennial feature in most of the post colonial states. In recognition of this new realities of the world significant amount of scholarly effort have been directed to understand the origin and factors behind the growth of such ethnic dissatisfaction. As a result of such efforts number of alternative and sometimes competing theoretical models such as modernization approach, political economy model, relative deprivation theory, elite competition model, internal colonialism thesis, cultural deprivation arguments etc. have been proposed. However, in the context of post colonial states besides these theoretical paradigms a link between nation building process and ethnic resentment is increasingly being drawn to explain the growth of such ethnic dissatisfaction in these societies. In other words there has been a growing tendency on the part of scholars as well as leaders of claimant ethnic groups to view the ethnic demands and mobilizations as reaction to the nation building process that most of these post colonial states are engaged in. It is argued that given the plural demographic character the nation building process of these states either by design or default has led to the political, economic and cultural marginalization of ethnic minority groups and the ethnic claims are assertions against such marginality induced by this nation building process. In the context of Assam also a similar connection can be seen between nation building process and ethnic resentment. The leaders of different ethnic groups of Assam have

repeatedly expressed their dissatisfaction on the nation building process for being exclusive and hegemonic in nature. It is alleged that the nation building process of Assam is designed to protect and promote the interests of the Assamese speaking people and does not take into account the interest and aspiration of other ethnic groups of Assam. While different theoretical perspectives have been proposed focusing on aspects like elite competition, deprivation, foreign conspiracy etc, the relationship between the nation building process and ethnic assertions has remained relatively unexplored in the existing scholarly attempts to understand the ethnic tension in Assam. It is in this context that the present article intends to examine the nature of nation building process and the associated problem in the post colonial states in general. Then, the proposed work will try to highlight the nature of nation building process in post colonial Assam in terms of its rational and manifestations. And finally an attempt will be made to explore the link between such nation building process and ethnic assertion in Assam.

2. Nationalism and Ethnicity in Post Colonial States:

The relationship between nationalism and ethnicity has assumed serious complexity in most of the post colonial states in the context of the nation building process that these states have engaged themselves in immediately after independence. The nation building process of these countries is necessitated by their effort to replicate the European nation state model in their own society. Nation state in Europe emerged out of a complex historical process that began with the treaty of Westphalia and perfected in subsequent period. This model is based on the idea of congruence between state, nation and sovereignty. In other words, it holds that state should be structured around a territorially anchored nation. Under this model nation became the basis for organizing state and accordingly national identity is prioritized over any other identity. The logic of nation state, therefore, demanded creation of a national community and as a result nation states were invariably engaged in a project of homogenizing ethnic and other pluralities in to a nation. 'Such project operated at two levels. At the visible level state sought to homogenize the ethnic pluralities into a civil society, through expansion of the market and extension of citizenship to them. At the second level, which was for long not so visible but is becoming visible now, the state sought to integrate the ethnic minorities into a *national* society characterized by the ethos and interests of ethnic majority'. (Seth, 1989) Accordingly, interest and right of ethnic minorities were protected to the extent that they did not threaten this nationalist project. The

post colonial states swallowed this readymade model of nation state made available by the West as they had no other choice and more importantly because it provided a state for their nascent nationalism, promised economic development and above all political coherence for their ethnically divided society. As in the case of European countries, the imitation of the nation state model by the post colonial states involves a state sponsored nation building project to create a national homogeneous community so that the state can correspond to a nation. Given the demographic complexity of these states, such nation building process has produced serious consequences for the relation between dominant ethnic majority and other minority ethnic groups. Most of the post colonial states in order to develop their 'nation', instead of trying to achieve the same through the creation of a civil society based on the extension of citizenship right, have sought to rely on the idea of creating a national society by integrating the diverse ethnic and other groups around the values and culture of majority ethnic group. As a result, states in these parts of the world has become an instrument for dominance for imposing the political and cultural will of ethnic majority over minority ethnic groups. The minority ethnic groups in return have also tried to politically mobilize themselves for securing their cultural and political rights. Thus the attempt to super impose nation state on ethnically plural societies of post colonial states on the basis of received history and theory of European nation states has produced serious ethnic resentment and mobilization with serious implication for legitimacy of the state and nation in these societies. A similar framework of analysis can be applied to understand the relation between nationalism and ethnicity in Assam.

3. Nation building process in post colonial Assam:

Parallel to the nation building process of India, one can observe the existence of similar process in case of Assam also. The nation building process in Assam began as back as in nineteenth century itself when some educated Assamese youth tried to forge the Assamese nation around Assamese language and culture. Initially the main concern of nationalist project of Assam was to promote Assamese language and culture and to rejuvenate Assamese society. In the twentieth century, however, this nationalist project assumed the concern of protecting the interests of Assamese people in the face of massive inflow of outsiders to the province. In the post independence period the nationalist project, as its supporter claim, was push forward in response to some socio-political, cultural and economic threats that confronted the Assamese nation and accordingly it was designed to

secure different socio-political, economic and cultural interest of Assamese people in the face of these challenges.

The nationalist movement in Assam in the post independence period was primarily aimed at securing Assam for the Assamese. This led the nationalist leaders to press for two kinds of demands-first to expel all the migrants who have entered Assam illegally after independence and second, greater share of political power vis-a-vis the centre either in the form of more autonomy or complete independence. It is significant to note here that both these demands are clearly linked and one has influenced the other. The origin of such demands, however, could be traced back to much earlier times. For instance, as back as in the 19th century itself resentment against migration and desire for independence were expressed and such sentiments were reverberated in the views expressed by people like Ambikagiri Roychoudhury, Jyananath Borah, Gauri Shankar Bhattacharya etc in the first half of 20th century. (Mishra, 1999) In the post independence period such demand acquired more vigour and intensity as could be observed in the demand for more political and financial power put forward by the leaders of Assam congress in the constituent Assembly debate and spirited defence put up by the Congress Government of Assam against the centre decision to rehabilitate Hindu refugees from East Pakistan and its antipathy towards the problem of unchecked illegal migration. The fear of being outnumbered by the outsiders ultimately culminated in the launching of a six years long Anti Foreigner Movement in 1979 by the nationalist leaders of Assam with the objective of expelling all illegal migrants that had entered Assam after 1971. The movement came to an end with the signing of Assam Accord between ASSU and the central government. The Assam Accord, among other things, provides for different political, cultural and economic safeguards for Assamese people. For instance, clause 6 of the Accord states that constitutional, legislative and administrative safeguards as may be appropriate shall be provided to protect, preserve and promote the cultural, social and linguistic identity and heritage of Assamese people. (The Assam Accord, 1985) During the same time some Assamese youth were toying with the idea of Swadhin Asom and accordingly on 7th April, 1979 formed the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) with the aim of liberating Assam through arm struggle.

Another important objective of the nationalist project of Assam was to improve the economic condition of Assamese people. The urge for economic regeneration was evident even in the formative stage of Assamese nationalism. As with the establishment of British

rule the control over economy of Assam gradually went away from the hands of Assamese to the outsiders, a belief gradually grew in among the Assamese nationalist that foreign domination was at the root of all economic misery of Assam. In such circumstances it was quite natural for the nationalist to access that if Assamese were to prosper economically, then Assam's economy must be liberated from the clutches of foreign hands and survival of Assamese community as distinct nation would depend upon its economic progress.

It was this consideration that led the Assamese leaders in the constituent Assembly to argue for strong financial autonomy for the province. They insisted on inclusion of certain provision in the constitution to safeguard the economic interest of Assam. In this regard, they wanted the constitution to specifically ensure larger share of export and excise duty for Assam on products like tea, jute and oil which were mainly produced in Assam. (Phukon, 1984) The constitution which was finally enacted, however, did not reflect these concerns of Assamese leaders. On the other hand the economy of the Assam in the post independence period declined further with complete absence of industrialization process, sharp rise in the rate of unemployment, low agricultural productivity and growing pressure on agricultural lands. It was in such an environment of growing economic resentment, Assamese people launched a movement demanding establishment of an oil refinery in 1957. In an another manifestation of nationalistic feeling, some youth, organized under the banner of Lachit Sena, attacked on Marwaris business houses of Guwahati and other towns of Assam in January 1968 with the aim of freeing Assam's economy from the control of outsiders. (Deka, 2010) This was followed by the second refinery movement which began in 1969 under the leadership of *All Assam Oil Refinery Sangram Parishad*. The mounting economic frustration of Assamese people ultimately found its expression in Assam movement. Although the immediate motivation behind the Assam movement was the fear of Assamese identity being swamped by the immigrants, as argued by the Udayan Mishra, it was in actuality a popular outburst of decades of economic neglect of the state by the central government. (Mishra, 1999) Such economic grievances and demands still remain recurring theme of Assamese nationalist agenda.

Again the nationalist project in the post colonial period in its cultural front has found expression in the form of an attempt to promote and expand Assamese language and culture. During the British rule, as it is argued above, due to various developments the Assamese language faced the danger of losing its identity and majority status. It was in this context that

the cultural mission of spreading Assamese language was undertaken and thus from the beginning of British rule and up to independence the main concern of Assamese linguistic nationalism was to spread Assamese language among those who had entered Assam from the rest of the country from the beginning of British rule and different tribes of plains and hills such as Mising, Karbi, Nagas and Garos of Assam. Different socio-political and cultural organizations that were set up from the beginning of 20th century including Asom Sahitya Sabha clearly exhibited this tendency of cultural expansionism. (Choudhury, 2007) In the post independence period also this fear persisted and thus not being assured of the future of Assamese language, proponents of Assamese linguistic nationalism carried on with their cultural projects of spreading Assamese language with *Asom Sahitya Sabha* taking the leading role. In 1958, *Asom Shatiya Sabha* brought out a book titled '*The Outlook on NEFA*' to promote Assamese language in NEFA. (Choudhury, 2007) The desire to spread Assamese language all over Assam has led the Assamese elite to launch the language movement in 1960 with the goal of making Assamese language the official language of Assam. In view of this growing pressure, Assam Government introduced the Assam Official Language Bill in the Assam Legislative Assembly on 10th October with a view to make the Assamese the sole official language of the state. Following this, Assamese middle class under the leadership of *All Assam Students Union* and *Asom Sahitya Sabha* initiated another move to make Assamese as the sole medium of instruction in the state. In response to this, Gauhati and Dibrugarh University decided to adopt Assamese as the medium of instruction in the state. A resolution to this effect was passed unanimously in the Assam Legislative Assembly on 23rd September 1972 which resolved that the medium of instruction at the college level under Gauhati and Dibrugarh University should be Assamese. English should, however, be continued as the medium of instruction. (Choudhury, 2007) Thus the Assamese nationalists in the post independence period have consistently tried to promote the Assamese language as a measure to protect their lingo-cultural interests. However, such attempt on the part of Assamese elite have been resented by the linguistic minorities of Assam including the different tribal groups of Assam as they consider such acts as some sort of design on the part of Assamese people to impose their language and culture on them.

4. Reaction to the nation building process in Assam:

There has been a strong tendency to view the ethnic assertions of different communities as a reaction to the nation building process of Assam. In the previous section, it has been discussed how the urban educated class of Assamese society from the later part of 19th century embarked upon a nationalist project to develop and further the interest of Assamese nation. This nationalist project continued in the post-independence period also and assumed different dimensions. It has been argued that this nationalist project in Assam is structured around the exclusive definition of Assamese nation based on Assamese language and culture. The leaders of Assamese society, who are engaged in the task of building an Assamese nation, have defined it primarily in terms of Assamese language and culture. The language and cultures of different ethnic groups are not accommodated in the definition of Assamese language and culture and as a result these groups have remained outside the purview of Assamese nation. As a result, nation building project of Assam in effect has turned into an attempt to protect and promote the interest of Assamese people without taking into account the interest of different ethnic groups of Assam. The nationalist project of Assam has aimed at making Assam for Assamese, but the very meaning of ‘Assamese’ (or notion of ‘Assamese’) is defined in such a way as to exclude the different ethnic groups. The project of making Assam for Assamese thus has meant politically capturing political power and administration, economically establishing monopoly over the government jobs, services and other economic opportunities and culturally promotion of Assamese language and culture.

It has been already discussed that the nationalist project in post-colonial Assam has assumed different dimensions. In socio-political term, it has come to mean expulsion of outsiders and arrest of political power. However, because of exclusive nature of the idea of Assamese, such socio-political project ultimately has turned into an effort for making Assam for Assamese speaking people only. The nationalist project with such objective in post-colonial Assam quite often has gone against the interests of different ethnic groups. For instance, the Assam Movement which was launched ostensibly to oust the outsiders/foreigners from Assam, at times was also directed against the different ethnic groups of Assam. During the agitation in places like *Gohpur* people belonging to *Bodo* community were targeted, attacked and even killed. (Choudhury, 2007) The Assam Agitation came to an end in 1983 with the signing of the Assam Accord between the Central Government and the leaders of the *AASU* and *Assam Gana Sangram Parishad* representing the interests of Assamese speaking people. However, at the time of signing the Accord,

different ethnic and minority groups were not taken into confidence. As a result, the Accord incorporated number of provisions that were highly resented by different ethnic groups as anti-tribal and anti-minority. (Deori, 2001) The Accord in its number of clauses provided for protection of political, economic and cultural interests of 'Assamese' people. But in the absence of any explanation of the meaning of the term 'Assamese', the AGP government interpreted it narrowly to mean only the Assamese speaking people and indulged in various activities that adversely affected the interests of ethnic groups of Assam. (Deori, 2001) The desire to make Assam for Assamese in the name of nation building process has also made the Assamese people reluctant to share political power with the members of ethnic groups of Assam. It is alleged that the Assam Movement was launched mainly to ensure the monopoly of Assamese speaking people over the political power and prevent others from getting share of it. (Guha, 2006) In the pre-independence period itself, Assamese speaking caste-Hindus had established their control over state's political power and they continued to enjoy such position in the post-independence period also. However, in the 70s for the first time the Assamese ruling class had to face challenge to its dominant position. Up to this period, Congress was the ruling party in Assam and the caste-Hindu Assamese had complete control over it. But from the 70s, the caste-Hindu Assamese gradually started losing its grip over the Congress party. In the 1972 Assembly elections in the Brahmaputra valley out of 96 seats, caste-Hindus could capture only 54 seats and in the 1977 elections the number further fell down to 42. (Choudhury, 2007) It was at this moment, the caste-Hindu Assamese started getting disillusioned with the Congress. And in order to retain their hold over the state power, they moved towards regional ideology which culminated in the launching of Assam Agitation. After the Agitation, *Assam Gana Parishad* was formed and its success in the Assembly elections again brought back the caste-Hindus Assamese to power.

One of the main motives behind the nationalist project of post-colonial Assam has been to capture all the economic opportunities for Assamese people. The tendency to reserve the economic benefits for caste-Hindu Assamese was apparent in the pre-independence period itself. During the pre-independence period, one of the important criteria for appointment in government job was that candidates must belong to good family. The good family in actual sense meant people belonging to upper caste. (Choudhury, 2007) Both during the pre and post-independence period, Assamese had to face stiff competition in the economic sphere from outsiders such as Bengalis, *Biharis*, *Marwaris*, *Nepalis* etc. Therefore, one of the major economic concerns of Assamese people has been to ensure their economic

interests against the competition from these outsiders. The nationalist project in post-colonial Assam to certain extent has been initiated in response to this concern. However, in their effort to reserve the economic benefits exclusively for Assamese, they have even excluded the ethnic groups along with the outsiders. For instance, during the Assam Agitation, *AASU* and *AAGSP* raised the demand for abolition of reservations in education and jobs for the tribes of Assam. (Memorandum, 1980)

The sectional design of nationalist project in Assam is most obvious in its cultural manifestation. In conformity with general trend (or like elsewhere) the nation building processes in Assam has sought to forge a common Assamese identity out of the diverse cultural tradition of Assam. The idea is to form a homogeneous Assamese community on the basis of common language and culture. As a part of this homogenizing drive, the Assamese speaking people have imposed Assamese language and culture on the different tribes of Assam. The Assamese speaking people through their numerous acts of commission and omission on the one hand have attempted to impose Assamese language on the tribal people of Assam and on the other hand thwarted the development of their own language and culture. In 1960, the Assam Legislative Assembly passed the State Official Language Act which made Assamese the sole official language of Assam. Again in 1972 in the wake of medium movement spearheaded by *AASU* and *Asom Sahitya Sabha*, the Academic Councils of Gauhati University and Dibrugarh University decided to make Assamese the only medium of instruction in college and university level. Further during the rule of AGP government the SEBA through a circular in 1987 imposed Assamese language as compulsory third language in all the non-Assamese medium schools of Assam. All these Acts were designed to promote Assamese language at the cost of other languages of different tribes of Assam. At the same time the Assamese speaking people have shown utter neglect towards the development of language and culture of tribes of Assam and ignored some of the genuine linguistic and cultural demands of them such as introduction of their language as medium of instruction in primary and secondary level etc. The tribal people of Assam have reacted strongly to such policies of Assamese speaking people aimed at establishing cultural hegemony over them. Lot of people argue that such cultural chauvinism of Assamese speaking people has created a permanent rift between the tribal groups and Assamese speaking people. For instance, the State Official Language Act of 1960 hurt the cultural sentiment of tribal people and eventually paved the way for disintegration of Assam and formation of hill states. The plains tribes have also resented against such expansionist design of Assamese speaking people.

Various tribal organisations, in numerous memorandums, have categorically mentioned the hegemonic attitude of Assamese as one of the main reasons behind their demand for political autonomy. For instance, in a memorandum to the Prime Minister submitted in 1973, the *Mikir and North Cachar Hills Leaders' Conference* alleged that Assamese junta are determined to 'Assamise' the linguistic minorities by forcing Assamese language and culture upon them and wiping out their own language and culture which they too cherish to develop. It further claimed that the only solution for the hill people is separation from Assam to have their own state. (Memorandum, 1973) The subsequent such memorandums submitted on November 24, 1980, January 18, 1982 and May 18, 1987 by various organisations representing *Karbi Anglong* and *North Cachar* also objected to language policy of Assam government as an attempt to impose Assamese language on them). Similarly, PTCA in a memorandum to the President of India on May 20, 1967 echoed the same sentiment by alleging that Assamese speaking majority are trying to 'Assamise' other linguistic minority groups and make them their political beggaries. (Memorandum, 1967) *Bodo Sahitya Sabha* also passed a resolution in 1960 opposing the Official Language Bill. It considered that the Bill had threatened the unity of Assam by realising fissiparous tendencies and would amount to imposition of Assamese language on other linguistic groups. (Memorandum, 1967) Likewise, the *All Bodo Students' Union* of Assam accused the Assamese people of following the policy of Assamese expansionism and chauvinism and considered this as one of the major causes of their demand for a separate state. (Leaflet, 1987)

The exclusive nature of nationalist project in Assam has created sharp reaction among the tribal people of Assam and the ethnic assertion of tribal people of Assam is interpreted as reaction to such nation building process in Assam. It is interesting to note that tribal people of Assam while expressing their reaction to the nationalist project of Assamese people have emulated the sub-nationalist movement of Assamese people. Particularly from the late 80s, different organisations representing the tribal people of Assam have modelled their agitation on the line of Assam Agitation in terms of goals, strategies and techniques to secure their various cultural, economic and political demands.

5. Conclusion:

Nationalist project in most of the post colonial states with multi-ethnic societies bears with some inherent problems. Following the nation-state model of the West, such projects are premised upon the assumption that there should be congruence between culture and power. It is assumed that every culture should be entrusted with power in the form of a state. The rationale behind such link is that state power is necessary to ensure protection and preservation of the culture and development of people belonging to that culture; at the same time cultural basis provides legitimacy and unity to the states and serves some other important needs of the modern states. Thus, the adoption of nation-state model in multi ethnic societies of the post colonial states involve the projects of creating a nation through homogenization either on the basis of common culture or political values and a state that will represent this nation. Third world states, however, had two alternatives to develop their nation-either through cultural homogenization or on the basis of common political values. The creation of a national community on the common political values in these multi ethnic states has faced serious challenges because of presence of traditional form of loyalties. Unlike the West where modernization process facilitated the production of a national community, the traditional bonds between people in these third world states remain strong in the absence of such process. So generally national mobilization in these states have taken place on the ethnic lines with the result that here nation-states are defined in terms of the culture and values of dominant ethnic majority and nation building process means imposition of majority's culture on minority ethnic groups. As a result, state end up representing the dominant ethnic group instead of the whole nation and become an instrument of the majority group for fulfilling their interest. As the nation-state that the nationalist project of most of the post colonial states propose to build fails to accommodate the culture and interests of minority ethnic groups, they are forced to seek political power either in the form of separate state or some autonomous arrangement that will protect and promote their own culture and interests.

Similar problems of nation building project in multi ethnic societies can be observed in India. India immediately after independence, like other states of the third world, in order to engineer a nation-state initiated the nation building project. However, after independence considering the plural character of Indian society, the nation building project of India rejected any ethnic basis for its propose nation and instead, try to fashion a national community on the basis of Western values such as citizenship, democracy, secularism etc. Such attempt to create a national community through political means soon had to face resistance from the competing nationalism of different ethno-national groups. Ultimately in 1955, Indian state was forced to reorganize its provinces on the ethno-linguistic line in recognition of the

nationalist urge of these groups. With this culture became the basis for recognition of political power within Indian nation state.

It is against this background that nation building process of Assam can be examined. Parallel to the process of rise Indian nationalism, the idea of Assamese nation and nationalism grew during the colonial period. Assamese nationalism, as it is the case with Indian nationalism, had two projects-to promote and rejuvenate Assamese nation and Assamese culture and to secure political power for promotion and protection of this Assamese nation. The political urge of Assamese nationalism got recognized with the formation of province of Assam. In the post independence period also, nation building project in Assam continued in response to certain developments that threaten Assamese nation. The nation building project in Assam in post independence period, however, meted with serious resistance from the different ethnic communities of Assam because of the nature of nation building project. For quite long period of time, Assamese culture developed as a composite culture incorporating elements of culture of different ethnic communities inhabiting Assam. However, when a particular section of Assamese society, being inspired by the nationalist ideas tried to develop Assamese nation and culture, they basically emphasized on the culture of Assamese speaking people to the exclusion of culture of other communities. The exclusive character of nation building project in Assam remained intact in the post independence period also, as it was defined in terms culture of Assamese speaking people and state government, the political power representing this Assamese nation, was used to ensure the various socio-political and economic interest of Assamese nation. As a result, the ethnic groups of Assam gradually came to distance them away from this Assamese nation and saw the state power as the instrument for imposing hegemony of Assamese nation over them. Further, the incorporation of these different ethnic groups within a centralized bureaucratic state under the nation-state scheme put them in disadvantageous positions. Centralized state implies certain uniformities-uniformity of rules, regulation and even opportunities and participation in the political and economic life of the state requires certain educational, technical and economic skills. The different ethnic groups of Assam, being habituated to isolated, primitive and tribal mode of living, were relatively late in acquiring these skills and therefore, remained at the periphery of the of this modern political and economic process generated by the functioning of a centralized state. The result was the gradual deprivation and marginalization of socio-political and economic interest of these communities. The emerging elite of these communities were first to realize their deprived and backward status. Realizing the fact that in a nation-state model every culture has the right to acquire political power and it is only

through the political power that the interest of the people belonging to a particular culture can be protected, elites of these different communities have raised various ethnic demands that collectively seek to promote their respective culture and to seek political power for them. It is in this context that today Assam is witnessing growing ethno-national demands on the part of different ethnic communities of Assam.

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Challenge of Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria: Its Origin, Causes and Effects

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Abstract

The origin of Boko Haram is a subject of great deal of debate and discussion. The fact is that the insurgency is posing severe challenge before the Nigerian State. It has led to numerous killings, attacks and loss of property worth billions of naira. These activities over a period of time are increasing. To understand the increasing momentum of the movement, the paper incorporates various theoretical perspectives, the study of which enables one to identify the factors-economic, political and psychological, which have created fertile ground for the emergence of the movement and also in accelerating its pace; which has serious implications both at the domestic as well as at the international level.

Key Words: Boko Haram, origin, economic, political, psychological, effects

1. Introduction

The recent killings in the north-east part of the country and similar killings in the past has led to the loss of life of thousands of innocent people and have destroyed properties worth billions of naira. For a number of years the group was treated as an internal Nigerian problem. However, this is not so in the present times as the study of Boko Haram's illicit and armed activities shows that they are increasingly taking place across the country's borders. When more than 200 girls were kidnapped in the town of Chibok in April, 2014, it was clear that neighboring countries and international community would need to co-ordinate their efforts (Barna, 2014, pp.5). According to Emmanuel Oladesu-

Since the end of the civil war no calamity of enormous proportion has befallen the fledging nation-state more than the harrow unleashed by the dreadful sec-Boko-Haram. Many lives have been lost, property worth billion of naira have been destroyed. Nobody is insulated from the attack, government officials and buildings traditional rulers, police and military formations and church worshippers are target. On the daily basis there is panic... (Aro, pp.2).

The insurgents have moved from arming themselves with primitive weaponry to becoming a well armed insurgency. This becomes so much a matter of concern for the Nigerian government that in May last year Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan declared a state of emergency in 3 of Nigeria's North-Eastern states including Borne. According to the President, the Boko Haram group constitutes a direct threat to Nigeria's very existence.

Owing to severe challenge the movement is posing before the Nigerian state it becomes pertinent to understand the causes which have created fertile grounds for giving dynamism to the movement. To identify the factors responsible for the growth of the movement, the present study has incorporated certain theories that explain the reasons for the outbreak of insurgency. But before examining these theories, the paper studies the origin and growth in intensity of Boko Haram. The paper also tries to understand the effects of Boko Haram insurgency and response to it at the national and international level.

2. Origin of the Boko Haram Movement and Growth in its Intensity

The very origin of Boko Haram is a matter of great deal of debate and discussion amongst scholars. This primarily arises owing to the confusion about the exact dates and who the actual founder of the movement was. Some scholars like Adibe trace its origin to the year 2001 or 2002. Others like Madibe traces its origin as early as in 1995 and argues that one Lawar Abubakar, who later left for further studies at the University of Medina, Saudi Arabia, actually founded the Boko Haram sect. Under Abubakar, the sect was known as Sahaba. According to Gusau, the origin can be traced to an evangelical group formed by Muslim students at the University of Maiduguri, Borno State, who reportedly felt dissatisfied with the Western education (Alozieuwa, 2012, pp:1-2).

Muhammed Yusuf to whom the formation is now generally ascribed assumed leadership after Abubakar's departure and "indoctrinated the sect with his own teachings, which he claimed were based on purity" (Alozieuwa, 2012, pp:2). Yusuf's notion of "purity" and teachings were inspired by the works of Ibn Taymiyya, a fourteenth century legal scholar. who preached Islamic fundamentalism and is considered a "major theorist" for radical groups in the Middle East (Alozieuwa, 2012, pp:2).

The obscurity surrounding its true origin explains why initially the sect had no specific name as its members attracted several descriptions where they operated based on the perception of the local population. Such names include Taliban and the Yussufiyah. The sect soon became formally identified as Ahulsunna wal'jama'ah Hijra – 'Congregation of Followers of the Prophet involved in the Call to Islam and Religious Struggle'. The name Boko Haram is derived from the sect's anti-Western posturing, literally meaning 'Western education (book) /civilization is sin' (Alozieuwa, 2012, pp:2). According to a Newswatch magazine, in 2004 a substantial number of students in technical colleges in Maidiguri and Damaturu tore up their certificates of education and left their studies to join up for Quranic lessons and preaching(Farrell, 2012, pp:2).

What is noteworthy about the period between 2002 and 2009 is the fact that Mohammed Yusuf is believed to have successfully gained a huge followers of an age group between 17 and 30 years old. Many poor families and unemployed

youths from Northern Nigeria as well as neighboring countries such as Niger, Chad and Cameroon enrolled in Yusuf's religious complex which included a mosque and school used for ideological propagation. Boko Haram initiated social programmes aimed at helping the impoverished and the indigent. The group's rhetoric appeared to be populist. The movement benefitted immensely from the immediate post September 11 global context which was characterised by al-Qaeda's anti-western avowals calling for universal jihad. In spite of widespread condemnation against September 11, terrorist attacks in the United States there was a prevailing mood among numerous young Muslims in the northern Nigeria which drew inspiration from the "guts" that Osama Bin Laden personified. The ensuing military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq commenced in 2001 and 2003 respectively coincided with diffuse events in Nigeria that inadvertently created the ideal environment for Boko Haram to capitalize on.

It is important to briefly draw attention to another historical detail that may have also fed into the contemporary dynamics of support for Boko Haram's rise and insurgency. Prior to British colonization, the current region of north-eastern Nigeria was a territory under the sovereign control of the Bornu-Empire, composed of a majority of Kanuri-Muslims. However, the imposition of British control contributed to an increased allegiance of the local people to the Bornu Sultanate as well as profound dissatisfaction with the activities of the British authorities. It can be argued that this fuelled the rise of fundamentalism among the Kanuri people and later generated sympathy and popular support for Boko Haram.

The movement over a period of time has picked up its momentum. In 2009, after the death of Mohammed Yusuf, the movement's radicalization and extremism were accentuated under the leadership of Abubaker Shekau, who took over as head of the organization's core faction. Since Boko Haram reemerged in 2010, the intensity and scope of its attacks has grown and its international linkages have also been strengthened. (Barna, 2014, pp.7). Under the leadership of Mohammed Yusuf in the years between 2003 and 2009, Boko Haram concentrated its attacks mostly on the security forces and the police as well as against politicians, chiefs and other representatives of the state. Since 2010, state installations have been targeted on a large scale for instance, the December 2013 attacks on an air force base in Maiduguri in which two helicopters were burnt down and that on Yobe prison in June 2012 freeing 40 inmates. Besides targeting the Nigerian state, the supporters of Boko Haram movement have also attacked the Western institutions, most notably the United Nations headquarters in Abuja in August 2011. This was the first suicide bombing attack that killed 21 people. The increasing sophistication of the attacks indicated assistance from international networks, especially al-Shabaab (which operates in the Horn of Africa) and al-Qaeda. Terrorist attacks in Abuja also reflect the increasing

geographical reach of the organisation. Fanning out from its stronghold in Maiduguri and Borno State, over the last five years, Boko Haram has also carried out attacks in the north eastern States of Kano, Yobe Adamawa and Bauchi. There is ongoing debate as to whether the movement has ambitions to increase its activities outside Nigeria, as its activities are on an increase in neighboring countries.

Since 2010 Boko Haram has also targeted banks and money conveyors to fulfill their economic needs. The group has also attacked people in markets, bus stations, schools and universities. As per an estimate, the death toll as a result of Boko Haram activities is over 22,000 between July 2009 and July 2014 which includes 2000 deaths in 2014 (Barna, 2014, pp.8-9)

The increasing influence of Boko Haram therefore directs one to focus on some theories, the study of which enables one to trace certain factors that created conditions for the emergence and spread of the insurgency.

3. Theoretical Understanding of the Boko Haram Insurgency

Unlike the Niger Delta militancy which preceded Boko Haram, and which reflected its desire for a separate state from Nigeria for decades of neglect by the Nigerian state and multinational oil companies in the Niger Delta region, Boko Haram has refrained from articulating and formally presenting its grievances apart from its declared desire for the strict interpretation of Islamic Law in Nigeria.

In spite of the complexity of the nature of the movement, one can incorporate certain theoretical perspectives, the study of which can facilitate the task of identifying the factors that have ignited the insurgency. These perspectives based on the review of the available literature can broadly be divided into two categories-one which lays focus on the internal conditions and the other that stresses the role of external forces in giving form to the movement. The former looks at socio-economic factors as well as deep seated political religious differences in the Nigerian society and the latter category characterizes the problem as part of global Islamic jihad and focuses on the sect's links with international terror groups such as al Qaeda or its affiliates as al Shabaab or the al Qaeda in the Islamic Mahreb. Within this external category, there is another view that views it as conspiratorial- to achieve the predicted disintegration of Nigeria. The conspiratorial thesis has within it the sub-theme that Nigeria is being targeted by envious and troubled neighbors. The details of the theoretical understanding follow:

3.1 The Relational/Vengeance Theory:

Relational theory attempts to provide explanation for violent conflicts between groups by exploring sociological, political, economic, religious and historical

relationships between such groups. The belief is that cultural and value differences as well as group interests all influence relationships between individuals and groups in different ways. Thus, a number of conflicts grow out of a past history of conflict between groups that has led to the development of negative stereotypes, racial intolerance and discrimination (Faleti, 2006, pp: 54-55). 'The differences in value invariably creates the "We" and "Others" dichotomy.' The fact that "others" are perceived as different makes us feel they are entitled to less or are inferior by reason of [...] values. This disrupts the flow of communication between us and them and to that extent, twists perceptions that we have about each other' (Faleti, 2006, pp: 55).

The state and other members of Nigerian society who are targets of Boko Haram's violence may indeed find it difficult to understand the sect's penchant for bloodletting. On the one hand, the former group becomes in the context the "We" and all efforts are being to secure it from savagery of the "Others", the Boko Haram members. On the other hand, the latter group bond either by the common purpose of fighting the "unbelievers" for Allah or feeling of deprivation or both sees the remaining members of the Nigerian society as the "Others". As a result mutual antagonism exists and can be violently expressed. On the part of Boko Haram, killings of members by government security forces-the "Others" attracts reprisals from it, the "We." The retaliatory attacks against Muslims in the Gonin Gora area of Kaduna state by an irate mob following the multiple suicide attacks on churches in the state on Sunday June 17,2012 highlights the vengeance thrust of the "we" and "others" psychology. In this instance, the avengers-the Christians constituted the "we", while the Muslims became the "Others". The establishment of Alfurqan Islamic School, solely dedicated to the teaching of ethics opposed to Western civilization in Jalingo, capital of Taraba, a North Eastern state in Nigeria, exemplifies an effort to institutionalize the "we" and "others" dichotomy. More significantly nearly every decade of Nigeria's contemporary history is replete with violence and conflicts that have religious undertones. Prior to Nigeria's Civil War, thousands of Southerners Igbos of Christian orientation were killed by northern Hausas (Muslims) in 1966. In 1991, over 200 mostly southerner Christians, lost their lives while over 20 churches were burnt by Muslims reacting to news of a planned visit by German Christian evangelist Reinhard Bonnke to Nigeria. The 2000s ushered Nigerians into the bloodiest decade in which thousands have died as a result of Christian Muslim clashes and terrorist violence instigated by Boko Haram. Religion in some cases thus appears to be the language of politics exploited by both state and non-state actors towards ends that are essentially parochial (Olojo, 2013, pp.8). The relational/vengeance perspective therefore has provided a useful explanation of the Boko Haram (Alozieuwa, 2012, pp:4).

3.2 The Human Needs/ Socio-Economic Theory

The socio-economic perspective of the Boko Haram challenge in Nigeria, essentially attempts to de-emphasize the interpretation of this being a particularly Muslim or northern crisis. The perspective which identifies social conditions for the violence is anchored on the human needs theory of social conflicts. Its central thesis is that all human beings have basic needs which they seek to fulfill and failure caused by other individuals or groups to meet these needs could lead to conflict. The theory is similar to the frustration-aggression theory of violence which posits that aggression is always a consequence of frustration. According to the theory, relative deprivation is a perceived disparity between value expectation and value capabilities and that the lack of a need satisfaction- defined as a gap between aspirations and achievement generally-relies on the psychological state of frustration and aggressive attitudes emerging from it (Midlarsky, 1975:pp.29).

This perspective has its largest proponents from the intelligentsia and is particularly viewed by some foreign governments of countries like the USA and Britain as explanations for the problem. Nigeria's socio-economic indexes seem to validate the assumption of human needs theory. The socio-economic factors being adduced as the root causes of violence in Nigeria include unemployment, especially among the youth, poverty and a deteriorating standard of living, especially in the north. Hence for Jean Herskovits ,'it was clear in 2009 when the insurgency began that the root cause of violence and anger in both the north and south of Nigeria is endemic poverty and hopelessness' (Alozieuwa, 2012, pp.4). The existence of very high incident of poverty in Nigeria is generally seen as a northern phenomenon. Poverty is higher in the Boko Haram infected regions of the North-East, North-West and North Central. A study by Charles Soludo shows that the three northern regions has an average poverty incidence of 70.1% as compared to 34.9% of the South. In comparison with the southeast and south west zones, which have relative poverty rates of 67% and 59.1% respectively, the north- east and north west have higher figures of 76.3% and 77.7% of relative poverty (Olojo, 2013, pp.6-7). Thus 70% of the people living in the north live below one dollar per day (Alozieuwa, 2012, pp: 5).It is this high level of poverty that pushes people to become members of Boko Haram. In May 2013, the Nigerian government released dozens of women and teenagers previously detained as relatives of suspected Boko Haram members. Among the youths were individuals who confessed of previously accepting payments of 5000 Nigerian Naira from Boko Haram militants, who in turn provided them with kegs of fuel to set schools ablaze in Maiduguri, Borno State. This is indicative of the economic desperation expressed by thousands of youths who have been rendered vulnerable by the shortcomings of Nigeria's leadership over several decades. The high conflict potential therefore could indeed be a function of frustration caused by economic deprivation.

3.3 The Corruption Theory

The worsening intolerable levels of poverty in Nigeria are caused by reckless high level of corruption in the country. As rightly asserted by Adetoro that corruption has taken deep roots in the Nigerian society as the country was ranked 90th most corrupt nation in the world in 2001 (Adenrele, 2012, pp.24). Virtually all the Nigerian ministries and agencies are known for their corrupt practices with Police ranked as the most corrupt among them. This explains why the Boko Haram insurgency is equally aggravated by law enforcement agencies 'complicity'. According to the Saturday Punch of 25 February 2012, the Nigerian General Inspector of Police and a Deputy Commissioner of Police had to be dismissed for negligence and conspiracy in the escape of one of the arrested leaders of Boko Haram. Even when it was reported that the explosives being used by the Boko Haram sects were stolen from warehouses in Sokoto, Borno, Bauchi and Gombe States in northern Nigeria, the security men were found culpable and the matters were not reported to the Police (Adisa, 2012). Similar ideas were expressed by Johnson (2011) who reported that 100s of extra-judicial killings and illegal public executions of Boko-Haram sects by the Nigerian Police as shown in Al-Jazeera television were allowed to go uninvestigated and unpunished as reported by Amnesty International. Utebor (2012) reported that a two term former Head of State and President of Nigeria, General Olusegun Obasanjo tagged the National Assembly political office holders as 'rogues' and 'armed robbers' due to their corrupt impetus especially in the oil scandal in Nigeria. This corroborated the earlier allegation of the Nigerian Central Bank Governor against Nigeria's political office holders, who are less than 1% of the total population, for appropriating more than 25% of the national budgets to themselves. Consequently, it is logical to state that the reckless popularity of corruption in Nigeria created the platform for Boko Haram's agitation for Sharia law in the country (Adrenrele, 2012, pp. 24).

3.4 The Political Feud Theory

In political terms, the Boko Haram phenomenon is perhaps more interesting because of the specific historical context in which it is occurring. First, while other Muslims may want to dissociate themselves from its activities, Boko Haram remains an Islamic movement. It is also occurring in a multi-religious political setting in which religion itself is a major factor in determining the distribution of political power. Second, its emergence was preceded by intense political bickering between some mainly political actors in the north and counterparts in the south in the period leading to the electoral victory of President Goodluck Jonathan, a Christian and southerner. In a political environment in which the power of incumbency is a major factor in determining electoral success, the fact that the victor in the contest superintended over the machinery of the state at the time of the election is a critical variable in conveying a sense of fair play or otherwise to the losing side. Through ingenious political engineering by the Nigerian power elite, a power sharing arrangement

was devised which rotates central power between the north and south. After eight years in the south under Olusegun Obasanjo's presidency power had returned to the north in May 2007 under Yar'Adua's presidency and was supposed to remain there for another eight years. Despite the constitutional provision that guarantees his succession by his deputy, Goodluck Jonathan, a southerner, the north was sour for having 'lost' power again to the south by virtue of Yar'Adua's death in May 2010 barely three years into office. The sense of loss, manifested in the tension in which Nigeria was soaked in the pre-2011 general elections period (Farrel 2012, pp:1-2)

The political feud perspective is premised primarily on the argument that while the extra-judicial killing of the leadership of the Boko Haram in 2009 could have triggered a violent confrontation with the state, the severity that the violence has now assumed is the fallout of a fierce political battle in 2011. The outcry at that time resonated around forcing Jonathan to give up his 2011 presidential ambition to allow for a return of power to the north.

3.5 The Islamic Theoretic State Theory

The Boko Haram sect has hardly masked its intention to bring down the Nigerian government, the Kufur system, and ultimately Islamize Nigeria. Total Islamization of Nigeria under the Sharia law has always been the motive behind various religious riots in Northern Nigeria. This motive has a long history and can be traced back to the era of jihad of Usman Dan Fodio. According to Farouk (2012), the Boko Haram insurgency only believed in the Quranic verse which states that "Anyone who is not governed by what Allah has revealed is among the transgressors" (Adenrele, 2012, pp.21). Lengmang (2011: pp.101) notes the allegation that some segments of the northern Muslim population may be unhappy with the compromise of state-level shari'a coexisting side by side with a secular federal system. Hence, although this segment may arguably be small, they are increasingly becoming radicalized and more willing to periodically express themselves through violence. In a statement issued by Boko Haram in Maiduguri on April 24, 2011, Suleiman (2011) reported that their objectives were to abolish democracy and institute Sharia law as they claimed to be fighting for justice and Islamization of Nigeria. Alzawahiri, one of the spokesman of the Boko Haram group submitted that: "we would continue to fight until Islam is well established and the Muslims regain their freedom all over Nigeria. We would never be ready to compromise and we don't need amnesty. The only solution to what is happening is for the government to repent, jettison democracy, drop the constitution and adopt the laws in the Holy Quran" (Suleiman, 2011, pp.50). To re-echo their interest in Islamisation of Nigeria, Usigbe (2012) reported that President Jonathan was recently threatened to embrace Islam or resign. According to the report, a leader of the sect known as Abubakar Shekau submitted in the youtube video that:

“I call on you President Goodluck Jonathan, you should abandon this ungodly power, you should repent and forsake Christianity, including Obama ...” (Usigbe, 2012, pp.1).

Boko Haram insurgents in Nigeria hold the vision of global political Islam, which is the overthrow of all worldly government and the enthronement of an Islamic theocratic state (Alozieuwa, 2012, pp: 8).

3.6 Conspiracy Theories

The conspiracy theories attempting to explain the Boko Haram crisis can be divided into two broad categories: one focusing on internal factors and other on external factors. Internal factors may include the disgruntled northern power elite who, having lost power are bent on bringing down Nigeria under a southern leadership. External factors may include powerful western states like the United States or neighboring African states envious of Nigeria’s progress and stability.

From the above brief discussion of various theories, one can identify certain factors that can explain the Boko Haram insurgency. These can be categorized under broad categories- economic, social and political. In the present paper, it is the economic and political factors that have been considered significant in explaining Boko Haram insurgency. It is these factors that create ground for the strengthening of social factors like religion and ethnicity. But for proper understanding of the role of economic and political factors one also needs to focus the psychological factors, the incorporation of which facilitate a better understanding of the reasons for the emergence of Boko Haram. The details of these factors follow:

Economic Factors

The economic disparity that prevails at both individual and regional level has created viable conditions for Boko Haram. The disparity existing at individual and regional level has a long history and can be traced back to the colonial period when the Britishers pursued differential policy. At the individual level differences have been created by factors like education. The southerners with better education than the northerners have experienced upward economic mobility while the northerners have lagged behind. In the creation of these economic differences the Britishers had a big role to play. By pursuing the policy of indirect rule, they did not make any attempt to bring changes in the Northern part. They were reluctant to introduce western education in the Northern part for they did not want any threat to their domination to emerge as had developed in the Southern region. The result was that the Northern region was left behind the Southern region in terms of education. One can get an idea of the variation between the two regions in terms of primary and secondary education from the 1962 Annual Digest of Education Statistics published by the Federal Ministry of Education. According to this, in 1962 there were 359,934

children in the Northern primary school and 1,266,566 children in the Eastern region. At the secondary level, there were 7,995 students in the North and 32,712 students in the East (Africa Diary, 1964, pp: 1832). The two regions North and South also differed in terms of enrollment of university students. For during 1966-67, the percentage of university students in the Northern part and the Southern region was 9% and 43.7% respectively (Rimlinger, 1976, pp: 43).

Persisting educational inequalities between different regions and ethnicities are now expressed in terms of states or zones. The Nigerian federation is currently made of 36 states which are then informally grouped into six zones-North-West, North-East, North-Central, South-West, South-East and South-South. The imbalance at all levels of education between these zones continues despite several government policies and programs. In 2000-2001, for instance the number of candidates seeking admission into the university showed that out of 36 states, the 6 states with largest number of candidates were all from the south; on the other hand, the 6 states with the least number of candidates were all from the north (Mustapha, 2004). The consequence of these educational disparities has been that the number of educated is higher in the Southern part than the Northern part. This disparity has two repercussions- a) the southerners were eligible for better economic opportunities as compared to the less qualified northerners and b) owing to lack of skills the northerners had to depend on the southerners who migrated to the north owing to the availability of economic opportunities. These two factors have played a vital role in generating a feeling of “relative deprivation” amongst the northerners. The idea of relative deprivation as propounded by scholars like T.R.Gurr, implies “actors” perceptions of discrepancy between their value expectations and value capabilities. According to Gurr, value expectations generally stands for the goods and conditions of life to which people believe they are rightfully entitled and conditions of life which they think they are capable of getting and keeping. The discrepancy between value expectations and value capabilities creates ground for the emergence of the frustration which then is released in the form of aggression (Gurr, 1970, pp: 24). The psychological theories that gained significance during the 1960’s therefore are very significant in enabling one to understand the reasons for the emergence of the Boko Haram movement.

Besides the disparities at the individual level, the differential policies pursued by the government at the regional level have also contributed to the emergence of feeling of frustration amongst the northerners.

At the time when the nation attained its liberation there existed three important geographical regions- North, East and West. Between these regions, there prevailed numerous differences in terms of area, population prosperity and ethnic composition. In terms of area, it is the Northern Region which is the largest followed by the Western region. If one sees the different regions in terms

of population, then it is the Northern region which is the largest; second was the Eastern region and then was the Western region. The variation between the regions also prevailed in terms of prosperity. The Northern region is the poorest while the other two regions are rich in resources like cocoa in the West and oil in the East (Forrest, 1993, pp:21). If one sees the regions in terms of ethnic composition, then one can conclude that each region is associated with the predominance of one particular ethnic group. In the Northern region it is the Hausa-Fulani; in the Western region, it is the Yorubas and in the Eastern region, it is the Ibos.

If one studies the economic development of the country in terms of industrialisation, one finds the concentration of industries in Lagos and low level of industrial development in the peripheral part of the country-North-East, North-West, Kwara and South-East (Rimlinger, 1976, pp: 50). The various studies therefore point out that manufacturing establishments are concentrated in several locations in the south with very few locations in the north.

The regional disparities prevailing have therefore created a ground amongst the northerners in generating amongst them a feeling of relative deprivation. The frustration generated by such deprivations has been played a vital role in giving momentum to the Boko Haram movement.

Besides the economic factors, one needs also to focus on certain political factors too in understanding the Boko Haram.

Political Factors:

What has been seen in the case of Nigeria that after its liberation in 1960, the reins of power has shifted in the hands of those rulers who have given more significance to the regions to which they belong and in the process they have sidelined the national interest. This gets clearly reflected in the way they formulated various policies. In the early years of liberation, power was vested in the leaders who basically hailed from the northern part of Nigeria. The northerners therefore greatly benefited from the policy of favoritism that was followed by the policy makers. The Prime Minister, a Northerner used his authority in such a way that the northerners occupied important position not only in the central government but also in the federal services. The Chairman of the Federal Republic Service Commission was a northerner. The permanent secretaries also belonged to the same group. In 1964, 14 of the 37 Nigerian employed as High Commissioners, Ambassadors and Charge-d'Affairs were Northerners, 3 of the 8 members of the board of the Nigerian Coal Corporation, 4 of the 11 Nigerian Railway Corporation and 6 of the 16 permanent secretaries were northerners (Nnoli 1978, pp:196).

Hence the northerners were in a position to exercise their domination not only on the basis of their merit but owing to the policy of favouritism that was pursued by their “own men” in the government. If one studies the political history of Nigeria, one finds that by and large the power has stayed in the hands of the leaders who basically hailed from the northern part of Nigeria. But inspite of have had the opportunity to produce majority of the Presidents and head of state, a careful analysis of their policy indicates that they have left the region barren thus arrested development. There is general failure of governance especially in the northern Nigeria. The region lags behind others on nearly all indices of human development. But the northern leaders have done nothing. In fact, they have exploited the ignorance of their people and have encouraged the traditional practices so that they can continue to rule without the poor masses challenging the status quo. They send their children to school abroad and upon returning home the kids take up important positions in government, big corporations or the private sector. Lacking skills or education or money, the almajiris and the talakawa continue to be used as pawns in the hands of the northern elites and politicians and have no chance of breaking free from this cycle of subjugation. The subjugation on the other is continued by employing all sorts of tools. One such tool is the Supreme Council of Sharia in Nigeria, which was formed in 1999. The policy pursued by the leaders therefore has facilitated the activities of Boko Haram (Raymond, 2013, pp: 1-2).

The northern elites therefore by using religion have succeeded in establishing a strong hold over the masses, who obey them without posing any question. So whenever this power has shifted from the northerners to the southerners, it has not been viewed positively by the northerners. This can well be seen in the present times. The shifting of power in the hands of Goodluck Jonathan has created lots of restlessness amongst the northerners. During his tenure that the Boko Haram activities have picked up great momentum because northerners perceive him as unresponsive to their needs.

The study of the above mentioned factors, therefore indicates that the movement which has accelerated its pace, is a product of not just one factor but numerous factors which are economic or political in nature and which have been given further momentum by the psychological factors.

4. Effects of Boko Haram and Response to it at National and International Level

The year 2009 has proved to be a critical year in the evolution of Boko Haram. A local dispute in Maiduguri between the police and members of the sect over the enforcement of a relatively insignificant motorcycle law led to riots and eventually to the burning down of a number of police stations. During a five day uprising more than 700 people were killed in clashes in Bauchi, Maiduguri and Poliskum.

In 2010 and after a period of relative tranquility, Boko Haram, under the new leadership of Iman Abubakar Shekau began a much more violent campaign against the federal state. Shootings and assassinations became an almost daily occurrence and the government again responded by deploying a large number of the security forces to the areas affected. Yet even though curfews were imposed throughout the area and many people were arrested. Boko Haram appeared to operate largely at will and indeed with a high degree of impunity. In one high profile event in September 2010, upto 200 Boko Haram militants were involved in an attack on a prison in Maiduguri. The militants managed to free over 700 people, including 150 of their own members. Boko Haram finally came to the attention of many international media outlets when a spokesperson telephoned the BBC to claim responsibility for a suspected suicide car bombing on 26 August 2011 at the United Nations Headquarters in Abuja. That attack left at least 18 people dead.

(Farrell, 2012, pp: 2) The killings by the supporters of the Boko Haram have increased over a period of time and thus have become a matter of concern for the present government owing to its serious implications. Some of these are-

4.1 Security Problem

The insurgency of Boko Haram in Nigeria have posed serious security challenges to Nigeria in the sense that people have been denied the freedom of movement due to fear of attack from members of Boko Haram particularly in some parts of Northern Nigeria where Boko Haram have taken over through planting of bombs as well as brutalized attack on innocent souls. These attacks have been not from Boko Haram alone but some groups are also using the presence of Boko Haram to go with their personal and ethical agenda through brutalizing people. Besides killing, kidnapping have also been used by some groups of people hiding under Boko Haram (Aro, pp: 9).

The activities of the Boko Haram in Nigeria therefore has led to palpable fear among the citizenry and high sense of insecurity due to regular loss of life and damage to properties and infrastructures on account of bombing and reported cases of assassination. The recent attack by the sect reflects clearly that the sect has no regard for any establishment including security, international agencies, press, private individuals, emirs, churches and mosques. It has left the impression that nobody is safe. The insecurity generated also has the tendency to breed religious unrest because of multitude of attacks on churches and of recently on Muslim prayer grounds. The inability of government to address the challenge posed by Boko Haram has led to the general belief that everybody needs to have his or her own security coverage. This will further compound the problem associated with proliferation of light arms.

4.2 Economic Effects

The militancy has slowed down the national economic growth and development since no investors would prefer to invest in a crisis ridden nation. It further compounded the problems associated with the relocation of Multinational Companies to safer territories in Africa like Ghana due to infrastructural decay. It has also contributed to near collapse of tourism industry as the nation loses huge foreign currency that could have accrued from this sector.

Boko Haram has led to the reduction of people's consumption of products from Northern Region because of rumors that members of Boko Haram are planning to send poisonous product from their region to other parts of Nigeria. This has negatively affected the business. Some of the businessmen had to close down, some of them had to retrench their workers and others had to cut down in the number of hours of operation.

The insurgency has had impact not only on the business but has also led to the migration of people. For the first time the country is experiencing migration where it is not the southerners alone that are migrating from the north but also the northerners on account of insecurity. The migrants therefore are putting additional pressure on the host communities in term of infrastructure and security challenges. Besides this, most of the migrants from the north are in their productive age and farmer and traders by profession. This has its serious consequences as their abandonment of their profession will have an effect on the food production. The food scarcity has led to the rise of prices of food items and vegetables and has also compounded the problem of food importation. According to Okpaga, Chijioke and Eme, Nigeria spends over 10 billion dollars on importation of four food items alone including sugar, wheat and rice (Alao, Atere and Alao, 2012, pp.9).

The migration has also contributed to the problem of unemployment and aggravated the problem of poverty.

Besides affecting the individuals, the Boko Haram Insurgency has also drastically reduced government derivation from the affected region due to restiveness in those places as well as reduced investment and growth of business in the affected places. According to the World Investment Report of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the lull in business activities caused by insecurity in Kano State alone has cost the Nigerian economy 1.3 trillion naira as a result of attacks by the Boko Haram group (Aro, pp:6)..

4.3 Political and Social Effects

Politically, the movement has affected the performance of government and its ability to deliver service to its citizens while social effect on the other hand connotes its effect on society and people's ways of life. The insurgency has

reduced drastically the government's days of performance in the affected areas. The confusion created by Boko Haram has prevented the President to fulfil the larger parts of his promises.

The social effect of Boko Haram has been that the activities of Boko Haram have made some Nigerians who are serving the Nation under the scheme of National Youth Service Corp to reject posting to some part of Northern Nigeria(Aro,pp:8), thus creating social division between regions.

4.4 Effect on Diplomatic Relationship

The Boko Haram insurgency has seriously affected the relationship between Nigeria and other Nation of the World. The bombing coupled with kidnapping and hostage taking with or without demand for ransome particularly of foreigners has affected its relationship with other countries. Sometime back United States of America had warned her nationals not to go to some states in Nigeria (Aro, pp:9)

The Boko Haram Insurgency have evoked serious responses both at thenational and international level. In March, 2013, Nigeria's National Security Advisor, Mohammad Sambo Dasuki announced a new strategy of the federal government focusing on a relatively soft stand relating to counter insurgency the aim of which was to prevent further radicalization of the local population through wide ranging co-operation with faith based organisations, local government bodies and traditional government structures. Following the strong public reaction to the kidnapping of school girls in April, 2014, the Minister of Finance, Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala announced the government's new financial stimulus to the counter- insurgency effort which now includes a 'Marshall Plan' for northern Nigeria, in addition to more funding and recruitment of soldiers and international efforts to cut off Boko Haram's funding. The international community in particular has stressed the importance of a non- military solution to the situation in the north.

The Nigerian government has also adopted a number of legal measures in the wake of Boko Haram's terrorist activities including the 2013 proscription notice which officially declared the acts of Boko Haram illegal and labeled them as acts of terrorism.. In April 2013, President Jonathan set up a special committee, officially titled the committee on Dialogue and Peaceful Resolution of Security Challenges in the North. Its recommendations included the establishment of an advisory group for dialogue with Boko Haram and a victims support fund (Crisis Group Africa Report N.216, 2014, pp.20).

Besides, the concern and efforts of the national government, the International response to the security crisis in Nigeria has been intensified following the Chibok abductions. Countries like United States, China, Israel, the United

Kingdom and France have provided assistance for locating the kidnapped girls. The United States President dispatched a team to provide military, law enforcement and intelligence assistance at the beginning of May 2014. To tackle the Boko Haram problem and to find solutions to the problem, several conferences and summits have been held in Europe including one on 17th May, 2014 in Paris and the other in London on 12th June, 2014 under the auspices respectively of President Francois Hollande and Prime-Minister David Cameron (Crisis Group Africa Report, N.216, 2013, pp.20). The summit brought together the heads of state of Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger and other regional players with a vested interest in addressing the security threat. The Paris Summits outcome was a joint declaration of war on Boko Haram as well as plans for better information sharing and cross-border co-operation. This declared co-operation advanced further in July 2014, when Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon committed to provide 700 troops each to create for the first time a joint regional force to tackle the crisis. The international community has also branded Boko Haram as a terrorist organisation.

The African Union condemned the activities of Boko Haram and the regional bodies like the Economic Community of West African States spoke out against the organisation condemning its activities and called for greater regional co-operation, especially information sharing to effectively fight the terrorist groups. The increasing interest of the neighboring states in particular reflects the spillover effect that has become increasingly visible in the wake of the cross-border population movements.

The Nigerian government secured the UN Security Council's blacklisting of Boko Haram on 23 May, 2014. This has led to travel bans, freezing of assets and other measures. Similarly, the European Union under Regulation No. 583/2014 (entering into force on 29 May, 2014) added Boko Haram to the lists of persons, groups and entities which are covered by the resolution of freezing of funds and economic resources.

The European Parliament in its newly elected 8th legislature took a strong stance against Boko Haram and the overall insecurity crisis in Nigeria. In resolution 0024/2014 which was adopted in July 2014, Parliament not only condemns the attacks and killings but urges the government of Nigeria to address the root causes of the insurgency including the lack of efficient and impartial judiciary (Crisis Group Africa Report N.216, 2014, pp.21)

5. Conclusion

The multitude implications of the Boko Haram insurgency should be taken by the government seriously. The government needs to take serious measures to tackle the movement. The problem of poverty and unemployment amongst the

youth need to be addressed by the government for poverty and unemployment intensifies the inclination to commit crime. The government needs to adopt a peaceful approach to understand the motivating force and reason behind actions and adopt measures ranging from consultation or peaceful intervention rather than excessive militarization to dilute the tension and conflict. The government should direct its efforts to get the cross section of Northern Emirs and prominent individuals involved in a genuine dialogue with the leaders of the group. In doing so the government should not shy away from punishing those found guilty. The government should adopt an effective measure to ensure homeland security. There is a need to formulate policy that involves the traditional rulers and local notables in the running of local government for local policing. The grass root implementation of security policy will not only make every village or town secured but will in turn lead to the building of a secured nation. The peaceful approach of the government accompanied by practical solutions addressing the root cause of the movement can go a long way in providing a viable solution to Boko Haram.

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Populist Politics and Electoral Democracy: A Study of Mamata Banerjee

Sumit Howladar

Abstract

One crucial factor behind Mamata Banerjee's enormous success in the landmark 2011 assembly election in West Bengal has undoubtedly been her populist style of functioning. In this paper I examine whether her politics can be labelled as a pathological political phenomenon or as an authentic form of political representation. I try and locate the element of 'the people' and see how she maintains a fine balance between the heterogeneous interests surrounding it juxtaposed against legitimacy and accountability. Lastly I analyse the possibility of ushering of certain self-imposed qualifications and limitations within the larger ambit of her populist style of functioning.

Keywords: Populism, Democracy, the people, Neo-liberal, Legitimacy

1. Introduction

The 2011 assembly election in West Bengal was a landmark in the political history of not only the state of West Bengal but of the country as a whole. The longest serving Left regime collapsed after thirty-four years and the main force behind this has been the fiery politician named Mamata Banerjee. That she had achieved massive personal popularity was clearly demonstrated by the high endorsement at the elections and the scenes of public acclaim. Behind this massive success of Mamata Banerjee one of her characteristics which according to many have done the wonders is her populist style of functioning. Her coming to power has clearly demonstrated the fact that populism is no more a marginal phenomenon in the world of politics. Two images of populism are well-established: it is either labelled as a pathological political phenomenon, or it is regarded as the most authentic form of political representation (Kaltwasser, 2012). I will try and explore in the following pages as to which of the above mentioned images fits into Mamata Banerjee's scheme of politics.

2. Politics of Redistribution Vis-à-vis Antagonism

With the coming of Mamata Banerjee to power there has been an effort to redefine the way power is distributed along the various spectres. What makes a politics 'populist' is not a particular, definable set of values or a particular social, political or economic programme but rather an antagonism to existing orthodoxies, to elite values and to the existing hierarchies governing the way in which power is organised and distributed (Vincent, 2011). The entire political career of Mamata Banerjee has been a proof to the fact that she has had this growing antagonism towards the various political formations active in the state. Even the formation of her political party has been the resultant effect of this

sense of antagonism. The parallel growing sense of antagonism among the common masses especially the middle class and the rural folk because of their own set of reasons ultimately provided her with the golden opportunity to successfully take the fight against the ruling political class to a culminating stage. We need to understand the fact that Mamata Banerjee's embracing populism is not merely an act of opportunism but is rather a response to social demand. She may have been opportunist but the fact remains that there would not have been any scope for this opportunistic behaviour had there not been a social demand for it. The logic and pattern of neo-liberal development (to which the Left Front regime had fallen for in the last leg of its rule) had over the time created a large section of under-privileged and neglected people. The social demand was basically an articulation of their hopes and grievances. One of the important aspects involved with this entire movement is the important idea of revival of democratic norms and practices. Goodwyn views Populism not as a moment of triumph, but as a moment of "democratic promise." To further use his words it was a 'spirit of egalitarian hope'.

It was a demonstration of how people of a society ... could generate their own culture of democratic aspiration in order to challenge the received culture of democratic hierarchy. The agrarian revolt demonstrated how intimidated people could create for themselves the psychological space ... to be autonomous in the presence of powerful new institutions of economic concentration and cultural regimentation. ... The Populists believed they could work together to be free individually (Goodwyn, 1976).

With the ushering of the movement and ultimately taking an overt form in the forms of Nandigram and Singur struggles, the entity called 'people' went through a psychological transformation. By working together and challenging the status quo, they began to sense their power and in the process gained self-confidence and self-respect. In recent times there has been an interesting development whereby this newly emergent sense of self-confidence has been neatly intertwined with the politics of redistribution by Mamata Banerjee. Through her signature style of conducting politics she has successfully provided a significant political space to a large section of earlier neglected population in the state. This includes members of certain caste and religious groups. In the recent past she has exhibited substantial political maturity by going out of the way to invite people from the Left sympathizing sections to join her party in order to efficiently bar the intrusion of the BJP into the political scene and fabric of the state. Though for some this has been reflective of the opportunistic political line of the Trinamool Congress but many have hailed this as a right step towards bolstering democratic functioning in the state. To use the words of Canovan, the phase just before the coming of Mamata Banerjee to power was

surely a 'redemptive' phase of democracy wherein there was an effort to bring democracy in the real sense of the term which was viewed as the promise of a better world through action by the sovereign people. Whereas the phase after her ascendancy to the helm of power in the state needs to be ideally a 'pragmatic' phase of democracy wherein there should be an effort to cope with conflicting interests and views under conditions of mass mobilization and mass communication. Whether we are going to witness the 'redemptive' or 'pragmatic' faces of democracy in their exclusivity or a fine mix of both the elements in the politics of Trinamool Congress under the leadership of Mamata Banerjee is something to be seen in the coming days.

3. The Popular Will

According to Di Tella populism is the result of the convergence of two anti-status-quo forces, the dispossessed masses available for mobilization and the educated elite that resents its status incongruence... and broods on ways of changing the current state of things. This is what has happened in West Bengal. From the year 2006 onwards there was this overt express of displeasure by a large section of the rural agricultural class against the policy decisions of the Left Front regime. This ultimately culminated into the fierce clash between the farmers and the government surrounding the issue of industrialisation and land acquisition. Coupled with this was also the long time resentment of the middle class in the state as far as their economic prospects and aspects were concerned. During this phase the people were the legitimising authority behind every action of Mamata Banerjee. The most important rhetorical device employed in a politics of populism is the appeal to 'the people' as the legitimising authority for a particular set of ideas (Vincent, 2011). Mamata Banerjee has very tacitly cum tactfully employed the people as the legitimising force for her actions. She has been successful in celebrating this entity called 'people' and has juxtaposed this against the elite nature of the Left regime especially in relation to their growing distance with the common masses. For there to be populist leaders, there has to be a people- a widespread belief that the social base of society has a collective will, not simply a variety of individual and group interests as in liberalism (Crick, 2005). It was Mamata Banerjee who gave voice to this collective will and successfully placed it at a higher pedestal as compared to narrow group and individual interests. Today populist leaders couple the sacred names of 'nation' and 'people' and they are impatient of procedures that frustrate the alleged popular will. They want a direct relationship between 'the people' and government (Crick, 2005). But it will be surely an error of judgement to conceive that Mamata Banerjee has been successful to completely do away with these narrow group and individual interests. Rather what she has been able to achieve is to defer the overt exhibition of these narrow group and individual interests in the public realm. Though the resultant subtle effect of this has been that these very particular set of interests are now cropping up in a very strong way which in the long run has the potential of miring the 'collective' or

‘popular’ will. The maintenance of a fine balance between these various set of interests while at the same time taking into account the heterogeneous nature of the concept of ‘people’ within the larger schema of populist politics is something which is going to be a litmus test for Mamata Banerjee in the distant if not the near future.

4. The Elements of Legitimacy and Accountability

Mamata Banerjee has successfully transformed herself into a public figure with whom a large chunk of the population can identify. She has used the media and her public appearances to convey an image and sense of constant and dominating presence in public space. She has in some ways re-crafted the ways of presenting herself in order to become more and more close to the ordinary people. This is one aspect where she has been undoubtedly much more successful than most other players in the political arena. She seems to have grasped at a very early stage of her political career the very fact that presenting herself as an enemy of the Left conveys an appealing message to her mass audience. But coupled with this is attached the paradoxical situation wherein Mamata has to take some hard decisions even crossing over the minimum threshold of democratic behaviour. When institutions have the full backing of civil society, they can pursue the values of the democratic regime. If, in contrast, the institutions postpone their objectives and expend energy and resources on consolidating and maintaining their legitimacy, then crossing over even the minimum threshold for democracy becomes a remarkable feat (Morlino, 2004). Populism often is pushed forward by individual or collective leadership, but to be effective in a democratic system, populist ideology has to resonate with widely held beliefs and this may limit the claims and policy changes populist leaders wish to make (Wyatt, 2013). This is something with which Mamata Banerjee seems to have been struggling for some time now. For her right now it is the maintenance of her legitimacy which is the greatest concern, for it is this very element which is going to guarantee her continuance in power and will open the paths for future manoeuvres as well.

Accountability is a core feature in the experience of representative democracy- as it grants citizens and civil society in general an effective means of control over political institutions. As far as the liberal tradition is concerned accountability is implicitly based on two assumptions. The first assumption is that if citizens are genuinely given the opportunity to evaluate the responsibility of government in terms of satisfaction of their own needs and requests, they are, in fact, capable of doing so, possessing above all a relatively accurate perception of their own needs. The second assumption is that citizens, either alone or as part of a group, are the only possible judges of their own needs. Indeed, judgements on responsibility imply that there is some awareness of the actual demands, and that the evaluation of the government’s response is related to how its actions either conform to or diverge from the interests of its electors. In fact, the idea that educated, informed and politically engaged citizens always know their own

needs and desires is, at best, an assumption, especially tenuous in situations where citizens might need specialized knowledge to accurately identify and evaluate those very needs and desires. However, too much dependence on common people's intellect for evaluating her government's performance is neither in favour of nor in tandem with the body of politics. The power of defining the welfare of the people needs to rest in her hands. Anything other than that is bound to create clash of interests keeping in view the various economic and social undercurrents prevalent in the state (though this does not entirely negate the possibility of hers taking into account the opinions of various groups).

Schedler suggests that accountability has three main features: information, justification and punishment/compensation (Morlino, 2004). The first element, information on the political act or series of acts by a given politician or political body (the government, parliament, and so on), is indispensable for attributing responsibility. Refusal to state publicly hard but necessary truths can, exacerbate the contempt in which populist leaders so often hold not just particular politicians, but the political process itself (Crick, 2005). This failure to state hard truths (and sometimes even hiding them) by the Left Front government regarding mainly the economic condition of the state, has been one of the major points of allegations by Mamata Banerjee. Hence the bigger responsibility lies on Mamata Banerjee herself to change the entire course of action as far as the dissemination of correct information to the common people is concerned. This is going to be a hard test for Mamata's political acumen because if strictly adhered to, it might prove very costly for her in the short term, although non-adherence to this principle might be costlier in the long run. This act is intrinsically linked with the two other aspects of justification and punishment/compensation.

5. 'The People' and 'The Enemy'

The concept of popular sovereignty is the populist's trump card. It is this very concept of popular sovereignty which has been given concrete shape and voice by the politics of Mamata Banerjee. The plasticity of the concept of 'the people' assists the individual populist, for whom it can expand or contract to suit the chosen criteria of inclusion or exclusion (Stanley, 2008). As far as Mamata Banerjee's populist style of politics is concerned it has been rather conspicuously hazy about who 'the people' are, conceiving them variously as the dispossessed, the hard-working middle classes, the burdened taxpayers, the 'common man', the moral majority, and so on. Regardless of all the vagueness, the populist rendering of 'the people' requires the standard distinction between a certain 'us' and 'them' characteristic of political oppositions. This presupposes an effort to configure the identity of 'the people' and to specify the disagreement that pitches them against named adversaries- the elites, Government, etc. This is correct, but even then the populist 'us' remains conveniently vague. It does so in order to blur the contours of 'the people' sufficiently as to encompass anyone with a grievance structured around a perceived exclusion from a public domain

of interaction and decision hegemonised by economic, political, or cultural elite. The heterogeneous composition of the 'people' has been successfully brought under one unified identity by Mamata Banerjee. The identification of one primary enemy (in this case the CPI(M) led Left Front) by her has helped in this process of consolidation. As Lepper has very rightly pointed out that populist seek to portray themselves as sounding boards which resonate with the reason of the ordinary person. Mamata Banerjee's content and style of politics resonates with the reason of the common people of the state.

Populism can also be conceived of as a kind of democratic corrective since it gives voice to groups that do not feel represented by the elites, and forces them to react and change the political agenda. Populism cannot be described as anti-democratic per se, but rather as a way to fill the vacuum that is being left by the growing chasm between governed and governors. When a society is characterized by high levels of economic, political and social exclusion, populism is a method through which disadvantaged groups may give their voice and lead to the implementation of policies that they prefer (Kaltwasser, 2012).

Mamata Banerjee has given voice to these underprivileged groups and portrayed her scheme of politics as an attempt to correct the course of democratic functioning in the state. As a discursive logic of political articulation, populism follows a particular path involved in hegemonic politics: first the linking of heterogeneous demands, then the formation of a collective identity through the recognition of an enemy (that is, 'the establishment'), and finally the affective investment in one leader that represents 'the people' (Nielsen, 2006). Mamata Banerjee has repeatedly emphasised her physical proximity to the people and simultaneous distance from the elites. Kurt Weyland...define populism as a political strategy with three characteristics: an appeal to a heterogeneous mass of followers, many of whom are subjectively or objectively excluded; a low level of institutionalization of the movement; and finally a direct relationship between the leader and the followers (Weyland, 2001).

Populism involves not only identifying the people as the underdog, but also celebrating them as the people; similarly it is not only about identifying the elites with reference to their structural position as antagonists of the people, but also condemning them for the identities and interests they represent. The positive-negative schema allows the populist to posit antithetical criteria by which the people and the elite can be identified (Stanley, 2008).

The scheme of populist activities has helped Mamata Banerjee to very categorically highlight this positive-negative schema and also to remain on the positive side. The interesting observation to be made here is that the non-adherence to any particular set of ideologies has been a boon to her as far as this situation is concerned. As the populist leaders do not believe in a well-defined ideology that needs to be adhered to, they are free to borrow at will from diverse political traditions (Albertazzi, 2006). The populist style of functioning carries within it a great sense of adaptability. Mamata Banerjee's grammar of politics has not been restricted by any particular set of codified norms or regulations instead they have been formed and restructured by the needs of the time and context in which they are to be applied. Ben Stanley has very rightly commented that ideologies are not products only of logical thought-processes but must resonate with the context in which they are located. And it is this phenomenon which Mamata Banerjee has very skilfully appropriated.

6. The Radical Democratic Project

According to the liberal approach, populism is a democratic pathology because it brings about disruptive forces that transgress both individual rights and representative institutions. This challenge goes back to the classical analysis of Alexis de Tocqueville and his concern with the emergence of a 'tyranny of the majority'. In saying this, he criticized the formation of a democratic rule in which the opinion of the majority achieves the same status as the king in an aristocratic rule, so that both the interests and existence of the minorities are likely to be in danger. Mamata Banerjee has even tried to skilfully tackle this aspect whereby she has promised of abjuring violence against the political opponents (Bodla noy, bodol chai) and taking into consideration the sentiments of people from different shades and walks of life for the fulfilment of the ultimate goal of development.

Populism is a sort of democratic extremism, which is not shared by actors and parties that defend the existence of constitutional limits on the expression of the general will (Kaltwasser, 2012). Populist leader tends to define political competition as a total war between the people and their enemies. From this angle, the respect of certain rules of the democratic game tends to be a secondary issue. But this is also interestingly linked with the negative role that the leader might play in the development of a radical democratic project. As authors like Arditì and Žižek have argued, Laclau deals with the potential underside of a populist leader, which by incarnating the unity of the people, might produce a travesty of empowerment by subjecting 'the people' to his/her dictates. By contrast to the strong organization provided by an institutionalized party and the stable connections established by patron-client ties, the relationship between populist leaders and their mass constituency is un-institutionalised and fluid (Weyland, 2001). This un-institutionalised nature of arrangement and the fluidity is many a times looked upon as the precursor to a radical scheme of politics.

Not only is the relationship but also the very base of support that is ‘the people’ itself heterogeneous in nature with conflicting interests and resultantly having the very potential of affecting the functionality of governance. Weyland considers populism as a political strategy through which a personalist leader seeks or exercises government power based on direct support from large numbers of mostly unorganized followers (Kaltwasser, 2012).

By way of emphasising their closeness to the grassroots and their distance from the political establishment, the populist leaders also tend to use colourful and undiplomatic language. This has been one of the most highly talked about traits of Mamata Banerjee. It has been her highly published and declared agenda that she is here to reclaim power for the people. But in this exercise of reclaiming power for the people she has to face the issue of democratic paradox as has been described by Margaret Canovan. She talks of the democratic paradox where the democratic project is to bring the mass of the people into politics; but making this possible requires institutional arrangements that are too complex for most people to grasp in imagination. Business as usual in the state seems to be run by jaded political impresarios whereas the voices of the amateurs which include a large number of common people seem to be unheard after a particular limit or extent. Moreover, the populist leader’s disdain for the procedural channels and for the checks and balances of the democratic process reflects a strong anti-establishment ethos.

Like Rousseau, populists distrust representation as a corruption of the general will and see themselves less as representatives than as the actual voice of the people, but, unlike Rousseau, they also distrust initiatives that empower citizens and that encourage their autonomous initiatives. This ambivalent oscillation between the independent action of the people and the instrumental appropriation of that action furnishes populist representation with a convenient alibi (Arditi, 2003).

Politics in representative democracy generally presupposes the priority of institutional mediations over charisma, the presence of checks and balances to limit the discretionary powers of political leaders, the widespread practice of reaching agreements through negotiations among political elites, and so on. Populism disrupts democracy by mounting its challenge on the redemptive face of democracy, often to the detriment of law and order. The cult of personality can transform leaders into quasi-messianic figures for whom accountability is not a relevant issue, and the populist disregard for institutional checks and balances can encourage rule by decree and all sorts of authoritarian behaviour while maintaining a democratic facade.

The presence of a populist mode of representation in liberal democracies is not just an arithmetic addition to that setting; it

also brings about a geometric dislocation insofar as it permeates the practice of democratic politics itself. Populism can remain within the bounds of democracy but can also reach the point where they enter into conflict and perhaps even go their own separate ways (Arditi, 2003).

Whether Mamata Banerjee has been able to maintain the professed aim of restoring some dignity to politics is something which is highly debateable.

7. Engaging With Neo-Liberal Agenda

One of the interesting aspects in the entire scheme of populist politics is the clubbing of neo-liberal agenda and the support of the very groups who have been affected by those very policies.

The most puzzling characteristic of these leaders is the fact that they succeeded in engaging support for neo-liberal agendas from society's subordinated groups, those groups who are most damaged by neo-liberal policies. The support of the lower classes for leaders who combine a populist rhetoric with neo-liberal policies is not the result of the irrationality, their primitiveness or their manipulation by unscrupulous leaders, but the result of the continued weight of the past experience of partial inclusion as well as the absence of true inclusive alternatives (Filc, 2011).

But it is to be borne in mind that the very dynamics which provide the avenues for (Friedman, 1999) democratic consolidation may not always act as the parameters for the measurement of the legitimacy of democratic practises. On the contrary they may even sometimes be considered as the de-legitimizing factors. These factors may include the uncritical acceptance of the institutions in place, simple obedience for a lack of better alternatives, or negative memories of the past. Sometimes the populist vision to develop a more regulated and equitable capitalism can eventually lose because of the presence of more powerful political and economic interests. When your country ... recognizes the rules of the free market in today's global economy, and decides to abide by them, it puts on what I call 'the Golden Straitjacket (Friedman, 1999). According to Friedman, as a country complies with this Golden Straitjacket its economy will foster growth but the political sphere will shrink as the parameters for policy choice are narrowed substantially (Plante, 2008). This is one of the important factors which Mamata Banerjee has to deal with in the coming times. On the one hand there lies in front of her the mammoth task of economic development of the state for which she (though unwillingly) may have to give in at times to the logic of free market economy. On the other hand this is going to narrow down her policy choices in some respects which again is incompatible to her style of

politics. The interesting thing to look out for in the future is how she brings about a fine balance between the two without risking her political position in the state.

8. Conclusion

As the American sociologist Edward Shils has rightly suggested that populism has two aspects: the supremacy of the will of the people and its endeavour to create a direct relationship between people and government, so it is exactly these efforts what is reflected in the actions of Mamata Banerjee. To use the words of Jean-Marie Le Pen populism precisely is taking into account the people's opinion.

Have people the right, in a democracy, to hold an opinion? If that is the case, then yes, I am a populist (Pen, 2005).

Populism as an ideology is dedicated to identifying the people as the privileged subject of politics and justifying their place on that pedestal. But in this endeavour great care needs to be taken as far as the maintenance of the sanctity of the democratic process is concerned. According to Schmitt the populist subscribes to the doctrine that [t]he specific political distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is that between friend and enemy. The denouncement of particular politicians is warranted, but the denouncement of the political process is unwarranted for. Beatrice Webb once said that democracy is not the multiplication of ignorant opinions. There is the undeniable fact that there is a need to draw a distinction between opinion and knowledge.

...even 'democracy' needs some qualification or limitation, especially at a time when political leaders tend to speak in emotive 'sound bites' or slogans on a level seemingly set by the great dis-educator of our times... the populist tabloid press (Crick, 2005).

Whether there will be the ushering of a process of certain self-imposed qualifications and limitations within the larger ambit of the populist style of functioning by Mamata Banerjee is surely a question of grave importance for the prevalence of democratic atmosphere in the state. Laclua has commented that if populism consists in postulating a radical alternative within the communitarian space, a choice in the crossroads on which the future of a given society hinges, does not populism become synonymous with politics? To this he has said that the answer can only be affirmative. There is an urgent need today to re-examine this alleged synonymous relation which populism shares with politics.

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Collective Mobilisation for Shelter: Politics of Informal Housing in Chandigarh Slums

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Abstract

The Major aim of the paper is to examine the patterns of collective mobilisation taking place in urban slums through a case study of grassroots mobilization around evictions and unavailability of security of tenure in selected slums of Chandigarh city. The biggest problem being faced by informal settlers in urban cities in the present times is the lack of adequate shelter and security of land tenure. Demolition drives and rehabilitation process started at large scale for the so called 'city beautiful' during the year 2013-2014 have compelled the slum dwellers to have more collective efforts. The paper uses an analytical narrative approach to account for patterns in collective behaviour, drawing on both quantitative and qualitative data gathered through interviews with 200 slum dwellers residing in Chandigarh city. Inferences drawn from the study reflect that dissent over demolition act and rehabilitation process for shelter gave significant rise to the collective mobilisation in the slums. Slum colonies are enjoying more exposure to outer world and support of local leaders or various grassroots organisations provide more potential for collective mobilisation.

Key Words: Collective Mobilisation, Eviction, Demolition, Urban Poor, Informal Settlements, Rehabilitation, Adequate

1. Introduction

Across the globe, there is growing evidence of frequent espousal of collective efforts by relatively powerless groups, specifically informal settlers in defending particular urban spaces and influencing urban development. Collective community efforts in contemporary period became an inevitable aspect of socio-political and economic life of marginalized section in the urban societies. The groups associated with poverty reduction recognised collective mobilisation as a meaningful political instrument to fulfil the basic demands of poor people. Among the various approaches to define, assess and solve the problems of informal settlements, collective mobilisation is considered as the most effective way to solve the day to day problems. Within the literature of urban studies an important sub-discipline, concerning the role of urban movements or collective efforts as initiators of social change, holds the central place.

One popular viewpoint in existing studies on this aspect reflects that poor people living at the margins of socio-economic structures do not share similar norms and values of mainstream society. Edelman (1964), Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995), Krishna (2002), Klesner (2007) and Perlman (1976, 2004) in their studies mentioned that socio-economic marginality leads to lesser participation in political activities and sometimes encourages use of improper means. Poor

people share a very low level of social capital. This viewpoint suggests that government assistance serves as a lifeline for many poor citizens and thus, suppresses any anger or resentment that might inspire any collective social and political efforts and participation. Brady, Verba and Schlozman (1995:275) in their study has mentioned that low-income citizens often do not possess the financial resources, free time, civic skills, to participate effectively in the political actions and the socio-political activities. Activities, such as contacting a public official or working on a campaign, require certain “civic skills” that can be acquired in various nonpolitical settings. But, because poor citizens are so poorly endowed with these participatory factors, over time they have become a very inactive group.ⁱ Along with this perspective there are two more theories ‘The Culture of Poverty’ and ‘Concept of Marginality’. These theories also provide explanations for less participation of slum residents in the collective and political activities. These theories shows that the slum dwellers have little interest and awareness of political events and they lack an internal political organization. Oscar Lewis in his thesis of ‘Culture of Poverty’ also puts forth the idea that poor people are characterized by low aspirations, political apathy, helplessness and disorganization.ⁱⁱ Theory of Marginality claims that disorientation of poor people towards collective efforts and political activities are due to their baggage of traditional (rural) norms and values which prevents their successful adaptation to the urban style of life.ⁱⁱⁱ

After going through the above given theories, it becomes clear that in these studies slums are seen as places which are socially and politically disintegrated and un-organised. These theories propose that poor people residing in squatters’ lack internal organisational qualities and have little interest in collective actions. The theories claiming lesser participation and disorientation of slum residents in collective actions may not be pertinent in many poor urban set-ups in contemporary period. Street people in urban set-up now seek more visibility in associational and political activities as it help informal settlers in urban area to acquire many governmental benefits. Their visibility can enable them to associate with allocation of funds, infrastructure and facilities.^{iv} Therefore, another set of literature on participation of urban poor in collective efforts and political activities offers the contrary perspective regarding participation. This viewpoint sees urban poor as active participant like any other group in the society. Lawless & Fox (2001:365) and Low (1999:15) in their studies saw that urban poor shows large extent of involvement in political activities and collective actions for adequate shelter and security of tenure which involve the conflict among government institutions, planning experts and local communities. Similar kind of views are provided by Castells (2012:15) in his theory on collective consumption that some issues, such as housing and environment have great impact on collective actions of all the groups in the society. The shared experiences of living in an illegal colony and common interests for security of tenure lead to the formation of collective identity. Fear, emotions and vulnerable position of slum residents play a really important role in creating collective actions /efforts in the informal settlements.^v

Investigation of literature in detail reflects that the notion of the urban poor including the ones living without shelter or in slums has changed and they are now recognized as a vital section of

the contemporary society. Literature also reveals that consciousness of collective identity stems from the common grievances of the families, largely regarding inaccessibility of adequate shelter, demolition and eviction process in the informal settlements. Fear, emotions and vulnerable position of slum residents insist them to take collective actions against authorities in the informal settlements. Modern cities in the world remain a mystery to the poor migrants, as they accept migrants only as workers to get services for middle classes and upper classes, but do not consider them full citizens by denying them housing rights. Residents of informal settlements attempt to make city inclusive for them by showing their collective strength against the exclusionary nature of the city authority.

In the above given context this research paper analyzes the nature of collective mobilization taking place in urban spaces through a case study of grassroots mobilization happening around evictions in selected slums of Chandigarh city. In order to explain the nature of collective mobilization, this paper focuses on the nature of protests, demonstrations and campaigns made by slum residents against authority, role of local leaders in these collective efforts, exclusionary process occurring in the slums, various attempts made by authority to provide basic amenities. The present study helps in finding out about those circumstances which mobilize people around urban issues and factors that either restrain or encourage potential urban protests. This study helps to find out what motivates the slum dwellers to take participation in urban social movement activities.

In the present study data is generated by using a mix of quantitative and qualitative method. Semi-structured questionnaire is used to collect relevant information. To get views from the slums residents, the personal in-depth interviews and focus groups discussion were followed. For the field study, four slum informal settlements Labour Colony Number-4, Janta & Labour Colony Sector 25, Nehru Colony and Madras Colony were selected. All the four slums are geographically scattered (the sample scattered in different direction of city) and among the largest slums (most populated slums of the city) of Chandigarh city. From these 4 colonies; 200 slum residents (50 from each) of different ages, works, gender and different places on the basis of random sampling were interviewed. Most questions asked were kept open-ended for the residents. Along with primary sources information has been gathered from CRRID reports, Chandigarh Housing Board, Planning Commission Reports, City Planning Development Department, Ministry of Housing and Poverty Alleviation Reports and Chandigarh Administration. This research paper has been divided in mainly two sections, the first part attempts to explain the problems for shelter and politics of dissent in slums, second part of the paper deals with the collective efforts made by informal settlers against demolition and for providing adequate housing facilities in slums..

2. Politics of Dissent in Informal Settlements: An Evaluation

The frequent choice for collective action or mobilisation by relatively powerless groups in recent period suggests that protest and demonstration represents an important aspect of low income

group politics in the society. Alternative of protest has been recognized as a meaningful political instrument for the fulfilment of basic amenities in the low income group politics. For most of the urban poor, mobilization means fighting for and defending a place to live in the city and more broadly, the right to maintain and maybe to enhance their livelihoods. When the urban poor come across a problem at community level, specifically regarding public services or basic amenities, they attempt to solve it collectively. Collective mobilization can be defined most simply as any broad social alliance of people who are associated in seeking to influence authority for change. Community efforts of low income groups are essentially the products of discontent of residents against unavailability of basic services. Through their collective actions/efforts low income groups attempt to transform the public authorities to become more humane and responsive to the sufferings of slum residents. Collective actions in slums are mainly exhibited in the forms of protests, direct confrontation, demonstration, agitations, rallies and participating in self-help programmes of neighbourhood communities. Mobilisation process in slums expressed through wide range of practices is strongly connected with ground level organizations to contest the dominant forces (governmental institutions and administrative authorities) in urban spaces. Socio-economic and political conflicts and expectations of the people are reflected through these collective efforts/movements.

In their collective efforts, slum residents either make demands for basic services or show dissatisfaction against administration and government authority. Field visits demonstrated that slum dwellers were involved in protests and demonstrations against authority while demanding the shelter and other civic amenities (water, electricity, public distribution system, health facilities, educational services, sanitation facility, street lights and roads etc.) in slums. In order to make the Chandigarh administration hear their voices, they came and protested on the roads multiple times. While analysing the participation of slum residents from selected colonies in demonstration against authority, it was found that around 60% had participated in demonstration/protest once and more than once in last five years.

Table 1: Participation of Respondents in Protests and Demonstration

Name of Colony	Number of Respondents Participated in any Demonstration/Protest in last five years
Labour Colony No. 4	41
Slum Colony at Sector 25	29
Madras Colony	39
Nehru Colony	21

Total -200 (50 from each slum)	130
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Source: Field Visit of Four Slum Colonies (January to April 2013)

Out of 60% slum residents around 45% respondents answered that they had participated in protests more than five times. While providing more information on collective efforts 54 % of respondents mentioned that they participated against demolition/eviction process, water and electricity supply, and delay/un-availability of ration through public distribution system. Very few (15%) respondents participated in protests against better roads, sanitation, street lights, health facilities and educational facilities.

Analyzing the nature of collective mobilization in urban slums of Chandigarh by researching various protests and demonstrations reveals that collective mobilization is a very effective method in slums to fulfil the demands of basic services. The type of demonstration, agitation and protests occurred at the slum colonies were economic in nature as they were prominently for the fundamental civic amenities (water, electricity, shelter) and security of tenure. Social issues such as women security and protection of social rights are taken up rarely for protests in the selected slums. Informal settlements in city do not show equal aptitude to put demands effectively and make protests against authority. A bigger number of slum residents at Labour Colony and Madrasi Colony have participated in protest and demonstration in comparison to the residents of Nehru colony. A large number of residents of Nehru colony did not remember any demonstration that may have taken place in the last few years. Labour Colony -4 has shown immense orientation for protest and agitation against authorities as residents are quite assertive when it comes to their demands. A huge chunk of slum dwelling population in the Madrasi and Labour Colony-4 are factory and industry workers and they get more exposure to the outside world. They get experience for participation in associational activities through trade unions and labour unions. Slum colony at Sector-25 and Nehru colony have less number of industrial/factory workers and more domestic workers. Therefore, they lack the experience and inclination needed for collective actions.

Conversation with slum respondents further revealed that collective actions in slums often depend on local leaders, neighbourhood associations, influential persons and political parties for the initiation and development. Local leaders of bastis take the credit for mobilising slum residents for making demands for water tanker, constructing pavements in arranging street lights, proper electricity and water facilities. Field visits demonstrated that pradhans in all the four slums play important roles in mobilizing low income rural migrants for collective actions. Community leaders are the persons who gather slum residents and decide the day and place for demonstration and protest for any issue.

Table 2: Mobilisation of Slum Residents by Local Leaders for Various Activities

Mobilisation of Slum Residents by local leaders	Rallies	49%
	Demonstration /protest	51%
	Meetings	34%

Source: Field Visit in four Slum Colonies of City (January to April 2013)

Local leaders are always ready to invest their efforts in these activities as it helps them in gaining popularity among slum dwellers and political parties. Slum dwellers vote en bloc and act as vote bank (easy target) for political parties therefore, political parties and leaders attempt to patronise them by providing them help to find secured tenure. This section reflects that collective actions in slums often depend upon local leaders, neighbourhood associations, influential persons and political parties for the initiation and development. Factory and industry workers who get more exposure to the outside world and experience in associational activities through trade unions and labour unions take active participation in protests and collective efforts.

3. Collective Mobilisations for Shelter: A Critical Perspective

Idea of informal sector and manifestation of informality in the domain of housing and settlement in India has gained attention in the present period. In the process of urban regeneration, informal settlement residents are often evicted. The government sometimes justifies the displacement of informal settlers with the rhetoric for the collective good. Process of demolition and denial of housing rights of slum residents has become an issue of concern for all in the present period. Demolition and rehabilitation process affects the politics in Chandigarh slums with full force as administration is committed to make the city slum free. Most of the slum colonies in the planned city are built at those places which were meant for the construction of buildings for developmental purposes. Therefore, the demolitions of the huts of such squatter are expected actions to be taken by the city administration. Fear of eviction and non-permanency (insecure land tenure) led many residents to take part in protests. Threat of eviction in Chandigarh slums gained momentum with the demolition of Labour colony-5 (17,000 structures have been demolished) in November, 2013 to make city slum free. Demolition drive of informal settlements took widespread form in city after this. In the second phase of demolition drive 37 acres of land was reclaimed in sector-52 and 51 on May 10, 2014. The demolition in four colonies namely Pandit Colony, Kuldeep Colony, Mazdoor Colony and Nehru Colony has been undertaken where 3,700 structures were demolished. In the third phase of demolition drive around 3,000 structures have been pulled down from Madrasi Colony. Not only demolition drives but failure of proper rehabilitation process also encourages protests in slums. The act of Chandigarh administration to demolish unauthorized colonies without rehabilitating all the slum residents invited protests from

the residents along with leaders, social activists and Non-Governmental Organisation workers. Various social groups, NGOs are making demands for a new scheme which covers citizens who have been residing in Chandigarh until 2014, without the insistence on one single biometric survey (biometric survey of 2006) as is being currently done. *GharAdhikarSangharshSamiti* and some other social activists are asking administration to grant property rights to poor people and in-situ settlement in central locations of cities. Demands for in-situ rehabilitation have been neglected by the city authority and all the colonies are built in the periphery of the city. All the rehabilitated places except rehabilitated colonies at sector-49 and *Vikas Nagar* fall in the outskirts of the city. This type of rehabilitation make slum dwellers realise that they are being socially and economically excluded from the parlance of planned city. Eviction and failure of proper rehabilitation compels slum residents to opt for violent methods and protests. Around 69% of interviewed respondents from four sampled slum colonies mentioned that they come out on the road shouting slogans against ruling party, authorities and administration on several occasions in recent years. It has been found during the interviews that in the collective efforts for shelter in slums were accompanied by the local community leaders. Slum dwellers need to get some initiative from outside for collective efforts which are performed by local leaders or any influential person /social worker. There is a growing and influential lobby against eviction.^{vi}

The role played by local leaders in slums gets ambiguous from time to time as sometimes they act on the behalf of slum residents and ask authorities to fulfil the demands and sometimes they try to manipulate the things and keep the residents away from the reality. For instance, local Pradhans are the persons who inform slum residents about the demonstration and notices regarding evacuation. Slum dwellers assemble for a meeting along with local leaders and social activists where structure of protest is discussed. Local leaders support residents to secure stay orders from courts and to organize protests, demonstration and other visible newsworthy events to derail any plans for displacement. Slum dwellers from informal settlements at sector-25 and Labour colony no-4 in their interview stated that famous political and local leaders have supported them in protest against demolition. But some of the incidents narrated by slum residents from Nehru and Madras colony reflected that sometimes leaders manipulate local residents to make compromises in demonstration and protest. They misguide the residents for their own interest and support state and its agencies for their benefit. Residents from Nehru and *Madras* colony confirmed the occurrence of such incidents. They recollect the episode when notice has been issued for demolition local leader assured them for sustenance of *Jhuggis* as they have confirmed it from city officials; but demolitions took place and many of slum residents lost *jhuggis*. Interviews with residents reflect that leaders get various incentives in the form of house at rehabilitated colony, money and employment opportunity for their dear ones for supporting state agencies/city authorities. These leaders create a wide communication gap between residents and political leaders/ concerned authority.

Studies further reveal that all the slum colonies do not show equal propensity to make collective efforts against eviction and rehabilitation. More number of slum residents at labour colony-4 and Madrasi Colony has shown large orientation towards protest and agitation than the Nehru colony. People are very assertive about their rights and demands. One reason for the large participation of residents of Colony-4 and Madrasi colony is that they get more exposure than the residents of Nehru colony. Residents in these two colonies are factory and industrial workers they get more exposure as trade unions and labour unions keep making protest and demonstration to fulfil their demands. On the other hand, Slum Colony at sector-25 and Nehru colony has fewer industrial and domestic workers resulting in very few persons who participated in protests and demonstration for housing facilities. Nehru Colony is the area with the least respondents who took participation in protest and demonstration places itself at the last among four slum colonies.

Various grassroots or civil society organisation like *GharadhikarSangharshMorcha*, Students for society, *Lokaawaz* and others are working to protect the interests of slum colonies. Only strong protest and agitation can stop the demolition of slum colonies before providing enough and adequate housing facilities to the slum residents. This can be exemplifying with the incidents of Labour colony no-5 and Sector 25 colonies. Slum people in these colonies came together and made *gherao* of the administrative officials and stopped the demolition machines. Some people showed up with weapons and rods as well. This protest was so effective and strong that the administration stopped demolition drive at that time. All the residents come up on streets/roads and started raising slogans against demolition. Slum colony-5 could not get removed in 2003 as the city authority had to face a strong agitation from the residents. But this slum was demolished in 2013. The major reason for this failure was lesser participation in protest. Many slum residents got rehabilitated in authorized colonies under small flat schemes. Another reason for the less participation was many went to *jail* under *JailBharo* Andolan and nobody left to make a strong protest against the administration. This made the work of administration easier and the slum got demolished without facing any strong demonstrations in 2013. The demolitions drive in 2013 demolished the colony completely and around 7000 houses were destroyed leaving many slum residents without any other option/place to live. The protests fell weak over time and not just in Labour colony number-5; but this trend has been seen in other slums like Nehru, Kujheri and Madrasi. Slums which put strong opposition (eg. labour colony -4 and Sector-25 colony) against city authority along with the social activist and political leaders protected their colonies but slums with weak strategy and support get demolished. While analysing the nature of collective mobilisation for shelter it has been found that large number of women residents (79%) take all these protests, rallies and strikes for accessibility of secure tenure quite seriously. This is because lack of adequate housing facilities is more problematic for the women than the men. Women living in the slums without proper water facilities and bathroom face more challenges than men. Among interviewed women around 79% of women accepted that they had participated in one or other protest against eviction and adequate shelter facilities. MahilaMandalPradhans of the selected slums put great efforts to gather women in slums and mobilize them for protest.

Women along with the male members of slums raised slogans against authority. Whereas, woman's participation in demonstration against unavailability of health facilities, better educational facilities and better streets were quite less in number.

During the protests not only the residents of notified slums came together but residents of all the slum colonies along with notified colonies came together and demonstrated against demolition activity. Slum dwellers demanded alternative accommodation and right for housing before the colonies get demolished. Most of the protests and *Morchaas* appeared recently are a result of the combined efforts of the slum residents along with intellectuals, lawyers, professors, students and some opposition political parties. Several groups and political parties including the CPI and CPI (Marxist) as well as the representatives from the Aam Aadmi Party also participated in the protests. Residents from other colonies also come to support the protest. In these protests various slogans like '*Bastiyo Ko Ujadana Band Karo, Ujdo Ke Liye Ghar Ka Prabandh Karo*' and "*Har Zor-Zulm Ki Takkar Mai; Sangharsh Hamara Naara Hai*" has been raised against the administration. Though all the protests and demonstrations do not achieve success to stop the demolitions of colonies but remaining slum colonies and residents have become active and aware. Members of many organisations like the SFS and *Ghar Adhikar Sangharsh Morcha* distribute pamphlets, show street plays and provide information by visiting the slum colonies to make slum dwellers more informed. Protest groups also demand for more transit colonies (established in the peripheries of the city) to accommodate those who became shelter less after demolition drive.

Even the potential beneficiaries in their interview have shown disappointment that they are getting rehabilitated in those areas which are far away from their working places. In these rehabilitated colonies even the basic amenities are not present. The strategy of city authorities to rehabilitate slum dwellers at peripheries reflects that in order to accommodate the accelerated urban growth, cities are thus expanding into peripheral agricultural areas around planned city. In this peripheral growth, the land is being appropriated from farmers or former land owners for public purpose.

4. Conclusion

Inferences drawn from the study reflect that dissent over the acts of demolition and inadequate rehabilitation process has given significant impetus to the collective mobilisation in the slums. Mobilisations occurring at grassroots level primarily focus on the problems of basic amenities and specifically to eviction. In these protests most of the ordinary working-class persons, labourers and domestic workers come together under the leadership of any organisation, leader or social activists. Study reveals that slum dwellers enjoying more exposure to outer world (as factory and industrial workers) are more inclined for collective mobilisation as they have more experience of protests and demonstrations as labour union members. Unconventionally, large number of women residents has participated in the protests/strikes for accessibility of secure tenure. Local Pradhans and grassroots organisations show great influence over collective actions

of slum dwellers. But the role played by local leaders in slums is quite ambiguous as sometimes they act on the behalf of slum residents and sometimes they try to manipulate the things for their own interest. Demands for adequate shelter and in-situ rehabilitation are coming from various social groups, leaders of NGOs along with residents. Though rehabilitation processes proved successful up-to some extent as many slum residents have been rehabilitated but it had not met with complete success as rehabilitated colonies are again excluded from main city and located in the peripheries of the city with limited facilities. It became very difficult for slum households to get rehabilitated at different places and continue with their earlier work and adjust with the old routine (schools for kids, aanganwadi, old neighbourhood and acquaintance with the place) in the new place. The rehabilitation process needs to provide a sense of citizenship to them as they contribute in the political and economic sphere of the society.

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End notes

ⁱ For details see Henry E. Brady, Sidney Verba and Kay Lehman Schlozman (1995). Beyond SES: A Resource Model of Political Participation. *American Political Science Review*, 89. 2. pp 271-294

ⁱⁱ According to Lewis There is a lack of participation and integration of the poor in the major institution of the larger society. He declares poverty as a way of life, which is remarkably stable and persistent, passed down from generation to generation along family lines. For details see Oscar Lewis, "The Culture of Poverty", *Scientific American*, 215 (October 1966), pp. 19-25.

ⁱⁱⁱ Theory of Marginality predicts that slum dwellers rarely participate in electoral politics, avoid direct action politics, and frequently attempt to pursue individual goals through administrative channels. Slums have no internal political organisation. The theory of marginality is defined by the concept of disintegration. Dominant in these areas are isolationism and dispersion; these make them appear as disorganized groups, without internal links or coherent social expression to define them positively in front of the society as a whole. For more details see See Alejandro Portes, "Rationality in the Slum: An Essay on Interpretive Sociology," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 14 (1972), pp. 268-286 and Janice E. Perlman, *The Myth of Marginality Revisited: The Case of Favelas in Rio De Perspectives from the Middle East, South Asia, and Latin America* (Lexington Press, 2005), pp. 105-146.

^{iv} According to Anna Zimmer the visibility, from residents' perspective, is associated with allocation of funds, infrastructure and facilities. Furthermore, knowledge of the population totals might help residents establish claims for more meaningful political participation as citizens. For details See Anna Zimmer, "Enumerating the Semi-Visible: The Politics of Regularizing Delhi's Unauthorized Colonies", *Economic & Political Weekly* 47 (30) (2012: 90).

^v For more details see Castells (2012:15), In his study of power structure relationship mentioned that there is an innate state of conflict for urban spaces, as government and landowners do not want squatters on prime land; while informal communities perceive these places as their homes and sources of livelihood. The origins of collective efforts/ movements are to be found in the emotions of individuals and in their networking on the basis of cognitive empathy. Castells, M. (2012) *Networks of outrage and hope: Social movements in the Internet age*. Cambridge. UK: Polity Press.

^{vi} Bipasha, Baruah in her study of 'Women and Property in Urban India' argued that slum dwellers or poor seek out the support of local political leader who can act on their behalf to secure stay orders from courts and to organize protests, demonstration and other visible newsworthy events to derail any plans for displacement. According to her in addition to support from local politicians there is a growing and influential lobby against eviction as well as media and judiciary support for the right of squatters as citizens. Bipasha Baruah, *Women and Property in Urban India* (The University of British Columbia: UBC Press: 2010), p. 114

Human Rights Perspective and Development Discourse: An Exploratory Note on Intellectual Possibilities towards Relation Building

Tirthankar Chakraborty

Abstract

This paper seeks to unravel some of the tangled threads of contemporary rights talks. For some, the grounding of rights-based approaches in human rights perspective makes them distinctively different to the areas of development discourses. Is there any real difference between these two in practice or not? Thus, the paper tries to explore some of the intellectual possibilities which reflect on the relationship of the human rights perspective and development discourse. Through this paper some areas like Evolution of the Idea of Rights within the Humanizing Parameters, The Generations of Rights within Humanising Parameters and the Relational Experience of Human Rights Perspective and Development Discourse are generally highlighted.

Key Words: Human Rights, Generation of Rights, Development, Aid, UNO, UDHR, RTD.

1. Introduction:

This is not to deny that after the post-cold war era, the better part of our human history is more or less “characterized by a unique innovation: the proliferation of the endless normativity of human rights standards, especially in the discursive praxis of the United Nations. One may say, despite the reality of massive and monumental violations, that ours is an Age of Rights. No preceding century of human history has been privileged to witness such a range of rights-enunciations as ours. Never, too, have the languages of rights thus far replaced all other moral languages. As the United Nations Secretary General observed at the Vienna Conference on Human Rights in June 1993, human rights constitutes a “common language of humanity”(Baxi, U. 1995: 6). Indeed, all these happenings have led to continuing argumentation between the emergent cultures of rights and the well-established culture of power. Though, this dialectical position between rights and power never has been vividly persistent and poignant in the last decades of the century, nevertheless, the culture of the rights of the human, ‘however, have long been in the making by the praxis of victims of violations, regardless of the mode of formulation of human rights standards and instruments.

The single most critical source of human rights, however, is the consciousness of peoples of the world who have waged the most persistent struggles for decolonization and self-determination, against racial discrimination, gender-bassed aggression and discrimination, denial of access to basic minimum needs, environmental degradation and destruction, systemic ‘benign neglect’ of the disarticulated disadvantaged and dispossessed’(Ibid. 6 – 7). Yet, the appearance of more contemporary concerns with rights-enunciation cannot be understood without a history of everyday moral heroism of diverse people asserting the most basic of all rights., namely, the Right to be Human and to remain, Human (Baxi, U. 1994: 1 - 17). As Upndra Baxi argued, “the right to be human is, of course, the *leitmotif* of all human rights thought and action. All the same, the human being who is the bearer of these rights may not have her basic material needs fulfilled; no right to use physical force is conceded to her, even in order to fulfil basic needs; and threats to the right to be human arising from civil society are not a part of the problematic of human rights. In the circumstances, human rights

thought and action becomes a *programschrift*, a blueprint for a just society; but a blueprint with vacant spaces, disallowing at the outset the pre-conditions for exercising the right to be human” (Baxi, U. 1986: 186 - 7).

2.1. Idea of Rights within the Humanizing Parameters:

It is widely acknowledged that ‘rights’ are defying precise definition. It is a complex notion, which permit a variety of interpretations and theories and are capable of embodying many different values and meanings; theories of rights in fact abound and have a long pedigree.¹ Aside this, rights are distinct in taking the entitlements of individuals as the starting point for political morality (Dworkin, R. 1978: 171), however, this stands in contrast to a view that rights be based on some prior theory of social and political morality, such as utilitarianism. Paradoxically, rights are also seen in distinct character when it is alive with in duties.² Yet, ‘there is much that can and has been debated about what those duties look like, which are primarily referable to the nature of rights under a particular theory or conceptualization. However, in terms of normative contrast, rights can be understood as correlatives – where right implies duty (Decker, K. 2001: 2). Thus, rights are also logically related to law, entailing a body of rules and principles (Waldron, J. 1984), which may be sometimes understood with special importance and high priority, as well as some degree of enforceability. Nonetheless, the values and political and philosophical theories underpinning a particular understanding of rights will often be more determinative than a particular formulation of a right or even the name or type of right itself.³

Positivist theories of rights, on the other hand, anchor conceptions of rights in what is provided for in particular legal systems - rights have meaning only as legal rights. Though, such theories are often subject to criticism that they are based on a “naturalistic fallacy”, purporting to derive certain norms from prescriptive premises about human nature. It also leaves open to interpretation the normative commitment or content of rights, as well as the basis or theory upon which positive law provisions are based. In contrast, theories of natural rights base conceptions of rights on a pre-existing moral order or natural law. The tradition of natural rights has roots with the Stoics and Romans, through St. Augustine and Aquinas, to more modern manifestations as Roosevelt called ‘Four Freedoms’ of human existence, such as, freedom of speech and worship, freedom from want and fear (Rathod, P. B. 2010: 182 - 3). Although, as MacDonald has argued, “That men are entitled to make certain claims by virtue simply of their common humanity has been equally passionately defended and vehemently denied” (MacDonald, 1984: 21). From this backdrop emerges the notion of human rights, defined as basic universal legal or moral guarantees, that belong to all human beings, and that protect individuals and / or groups, from actions and omissions of the state and some non-state actors that affect fundamental human dignity.

2.2. The Human Rights Perspectives: Ideas and Issues:

More or less, the idea of human rights are based on an assumption that takes for its starting point the human dignity of individuals and their entitlement to have basic autonomy and freedoms respected and basic needs satisfied (Henkin, 1981). While they are founded on moral principle and conceived of in terms of inherence, universality and indivisibility, they

are at core, [legal] guarantees against actions and omissions (Decker, Opt. Cit., 3). As with all rights, human rights embody duties, providing a legal framework of entitlements and obligations; each right implies a claim holder and a duty bearer. On the other hand, normatively human rights can be described as a series of moral imperatives or entitlements based on the inherent dignity of people. Similarly, human rights may be conceived of as individual rights or collective rights. Some commentators have resisted the notion of “collective human rights”, however, on the basis that the essential meaning of “human rights” would be diluted or made conceptually vague if one were to include collective entitlements (Donnelly, J. 1990). Others, focusing on human rights as standards for relationships within society, welcome the notion of collective human rights on the basis that human rights are inherently relational and are, at least in part, a response to a universal problem of unequal power relationships (Burgers, J. Herman, 1990: 63).

Hence, collective human rights are conceptualized in a number of ways. First, there are human rights that can only be exercised collectively, such as the right of freedom of association or assembly. Second, there are rights that can only be implemented in a collective manner, such as certain economic, social and cultural rights that obligate the authorities to take general measures, which affect subjects collectively. Third, there are rights that are held by collectives, where the subject of the right is collective, such as the right of self-determination of indigenous people or the right of a national, ethnic, racial or religious group not to be destroyed – as protected by the Genocide Convention. This is perhaps the strongest sense of the term collective right, and perhaps the most accurate use of the term. Most human rights advocates and commentators do not therefore prioritize individual rights at the expense of community rights, rather these rights are seen as ultimately compatible even if in some situations they need to be balanced against each other (Decker, Opt. Cit., 4 - 5).

Yet, from the above description it clearly shows that human rights perspectives cannot be accepted uncritically (Scott, D.1993: 25). Despite the fact that, ‘there is virtually no disagreement among the scholars on the desirability of entitlements and empowerments for human beings there is noticed wide disagreements among them on the nature, extent, typology and dimension . . .’ (Yasin & Sengupta, 2004: 135). Therefore, this perspective has been made more confused in real acceptance; naturally, it leads us to concentrate more conceptual narratives in different ‘generations’ of rights within the broader framework to human rights perspectives which may be made as under follow:

2.3. The Human Rights Perspectives: The First Generation of Rights:

A starting point for some rights is a particular aspect of moral traits – the “active, practical, assertive side of human life as opposed to the passive, affective and even pathological side” (Decker, Opt. Cit., 6). Rights are seen as the basis not for all human rights but for those specifically related to choice, self-determination, agency and independence. On this view the duties correlative to rights are mainly negative in character; they are duties to refrain from obstructive action or interference with choice rather than duties to provide positive assistance.⁴ First generation rights are rights predicated on this conception. These rights epitomize an understanding of rights that protect the individuals against arbitrary or misuse of public power and are the basis of protection for certain kinds of human interests related to

choice, self-determination, agency and independence. Thus, these rights are associated with the eighteenth century liberal enlightenment, and best understood in terms of the nature of the duty they impose. In other words, they require primarily forbearance or non-interference on the part of the state and enjoin rather than require certain kinds of state action. As conceptualized, first generation rights include rights such as freedom of religion, freedom of the press, and the right to free assembly. The French Declaration is a classic example, in this respect, which embodying this negative conception of human rights and proclaiming the “freedom of man” (Ibid). In turn, the state has a duty to refrain from interfering with individual choice. As such, first general rights are often political philosophies advocating laissez-faire principles and minimalist theories of state (Waldron, Opt. Cit., 5).

2.4. The Human Rights Perspectives: The Second Generation of Rights:

However, the philosophical foundations of first generation rights were subject to sustained attack throughout the twentieth century. These, critiques were accompanied by the emergence of a new species of rights of a more affirmative in its nature. Such rights embody entitlements to positive assistance and reflect a broader range of rights social, economic and cultural - rather than being limited to civil liberties. These entitlements to more positive or affirmative action by duty bearers are sometimes called “second generation rights” (Decker, Loc. Cit.). Substantively, these include rights to a decent standard of living, the rights to work, and rights to health, social protection, education and social security. Indeed, these rights in a chronological sense, being a product of the twentieth century and their emergence reflects a growing understanding that non-interference alone will not suffice to protect people’s rights and dignity, and that indeed negative rights themselves require some affirmative action on the part of states and may even depend, in part, on second generation rights to be fully meaningful.⁵

2.5. The Human Rights Perspectives: The Third Generation of Rights:

With the end of the twentieth century the emergence of a third generation of rights makes a solid foundation in the human rights literature and its action. Mainly rooted in the Article 28 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, these have also been termed as “development rights” or “solidarity rights” (Alston, 1982: 29; Vasak, 1979). As the Article 28 proclaims:

“Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.”

Third generation rights are based on holistic community interests although each reflects both individual and collective interests. Thus, according to Decker these rights maybe understood into two different dimensions. Firstly it is seen to reflect a “revolution of expectation” in the developing world and its demand for a global redistribution of power, wealth and resources, and include the right to self determination (political, economic, social and cultural), the right to economic and social development, and the right to participate in and benefit from the “common heritage of mankind (scientific and information progress, cultural traditions and sites and monuments). And, secondly, it relates more to areas in which the nation state falls short (and thus duties may fall on the wider international community). These rights include the right to peace, the right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment, and the right to

humanitarian disaster relief and the right of groups of people to cultural, political and economic development (Decker, Opt. Cit., 7).

However, the lessons of human rights generations as outlined above, thus, suffer from a number of limitations and making them merely the perspectives to view the issue of human rights from a number of preferred lenses fitting different value choice. Since all these perspectives underlying objective is to justify a particular brand of socio-economic and political thrust, the entire human rights discourse has virtually been dependent variables to the preferred order (Yasin & Sengupta, Opt. Cit., 149). It is therefore now evident from the so called, westernised promotional standards are marked as the ultimate end of human betterment. As Fukuyama remarking that “what we may be witnessing is . . . the end of history as such, that is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalisation of western liberal democracy as the final of human government” (Fukuyama, F. 1989: 3-18). Although, ‘there is no less manifest acknowledgement that liberal ideology and the thoughts of global conceptualisation, going to ensure universalisation of human rights and, in turn, human betterment’(Yasin & Sengupta, Opt. Cit., 150).

3.1. The Developmental Discourse & Human Rights Perspectives: One in Size but Doesn’t Fit All:

From this attempt of analysis it can be observed that the ideas and actions of human rights perspectives fall in between a paradoxical position of ‘bread’ and ‘freedom’. Though, “freedom usually wins with the liberal conceptions of rights, despite the awareness that without ‘bread’, freedom of speech and assembly, of association, of conscience and religion, of political participation – even though symbolic adult suffrage – may be existentially meaningless for its ‘victims” (Baxi, U. 1986, Opt. Cit., 186). Again, “the issues are not really “bread” and/or “freedom” in the abstract, but rather who has how *much* of each, for how *long*, at *what* cost of others, and *why*. Some people have both “bread” and “freedom”; others have “freedom” but little “bread” or none at all . . .” (Ibid.). Therefore, it is a question of scarcity; scarcity of ‘food’, ‘clothing’ and ‘shelter’, is thus one of redistribution, accesses and needs. Yet, “it is problem of “development”, a process of planned social change through continuing exercise of public power. As there is no assurance that public power will always, or even in most cases, be exercised in favour of the deprived and dispossessed, an important conception of development itself is accountability, by the wielders of public power, to the people affected by it and people at large. Accountability is the medium through which we can strike and maintain a balance between the governors and the governed” (Ibid. 186 -7). In this way, the discussion of human rights perspective becomes fused with discussion of developmental discourse.

Nevertheless, despite their common roots as international discourses established out of a concern for the plight of people across the world, human rights and development practice have evolved separately, and their discourses have, until recently, been seen to occupy different spheres. In fact, until the early 1980s most of the experimentations saw a fundamental conflict between development and human rights. Even today, the discourses of rights and development remain distinct, and continue to be viewed by some as necessarily separate; indeed in some attempts to bring human rights concerns onto the development

agenda are strongly opposed. Still, this rather outdated view that presumptively separates human rights and development continues to permeate both discourses, with proponents of each agenda often failing to meaningfully engage with the approaches or visions provided by the other. In fact there are possible reasons to argue that these two bodies of thought and practice are in fact two sides of the same coin (Alston, P. 2005). On the one hand, advocates of human rights have increasingly realized that humanizing principles on rights can only be meaningful in practical sense if supply and demand capacities exist. On the other hand, understandings of development have expanded to encompass more holistic understandings of human wellbeing and human development.

The relationship between development and human rights has a long historical experience, both in concept and in practice. It is important to recall that the story goes way back to the end of the Second World War, the most destructive conflict humanity had ever experienced. No wonder that the founding fathers of the United Nations had pledged a strong commitment to the promotion and protection of human rights. In fact, the basic structure of the United Nations, by its very Charter, is built on three main pillars: peace and security, development, and human rights. Conceptually, these three pillars were linked, interrelated and interdependent, so much so, that there could be no peace and security without development, no development without human rights and no human rights without peace and security. This trilogy was and remains the conceptual underpinning and basic mandate of the United Nations.

Historically the first signpost of change regarding the issue came about with the adoption by the United Nations General Assembly of the Declaration on the Right to Development which explicitly affirmed the human right to development. This proclamation was strengthened by the 1993 Vienna World Conference on Human Rights as well as by the various world conferences and summits which took place under United Nations auspices during the 1990s, bringing basic human rights and freedoms to the fore, and culminating with the Millennium Declaration and the Millennium Development Goals based on an integrated and interdependent set of human rights, identified as the underpinning of the process of economic and social development. In parallel, there was a redefinition of the process of development itself, a shift away from the purely “economist” approach to development, towards development defined as human development, as a comprehensive, people centred economic, social, cultural and political process through which all the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all individuals and entire populations can be realised, civil and political rights, economic, social and cultural rights.

Though, definition of development as a process of social and economic change is widely debated and contested. It is fair to say, however, that common understandings of development generally include the aim of enhancing well-being and capacity, and building a better quality of life for poor and marginalized groups.⁶ Whatever it may be made to mean, “development” must at least mean this: people will be given the right to be and remain human. One could argue that among those overarching goals, development is also aimed at enhancing peoples' human rights. Thus, despite a fairly disconnected history, the mutual interdependence of human rights and development is now generally accepted. The codification of rights in international, regional or national regimes is meaningless if people do not have awareness the

capacity to claim those rights. Improving individual circumstances through economic development may therefore be a precursor to making human rights meaningful in practice. Thus, the history of development is one of ongoing change, influenced to varying degrees and at different times by diverse pressures: dominant political ideologies; particular regional circumstances; trends in academic and non-governmental discourse; and the continuing failure to generate lasting solutions to poverty and human insecurity; to name but a few. While the changes in development practice inevitably form a continuous process, a review of last several years reveals a series of trends that can be broadly associated with each of the last five decades of the last century. Therefore, a cursory examination of some areas in this respect may be as follows.

3.2. The Development Discourse: Revisiting the Issues of ‘Aid’:

The era of development emerged as overseas aid in the 1950, in an environment dominated by independence movements and the gradual ending of the colonial period (Paul & Jonathan, 2005). Aid was provided by European states to their dependents, soon to be demanded as a duty by former colonies, and large capital injections were provided in the belief that modernization projects would have a catalytic effect on emergent economics. Aid was considered to be a transitory arrangement which would induce ‘take-off’ and was accordingly defined by an economic agenda: growth was sought and large-scale infrastructure projects were the mechanism for its achievement (Tomasevski, K. 1993: 30-1). Though, there are some, who believed that it is an instrumental mechanism to preventing the spread of communism; after 1959 fears of ‘another Cuba’ were felt acutely in the United States of America (Veltmeyer & James, 2005: 120-6) and it intensified in 1980s (Oya, C. 2008) because competition between the two superpowers led not only to proxy wars in the developing world, but also benefitted those countries who pledged their loyalty to one or the other camp with varying degrees of boldness.

However, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the apparent victory of the free market recast the US in a ‘global leadership’ role in some minds (Fang, T. 2004: 105-111), but the problem is that in the globalised world the ‘power continuum’ not settled in a particular one centre, rather mushrooming at different levels and in different understandings. Though, the initiatives regarding endowment of ‘aid’ continued as an important element in developmental discourse in global consideration based on four pillars, such as, democratisation, poverty reduction, good governance and neoliberal reforms. This cartel creates thus an environment in which orthodox beliefs are taken for facts and space for deviation from the norm is minimal. Paradoxically, in post – 9/11 context ‘aid’ has been associated with damage rather than progress and seems to be undermining prospects for long-term developmental initiatives, especially when the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, hotbeds of ‘terror’ in the ‘axis of evil’ prompted an aid influx.

3.3. The Development Discourse: Role of the ‘State’:

Following this brief illustration, it is evident that role of ‘aid’ in developmental consideration has always been political, with the useful distinction between capital ‘P’ (political) and lower case ‘p’ (political), the former is partisan; promotes particular political actors and non-consensual values, whereas the latter asserts that aid should be informed by certain core,

higher, consensual political values and takes sides to extent that it is pro-poor. The core political values of humanitarianism have been found wanting in complex politicized scenarios such as the 'war against terror', and need to be supplanted by the values of Right to human. Hence, all such values are 'political' because they inform processes through which resources and power are allocated and used. In this backdrop if we consider the role of the state; which is seen as highly debatable in its position. The state functionaries may be constructed around two normative principles. The first principle is that it is the role of the state to intervene in both civil society and the workings of the market to ensure certainty and stability in people's lives and the second premise is that this intervention should be based on the principles of social rights, social justice, social equality and redistribution. Of course the extent to which these principles are applied varies according to socio-political context. Paradoxically, the state, being subjected to the forces of neo-imperialism is being forced by the logic of development to impose 'anti-people politics and exploitative politics on the community. National sovereignty has been replaced by new concepts of intellectual property rights, based on the interests of corporations and the reality of social, economic and political organisation of industrial west (Shiva, V. 1992: 40-4).

Paradoxically, the logic of "locking in" credible policies through classical role of states are very cynical towards individual as well as the community-politic. The concept of the 'relatively autonomous state' in the South Asian countries is also supposed to take beating. The social formation of these underdeveloped countries due to their colonial heritage the state is overdeveloped and these tendencies make more hegemonic plunge towards the subjects (Rathod, Loc. Cit). As a result the dual expropriation and mistreatment by the agency of the state and other forces of the individual which has serious repercussions for the future of 'rights of the human' of the people in the underdeveloped or developing countries. The "two-level games" 'creating a quasi independent body is a tactic used by governments to "lock in" and fuse democratic institutions, thereby enhancing their credibility and stability vis-à-vis non-democratic political threats (Moravcsik, A. 2000). In this respect, human rights perspective seems to be so decisive.

4.1. The Development Discourse & Human Rights Perspective: Approaching Towards Harmonizing :

The story of the understanding between rights and development highlights the role played by the broader political context in defining the emergence, function and impact of the rights. Yet, the nature of the relationship between human rights and development discourses is at least partially attributable to the different modalities employed by each - development policy has tended to focus on projects and programs, while the world of human rights is premised on norms, standards and duties. These different starting points also mean that the way progress is judged in each field is different - with development policies of assessed in terms of obstacles and indicators, while human rights records are understood in terms of compliance and derogation (Decker, Opt. Cit., 17).

Indeed, it is the emergence of Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which represents one of the strongest statements of rights as the mechanism for human realization in the development discourse in broader understanding. It is actually not only redefined the

relationship between the individual and global political order (Sano, H. O, 2000: 737), but did so by declaring the individual to have both civil and political freedoms and the right to cultural, economic and social welfare. While the relationship between the different rights became a disputed political territory, due in no small part to the polarization of global ideologies in the post-Second World War period, the unified presence of all rights in the UDHR is clear and relates to the goals of personal and social well-being that are synonymous with the modern development agenda.

Though, the separation into civil and political rights on the one hand, and cultural, economic and social rights on the other was reified by the approval of the UN General Assembly of two related, yet indisputably distinct human rights covenants two decades later in 1966 in form of the 'International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights' (ICCPR) and the 'International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights' (ICESCR). Though, it was to take until 1993 Vienna Declaration, through the 'Declaration on the Right to Development' (RTD) to secure rhetorical reconfirmation of the indivisibility that was clear in the text of the UDHR. Nevertheless, outside the partisan power struggles of international politics, the inter-relationship between the rights identified in the UDHR and their centrality to development to be recognized more prominently in 1978, 'development should not be conceived of or understood simply in terms of economic growth, nor as an increase in per capita income, but should necessarily include those qualitative elements which human rights constitutes and which provide an essential dimension'.

Yet, while the dominant paradigm of the 1970s shifted to anti-poverty strategies and basic needs, human rights remained a theme among those critical of or seeking to expand the concept of development. Although it would be 1986 before the Declaration on the Right to Development would be adopted by the UN General Assembly. In 1977 the Commission on Human Rights prompted the Secretary General to undertake a study into the international aspects of the right, and two years later the Commission affirmed the existence of the right to development (Alston, 1981: 101). The Secretary General in his report tries to redefine the very idea in the following manner:

The central purpose of development is the realization of the potentialities of the human person in harmony with the community; the human person is the subject not the object of development; both material and non-material needs must be satisfied; respect for human rights is fundamental; the opportunity for full participation must be accorded; the principles of equality and non-discrimination must be respected; and a degree of individual and collective self-reliance must be achieved.

Therefore, it is a clear departure from its early position to its new position. It is considered that the Declaration on the Right to Development is a useful extension of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights because it places the protection and promotion of human rights in the context of a globalizing economy and places greater emphasis on the international economic system. Yet, historically, a critical backlash against structural adjustment emerged towards the end of the 1980s, embodied in concepts like 'Adjustment with Human Face', launched by UNICEF in 1987 (Cornia, G. and R. Jolly, 1987) and the World Bank's rhetorical engagement with poverty alleviation (Einhorn, 2001: 26). It is interesting to note

that UNICEF's challenge to adjustment advocated empowerment policies and people centric development, and was scathing of the marginalization that had taken place under economic stabilization programmes (Jonsson, U. 2003: 2). Indeed, more or less, in this era visualized a 'conceptual shift' moved from being needs-based and service-driven to a more strategic approach, in which rights issues were increasingly incorporated. On the other hand, the sidelines of development discourse and the failure of the neo-liberal reaction provided an alternative paradigm, allowing the human rights approach to emerge. Indeed, the recognition of the shortcomings of structural adjustment coincided with a profound shift in the global political context ending of the Cold War. From a rights perspective, the most striking evidence of this change was the content of the Vienna Declaration, released from the ideological stalemate of political 'power-continuum'. The declaration was a work of compromise between North and South rather than East and West, in which the indivisibility of rights was conceded by the North in return for an acceptance of universality by the South (Hamm, 2001: 1007). However, in the emergence of rights in development accelerated the assumption that all the rights are proved crucial, as those who had articulated a vision of rights-based development had identified for more than three decades, indivisibility of rights forms the key element in the approach. (Paul and Jonathan, Opt. Cit., 21).

4.2. The Development Discourse & Human Rights Perspective: If's and But's :

Paradoxically, the relationship between human rights and development has also been challenged on a number of other grounds. Amartya Sen has identified three core concerns with the legal edifice of human rights in the development context (Sen, Opt. Cit., 227-228). Firstly, what he terms the 'legitimacy critique' that rights have no real status or import without being entitlements sanctioned by the state. From a legalistic perspective, rights require legislation to exist, thus one is left with the dilemma of having no rights without laws. As many developing countries have failing, embryonic legal structures, does this mean that their citizens have no legitimate claim to human rights? Secondly, the reasonable critique related to form- without identifying correlative duties and duty bearers, rights have no meaning. And, thirdly, the cultural critique which is that rights cannot claim to be universal because of cultural diversity and resistance to the idea of rights; for examples, Asian values debate (Ibid. 19). Similarly, some argue that that, in contrast with development strategies, human rights is often seen as retrospective in outlook, focusing on wrongs that have occurred in the past, rather than orienting itself forward-looking programmatic outlook and perspective.

Yet many of the criticisms are not insurmountable. While many developing countries do not have the means, or an effective legal system, to adequately protect people's rights, this does not mean that the fulfilment of such rights should not be a high priority policy reform goal for both the governments themselves and international donors who assist them (Ibid. 18-20). Nevertheless, the relationship between development and human rights is certainly complex in its very nature. However, despite an early vision of the two operating in and occupying distinct realms, there is evidence of a move on both sides for greater coherence and a growing commitment to identifying synergies and complementarily. As a result, an emerging consensus around the correlation between rights and development is becoming evident. This

has arguably come about due to developments within both development and human rights circles. Therefore, accordingly many human rights advocates, the relationship between human rights and development is obvious - with the fulfillments of all people's rights being of intrinsic importance and thus an ultimate and natural goal of development. Naturally, human rights are seen as providing a framework for equality and non-discrimination in the context of development and a basis for the design of programs that respond to growing national and global inequalities.

5. Conclusion :

Thus, the foregoing discussion conclusively proves that some progress has been made towards integrating human rights and development. It is also clear that for many these two discourses should remain distinct, and also the approaches where attempts are made to find the commonalities and convergence cross the divide face numerous issues in practice. Originally, many of the formal legal structures that strengthen human rights obligations, are lacking adequate enforcement mechanisms to make them meaningful. Further, their legalistic nature often means that they remain inaccessible to those in the greatest need of their protection. On the other hand, principles based on the Right Based Approach attempt to target those in the greatest need, arguably may take away the obligatory nature of legally enshrined rights and thus may serve to weaken the basis on which they have been developed. This has led to a concern that human rights standards may co-opt and may be corrupted in the process. The multiplicity of Right Based Approach may also be seen to add to the already numerous rules of engagement within development practice, the complexity of which is compounded by the apparent failure to advance alignment and foster coherence of values between actors (Decker, Opt. Cit., 49).

Yet, a key question for both human rights advocates and development practitioners therefore turns on how human rights standards can be maintained in the context of development in a globalised order? First, it is necessary to accept the transformative possibility of human rights perspective and to understand its implications for development theories and practices, which constitutes the 'balance' between national and international responsibilities of states. Second, to probe whether the right to development is exclusively defined as a right of individuals, or extends to include the collective rights of groups and nations represented by states. Therefore what seems to be the need of the day is the creation of an international ethos (Menon, 2011: 64) and such a process, according to Parekh definitely lead to the creation of an universal value (Parekh, B. 1999) in human rights perspective and development discourse in our globalised world.

NOTES

1. It is actually argued that the idea of rights may be stresses in the writings of Romans and Stoics.
2. On the relationship between rights and duties and the relationship between duties and right-bearers, see “choice theory of rights – accordingly, the right-bearer in view of the power he has over the duty in question and benefit. Similarly, if we see the interest theories of rights which focus on duty – e.g., X has a right if Y has a duty to perform some act or omission which is in X’s interest. For an in depth analysis of the “correlativity of rights and duties”, please see, B. Mayo’s, ‘What are Human Rights?’ in DD Raphael (ed.), “Political Theory and the Rights of Man”, Indiana: UP, (1967), pp. 68, 72. (Mayo, B, 1967, pp. 68, 72) 3.
3. As it is suggested that, rights are given explicit treatment in the work of John Locke and his ‘Two Treatises of Government’ (1689) and Thomas Paine’s ‘The Rights of Man’ (1792) and emerge implicitly in the political and moral philosophy of Kant, Rousseau and Mill. The notion of human rights is viewed by many, to be a revival of the 18th century concept of the Rights of Man.
4. According to Waldron that this distinction in types of rights relates also to the distinction between Choice and Benefit theories of rights identified earlier with negative, first generation rights being associated with choice theory while second generation rights are associated with benefit theory. Under the former, the right-bearer is agent and chooser rather than merely a potential victim or potential recipient of assistance (Waldron, Opt. Cit., p. 11).
5. A number of important declarations validated the principles of indivisibility and interdependence of all forms of human rights includes, The Tehran Declaration in 1969; Resolution 32/130 (December 16th 1977); Resolution 40/114 (December 13th 1985); Resolution 41/117 (December 4th 1986); and the Vienna Declaration and Program of Action (UNGA A/CONF.157/23) (July 12th 1993).
6. Amartya Sen has defined development as the “expansion of the real freedoms that people enjoy (Sen, Amartya, 2000, p. 3)

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Protection of Natural Resources and Proactive Role of Grassroots Institutions in Goa

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Abstract

Natural resources play a significant role in our lives; hence their proper governance becomes a pertinent issue. There are various approaches towards its governance. Some advocate complete control by state agency over natural resources, while some other propose on bottoms-up approach with community involvement toward natural resource management. The present study proposes a Model for State-Community Partnership, suggesting devolution of more powers to Panchayats and Gram Sabhas as these are community oriented institutions. This model is tested with a Case Study of Goa. Goa is today facing the crisis of resource exploitation and misuse. Can grassroots institutions check these trends by being alert and proactive? The paper attempts an answer.

Key words: Natural resources, governance, Goa, community, Panchayat, Gram Sabha

1. Introduction

‘Earth provides enough to satisfy every man’s needs, but not every man’s greed.’

Mahatma Gandhi

Natural resources form an integral part of any society. They are a source of income, industry and identity. They play a central role in the wellbeing of local community. The community is dependent on them for their livelihood. These resources are also a point of pride to them as a part of village patrimony. Besides its economic value, natural resources also have historical and cultural significance. People have attachment to these resources as they and their forefathers have invested labour and sweat in them. And therefore growing misuse and depletion of these resources is a matter of great concern. Natural resource degradation is not a new thing but it is now occurring at a much faster rate, therefore not leaving enough time for the environment to recover and regenerate(Gogoi, 2013).There are various reasons for this degradation. Some of these reasons are; demographic growth which has increased pressure on resources for consumption, penetration of market forces which linked local use of resources to larger network of demands, and conflict over ownership of these resources because of

which onus of responsibility cannot be ensured (Agarwal, 1997). Conflict over resources depends on ownership, as well as how the resources are extracted, distributed and traded. The stakeholders are the state, local communities and outside actors. The conflict is all the more grave on revenue producing resources. If the resources are scarce and non-renewable it discourages diversification, and increases volatility of prices and revenue. However sometimes even abundance of resources can lead to mismanagement and corruption. Lack of clear ownership and management of natural resources often lead to problems like environment degradation, human rights violations, lobbying by business houses and other powerful groups, lack of accountability, capture of resources in few hands which results in widening the gap between rich and poor, pushing the marginalized group to periphery. There is an opinion building which proposes that increasing inclusion, involvement and participation of local community (the major stakeholder), can reduce these conflicts over natural resources.

2. Why Community?

In the last few decades, there has been a growing awareness that community has a larger role in ownership, preservation and management of resources. A wide range of policy makers and development and conservation practitioners have supported efforts to revive or bolster local natural resource management institutions in response to various economic, social, environmental and political pressures and increasingly, debates over local communities' ability to manage their lands and natural resources are a part and parcel of broader struggles over political and economic power and authority (Roe, 2009). Even though the earlier belief upheld was that people were major obstacle in management of natural resources (Ives & Merserli, 1989), thinkers like (Ostrom, 1990) strongly advocated community ownership and emphasized on bottom up approach.

The arguments in favour of community involvement are:

- Local populace is in need of these resources for livelihood, and would contribute in resource conservation as it is in their interest to do so.
- People from the locality possess time and place specific knowledge, which can be best used for resource utilization.
- People are aware of multiple uses of these natural resources and hence are in best position to explore ways of linking conservation and livelihoods.
- People are attached to these resources and have common territorial affiliation and communal bond with these resources.

- There are various customs, traditions, practices and guidelines evolved over a period of time about utilization of these resources, and the local people are aware and abiding these practices and therefore are in better position to manage these resources in a suitable manner.
- The natural resources also act as a binding factor, where the people in the locality get attached with each other and start sharing common experiences. These common experiences often give rise to the concept of common good. Individuals give up some of their individuality to behave as a single entity to accomplish goals(Kiss, 1990). Common sharing of problems can result in awareness that problems are not personal/private but affecting the whole community(Miller, 1987). Active participation in deliberation, decision making and implementation process at the grass roots can pave way for benefit of many(Kothari, 1998).
- Community participation can also reduce administrative and management costs due to proximity of local participants(Ribot, 2004).

3. Grassroots Democracy – Impetus for People’s Involvement

There is growing emphasis on grassroots democracy for development. In grassroots democracy, state cannot impose on people unpopular or lopsided development programmes and policies. The state has to function with the consent of the ruled. And this is possible with Panchayats as mediator and Gram Sabhas as ‘hybrid communities’. This is a structure based entirely on people’s power, *Lokshakti* expressing itself in the form of village power, *Gramshakti*(Buch, 2012). Thus Panchayats and Gram Sabhas can be institutions which can mediate and facilitate better outcomes of resource utilization and conservation. Panchayats are democratically elected bodies. Panchayats can make necessary rules, implement them smoothly and also can exercise adjudicative authority to settle the disputes that may arise. In fact Art. 243(G) of the Indian constitution have made it mandatory that Panchayats have to take the responsibility of 29 subjects, which include important natural resources like fisheries, water, forests, mining etc. There is provision through 73rd Amendment that interests of different marginalized sections are represented at Panchayat level. Panchayats can ensure outcomes of the decisions taken in Gram Sabhas. It can create data base which can help in mapping the achievements, and also aid in future decision making. It can also ensure accountability through periodic meetings.

Gram Sabhas are often referred to as fourth tier of Panchayati Raj. Effective Gram Sabhas possess the capacity to satisfy the desires and aspirations of the people. The much needed transparency at the grassroots is possible through these institutions. Gram Sabhas are described as ‘watch dogs’ and ‘a

force to reckon with'(Kothari, 1998), and as a soul of Panchayat. Gram Sabha is the pivot of functional participatory democracy. Gram Sabha provides basis for autonomy to the people and promote cooperation. It ensures distribution and effective control of power. It inculcates value of responsibility and moral obligation in people towards their village. Collective interaction creates incentives for individual to participate in collective actions. Initially there is every possibility that subjective/personal interest may motivate and direct behaviour when people respond, but over a period of time one cannot deny the possibility that they may be guided by substantive ends regarding justice and public good(Salgaonkar, 2013).(Chhatre, 2007)emphasized on strengthening 'community agency' that is at the heart of natural resource management that is the Gram Sabha and Ward Sabha.

4. Experiences from different states in India

Studies conducted in different states to assess the functioning of Gram Sabhas in resource management and conservation has shown positive results. In Madhya Pradesh, Gram Sabha is entrusted with different functions and powers right from safeguarding and preserving the traditions and customs of the people, their cultural identity, community resources and the customary modes of dispute resolutions. In fact Gram Sabhas are so powerful that they exercise control over institutions and functionaries in all social sectors transferred to Gram Panchayat(Singh, 2002). In Karnataka, there exists a system of social audit called *Jamabandi* where officers and the members including the general public can participate in an open system of audits whereby they can visit even the work spots and can inspect the progress and quality of the work. The *Jamabandi* report has to be placed before the Gram Sabha along with action report, so that the transparency of the work is ensured(Bandopadhyay, 2000).In Tamil Nadu, GramaSabha is an instrument through which public directly enjoy the power and feel the pulse of administration. Collective wisdom of GramaSabha guides the Panchayati Raj Institutions in their planning and execution of developmental functions. Apart from this, social auditing is an integral part of GramaSabha in Tamil Nadu, which ensures transparency in administration and accountability to all in the village development(Dwarakanath, 2013). In Kerala Gram Sabhas also undertake mass development works. Various committees are formed to incorporate the suggestions in the developmental programmes such as watershed, agriculture and related sectors, drinking water, women development, schedule caste development, etc. There is also a samiti established called the '*Karmasamiti*' of the ward members, retired engineers or technicians and the senior persons of that particular ward, to lend their help in the designing and implementation of

development project. The Kerala experiment made a big impact on resource mobilisation and people's participation in planning (Ramakrishnan, 1997). These reforms represented the most ambitious effort to build local institutions of participatory democratic governance (Heller, 2007). In Odisha different legislative instruments have entrusted definite powers and functions to the Gram Sabha and different layers of Panchayati Raj for natural resources management and resource preservation. Odisha Forest Rights Act (2006) has endowed Gram Sabhas with Powers of important natural resource-forest (Rath, 2012). A study carried by NIRD in 2005 presented a hope for future by concluding that the institution of Gram Sabha has begun affecting the decision-making process at the Panchayat level and the elements of transparency and accountability are slowly and steadily creeping into the grass roots level democratic institution of Schedule V Area States of Indian Union (Buch, 2012).

5. Goa: Increasing Scramble for Natural resources

Goa is the smallest state of the Indian Union. Small size of the state has its own benefits. Key decisions can be taken closer to the ground, it promotes easy administration, enhances accessibility between rulers and ruled and thus has potentials to promote good governance. Goa is a land of abundant resources. For Goa, natural resources mainly compose of land, water (drinkable as well as water bodies), minerals, forests, beaches, fish and wildlife. These resources are part of identity of Goa. People of Goa hold a powerful attachment to these resources as they have invested their labour and sweat in them for generations together. There are also religious and cultural traditions evolved over time and thus there is emotional bond established in the people of Goa over the natural resources of State. For example fishing community in Goa has developed elaborate cultural and religious traditions that accompany work. When we turn the pages of history of Goa, much before the advent of Portuguese colonial rule, there were ancient grassroots institutions called 'Gaunkari' (which later were referred to as Comunidades) that took the onus of looking after the natural resources and thus maintained balance between society and its natural resources. There was also the existence of concept of CPR (Common Pool of Resources) managed by these institutions.

However after Goa was liberated from Portuguese Rule in 1961, the political, demographic and economic changes that it was undergoing, began to affect the natural resources of the state. Goa, most sought after tourist destination, began to witness a dramatic change. The socio-economic changes, demography and development in this otherwise 'susegado' (content) state began to have tremendous implications for its natural resources, both renewable as well non-renewable. Ruthless mining carried

out in seven talukas out of twelve talukas of Goa adversely affected the natural resources in the state. Poorly regulated mining activities resulted in incessant removal of mud surface threatening the very demography of the village. Goa is occupying just 0.11% of India's total geographical area, and yet it produced over 50% of the country's iron ore exports. This was 460 times its geographical capacity of ore extraction. This is ecologically destructive.

Concrete jungles are coming to stay in this small state. These include massive residential projects, huge resorts, building of industries and companies. These mega projects are an immense strain on already inadequate infrastructure such as road, electricity, water, sewage and solid waste management. Due to massive cutting down of trees the villages give a deserted look besides ever reducing natural resources in the locality. To add to the agony the coconut trees which are an essence to the identity of Goa, are now given the status of 'palm' which makes it easier to axe them as and when concrete buildings are to be raised. Water resources in Goa also are polluted and drained. There is sand extraction, and shacks and other structures raised at every nook and corner of the beaches are robbing the beaches of their pristinely beauty. Increasing influx of the migrants, capital centric development policies, and booming of tourism industry has resulted in strain on the natural resources of the state. Various stakeholders are asserting their claim on the rich natural resources of the state. The government, business houses, industry, landowners, NGOs, Comunidades, Church, migrants, and the local populace, everybody is involved in hoarding of access rights to resources. Today Goa has become a 'pie' or an 'egg' and there is scramble for its natural resources for revenue (e.g. mining) on one hand and destruction of resources (e.g. incessantly falling of trees) in the name of development on the other. The central question is who will control and manage the natural resources of Goa? Can the Panchayats and the Gram Sabhas play a proactive role in this endeavour?

6. Research Objectives:

The objectives of this study are twofold:

- i. To propose a Model for state-community partnership for management of natural resources, suggesting for devolving more powers to Panchayats and Gram Sabhas as these are community oriented institutions.

- ii. To test the practicality of this model with a case study of Goa.

7. Research Hypotheses

- i) Gram Sabhas can reduce the misuse of natural resources of the village.
- ii) There is positive relationship between attendance at the Gram Sabhas and trust of the people that Gram Sabhas can protect the natural resources.

8. Research Method

The data for the research is based on both primary as well as secondary sources. The secondary data consist of newspaper reports, and reports of NGOs and other active groups. The primary data is collected by survey method where in a questionnaire was administered to members of Gram Sabhas across Goa. A total 900 respondents were interviewed. Case studies of some of the Gram Sabhas were also undertaken to substantiate the findings.


9. Model for State-Community Partnership (SCP)

The experiences of different states in India, as mentioned earlier, clearly reflect that the grassroots institutions, the Panchayats and Gram Sabhas, are emerging as effective institutions in managing the resources of the state. In fact there is statutory provision in the constitution of India for forming such institutions. The state agency can exercise control over natural resources through these institutions. On the other hand there is community with important features such as small size and population, common interests and experiences, and common norms, customs and practices. These features which are interrelated create core beliefs in the community which results in voluntary participation of the people in the Gram Sabhas. This results in SCP model (State Community Partnership) between State and Community which has the capacity to ensure optimum utilization, conservation and management of natural resources. Gram Sabhas are Magic box of David Easton, through which important deliberations, decision making and governance of resources can take place. This can result in desirable output of management and conservation of natural resources. Thus this model proposes a proactive role to Panchayats and Gram Sabhas towards governance of Natural Resources. So instead of focusing only on community, focus on grassroots institutions that is Panchayats and Gram Sabhas (which can be described as hybrid community) one can ensure community based natural resource management.

There are locally evolved norms and practices to manage these resources. These practices can get legal sanctity through approval in Gram Sabhas.

An attempt is made, by expanding David Easton’s input–output model, to explain the proactive role the grassroots institutions can play in protecting, maintaining and augmenting the natural resources of the village.

Management of Natural Resources



10. Can Gram Sabha Protect Natural Resources?

The indiscriminate hoard for resources in Goa has posed a challenge to seriously think about the future of the state. Villages in Goa are small, both in size and population. Most of the village Panchayats is of nine or eleven wards. There is growing resistance by the people for various developmental projects, whether it may be Ingo's flea market in Assagao, Bardez Taluka or Raheja Project in Benaulim, Salcete Taluka. The strength of Panchayats and Gram Sabhas was witnessed by the state when various meetings were held across the state, and Government of Goa was forced to scrap the Regional Plan 2011. The Gram Sabhas which were so lackluster all this while, today are taunted as 'Garam Sabhas'. A survey was conducted with 900 respondents who were the members of Gram Sabhas across the state to study whether the Gram Sabha can protect the natural resources of the village. The questions were closed ended questions with five point scale. The respondents were asked how often they attended the Gram Sabhas with five options of Never, Rarely, Sometimes, Often, Regularly, and whether they agree with the statement that Gram Sabha is effective in protecting natural resources of the village with five options namely; Strongly disagree, Disagree, Neutral, Agree, and Strongly Agree. Ten forms were rejected as they were incomplete and therefore analysis was done with the help of 890 replies. The analyses are presented in Table 1.

Table 1
Protect natural resources and attendance at Gram Sabha

		PRONATRES					Total
		1	2	3	4	5	
Attendance at GS 1	Count	2	12	14	30	8	66
	% within Attendance at GS	3.0%	18.2%	21.2%	45.5%	12.1%	100.0%
2	Count	0	4	0	4	2	10
	% within Attendance at GS	.0%	40.0%	.0%	40.0%	20.0%	100.0%
3	Count	4	24	14	104	32	178
	% within Attendance at GS	2.2%	13.5%	7.9%	58.4%	18.0%	100.0%

4	Count	12	38	26	238	110	424
	% within AttendanceatGS	2.8%	9.0%	6.1%	56.1%	25.9%	100.0%
5	Count	10	12	10	142	38	212
	% within AttendanceatGS	4.7%	5.7%	4.7%	67.0%	17.9%	100.0%
Total	Count	28	90	64	518	190	890
	% within AttendanceatGS	3.1%	10.1%	7.2%	58.2%	21.3%	100.0%

Attending GS: 1-Never, 2-Rarely, 3-Sometimes, 4-Often, 5-Regularly.


PRONATRES (Protection of natural resources): 1- Strongly disagree, 2- Disagree, 3 – Neutral, 4 – Agree, 5 – Strongly Agree

It was amazing to note that 708 respondents (79.5%) agreed that the Gram Sabha is empowered to protect the natural resources of the village. In fact this trust in the Gram Sabha has led to increase in participation at Gram Sabha as 528 respondents from 708 respondents said that they attended Gram Sabha regularly or often (See Table 1).

Figure 1 clearly reflects that in general people felt that Gram Sabha can protect the natural resources of the village. In any category of attendance viz. ‘Never’, ‘Rarely’, ‘Sometimes’, ‘Often’ and ‘Always’ it can be seen that the ‘agreed’ category is more, and in the category of ‘often’ and ‘regularly’ the ‘agreed’ and ‘strongly agreed’ is definitely more. Therefore it can be concluded that people are attending Gram Sabha as they trust that Gram Sabha can be active in protecting natural resources of the village. The study reflected that the people in Goa, who are the components of Gram Sabha, strongly believed that the Gram Sabhas can protect the natural resources of their village.

Figure1

Protect natural resources and attendance at Gram Sabha



Attending GS: 1-Never, 2-Rarely, 3-Sometimes, 4-Often, 5-Regularly.

PRONATRES: 1- Strongly disagree, 2– Disagree, 3 – Neutral, 4 – Agree, 5 – Strongly Agree

11. Case Studies

Some case studies are presented below as to how Gram Sabhas have tried to protect the natural resources in the state and have even been successful in thwarting certain projects which were harmful for the demography of the village.

- In Velim, Salcete, South Goa, Gram Sabha called on February 8th 2009, the members opposed any move to convert water bodies and asked the authorities to retain economically sensitive zones and save the village hills and paddy fields.
- Gram Sabhas of Benaulim as well as Ambelim, from Salcete, South Goa, vociferously voiced the need to retain identity and demography of the village. They also demanded protection of beaches, sand dunes, paddy fields and water bodies.

- Special Gram Sabha called by NavelimPanchayat in August, 2012 called for 12 hours bandh on 13th August, 2012 to protest against the pollution allegedly caused due to activities at Sesa Goa's pig iron plant at Amona. People complained that thick particulate matter had filled the air, and dust had settled on their houses, vehicles, vegetation all around. Villagers, numbering hundreds voiced concern over the project, which they claimed had no permission from Goa State Pollution Control Board or the Central Ministry for Environment and Forest.
- Socorro Gram Sabha, BardezTaluka, in almost every Gram Sabha have requested Water Resources Department not to issue any more permission for sinking of bore or tube wells in the village as this had led to depletion of ground water level and it is affecting the existing open wells.
- The Gram Sabha of Carmona village thwarted the ambitious real estate project worth crores of rupees. In its 88,000 square meter area project on the banks of river Sal, Construction Giant, Raheja, had divided the area in 15 plots of 2,000 sqmt. and 6,000 sqmt. and was intending to build 700 flats. In the village of 300-400 houses, such a mega-housing project would not only change the demography of the place, but would also create water, electricity and other infrastructure issues. A study of all the subsequent Gram Sabhas held in these villages reflected that the villagers have consistently raised their voice against mega projects.
- Bhirondhe Gram Sabha from SattariTaluka held on August 17th 2012 took a unanimous decision that not even an inch of land of the village will be sold to any outside party, and if any such deal was struck by any party, Panchayat would not give any NOC for such sale or purchase. The villagers felt that such resolution was necessary to secure the lands of the farmers of their village and also that of other people.
- Hundred and twenty villages came together and formed 'Village Group of Goa' and demanded for constitution of local Committees and taking local people into confidence while drafting the new regional plan 2021 and they opposed any move to convert water bodies and asked the authorities to retain economically sensitive zones, Khazan lands, and save the village hills and paddy fields. They opined that it was necessary to retain identity and demography of the village. They also demanded protection of beaches, sand dunes, water bodies and protecting the agriculture and orchard lands from settlements.
- In a classic case of Ingo at Assagao, Mapusa, a foreign national named Ingo, wanted to set up a flea market in this area. He began with clearing the mountains for this purpose. People were

not aware of this project. On seeing that their village hills were brought down with bull dozers the villagers got together and opposed this project tooth and nail till the project was shelved.

- Efforts at various Gram Sabhas in mining affected villages (Rivona, Cavrem, Vagurme, Usgao, Pilgaoetc) proved very successful in pressuring the state to put a ban on mining activities in Goa. Though mining has resumed again in the state, but hopefully with some stringent rules and regulations. But the fact remains that mining has left irreversible impact on resources in the state, and further deterioration can be checked only by proactive Panchayats and Gram Sabhas.
- Colva is located on the coastal belt of south Goa. Tourists flock to this place, and as a result this place faces hazards like garbage problem, water shortage, clogging of drainages, huge mega projects and tourist resorts etc. Cutting of hills and trees is affecting environment. People from this area have been agitating for cleaner and greener Colva for a long time now. In one Gram Sabha, issue came up on one such resort which closed down the traditional access to beach to the locals, and as a result it became difficult for people to have access to sea and to carry out their traditional fishing activity. The Resolution was adopted that the access to beach would be opened to locals with an immediate effect.

Thus the data analyses supplemented with various case studies gives a ray of hope that the State Community Partnership can be best realised by giving more powers to the grassroots bodies i.e. the Panchayats and Gram Sabhas. These bodies have statutory standing as well as are integral part of the community. The Gram Sabhas are rightfully addressed as ‘hybrid community’. The small size of the villages in Goa, the social affinity among the people, smaller distance between the ruler and the ruled, peer pressure can be a guiding force for the grassroots institutions in protecting the natural resources of the state.

12. What more can be done?

The Panchayats could implement the following policy options and actions towards better preservation and augmentation of natural resources:

- **Policy of Inclusion**

The Panchayat should strive towards policy of inclusion, where different sections of the village community are involved in resource management. The NGOs, women, Women Self Help Groups etc. can play very proactive role in management of resources.

- **Identify Common Property Resources (CPR)**

The main role of the Panchayat should be to identify the resources which can be categorised as CPR. These can be forests, mountains, water bodies etc. The Panchayats should make the community realise the significance of these CPR through Gram Sabhas and need for their preservation and effective utilization.

- **Capacity building**

The Panchayat should focus on capacity building to manage and develop natural resources. There can be major projects undertaken, such as watershed programmes. The schemes like MGNREGS can be effectively implemented in this direction. This will also provide employment to the people in the villages. It will create durable assets for socio-economic development too. Common guidelines can be framed, and committees can be formed from among the Gram Sabha members for monitoring and evaluation.

- **Promote cooperation and symmetrical growth**

The Panchayat should promote cooperation between various stake holders in the natural resources. Promoting symmetrical growth can arrest and reverse the trend of degradation of natural resources.

13. To conclude

Natural resources play a significant role in our lives; hence their proper governance becomes a pertinent question. There are various approaches to it, while some advocate complete control by state agency, there is also a large pool of research that emphasizes on importance of bottom-up approach toward natural resource management. The recent trends in the country reflect an interesting shift in management paradigms from strict agency control to collaborative management. Excellent example could be state-people partnership, and this is possible by devolving more and more powers to Panchayats and Gram Sabhas. These are community oriented institutions and therefore needs to be strengthened. Interaction and decision-making regarding the use of natural resource requires developing a solution that is fairer and more effective and equally acceptable by all and therefore such decisions may be rested in grassroots bodies. It can also reduce evils like corruption, nepotism, ambiguous policies, lack of proper policy implementation and unequal resource distribution which often result due to centralized resource governance. A proactive Panchayat body can overcome these evils. Goa is today facing the crisis of resource exploitation and misuse and therefore fear of resource degradation and depletion looms large on this beautiful state. Proactive and alert Panchayat and Gram

Sabhas which are hybrid communities can check these trends and therefore a very active role to these bodies is proposed.

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The Evolution of BRICS in International Political Economy

Shameem C.C and K. Jayaprasad

Abstract

In an era of regional integration and interdependence, organisations like the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) can play a meaningful role in not only the international level but also regionally. The recent summit of the BRICS reiterates that more cooperation is needed at various levels.¹ It calls for a more representative international financial architecture demanding an increase in the voice and representation of developing countries. The establishment has also improved international monetary as well as trade systems which can serve the interests of all countries and support developing economies. This paper analyses the tendency of BRICS towards economic integration, its evolving nature in global political economy both political as well as economical aspects.

Key Words: BRICS, International Political Economy, Political Interdependences, and Economic Interdependences

Introduction

In an era of regional integration and interdependence, organisation of countries like Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) can play a meaningful role in international level as well as regional in years to come. The recent summit, (2016) of the BRICS reiterates that more cooperation is needed at various level. The BRICS focused on more representative international financial architecture demanding an increase in the voice and representation of developing countries and the establishment improved international monetary as well as trade systems that can serve the interests of all countries and support developing countries. Moreover, these economies are experiencing large scale growth and are now significant contributors to the global economy. One must acknowledge the fact that the BRICS countries are composed of various political systems in various subcontinents, but in a changed context, came together under the category of ‘developing countries’ in broader terms (Jayan, 23, January, 2013).


The BRICS is a group which promotes the interest of the global South within a multilateral system. It constitutes of different political system which are authoritarian, totalitarian, democratic and federal characters. This consensus gives them the ability to influence global

decision making and safeguard developing countries interests and concerns. The BRICS has projected itself as an independent group in a fast changing world. The BRICS is a relatively new group and its institutional structure is still evolving. A number of cooperation mechanisms have been developed, including the Action Plan and meetings of foreign, finance and trade ministers as well as central banks governors are taking place on a yearly basis to further enhance the working of this institution.

The BRICS economies have grown quite resilient to global shocks due to flexibility of their markets and economic policy frame works. Through increased trade and investment linkages, the BRICS countries are also increasingly growth drivers of low income countries (IMF report, 2011). The rich flow of FDI within this group, trade flows, and migration flows have substantiated their economic growth and development. These factors are considered to be evolving growth factors of their economic growth and development.

The BRICS does not represent a region (against a well- known gravity model)². Moreover mutual concerns and interest forms the core of this group in which regionalism is promoted through economic integration and interdependence among member states. The BRICS is usually referred to as a ‘Three trillion dollar trade’ club. In fact the total trade of BRICS is recorded as 3.41 Trillion USD, although it may be a convincing argument to consider the BRICS as a major trading bloc in international trade (IMF report, 2011). Thus trade is one of the integral factors uniting BRICS countries as a group.

Figure 1
BRICS share of World Trade (% of Share)




Source: IMF report, 2012.

However, the above figure 1 looks at the BRICS in comparison with other trade and economic blocs such as the EU, ASEAN, GCC, and Rest of the world. The BRICS trade has increased significantly since 2001 and have overtaken the EU, which reflects the importance of BRICS as an emerging trade bloc. The published statistics support the view that the BRICS is indeed a trade bloc, with China being the major player (IMF report, 2012). The above (figure 1) provides statistical evidence that the BRICS is evolving itself by contributing to world growth and development. According to Goldman Sach's estimate from 2012, the BRICS countries would continue to show strong economic growth rates in post global financial crisis period (Wilson, Burgi and Carlson, 2011, p.4). This estimation also substantiated the argument for BRICS economic growth and development.

While it is difficult to predict exactly how it will look like in 2050, there is no doubt that a 'great economic convergence' is taking place between the economies of developed and emerging markets (Beausang, 2012). In the year 2000, the GDP, in terms of PPP (see figure 2) of US was at 22 percent in the world while the GDP was slightly larger than 21.4 percent of combined BRICs.

Figure 2
Percentage Share of Global GDP at PPP in USD, 2000




Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook, May 2001.³

Ten years later, the combined GDP of BRIC's was (see figure 3) 12 Trillion USD, or approximately 25 percent of world GDP, larger than US contribution of 20 percent. These changes in the BRIC's contribution to world GDP was accomplished by consistently high growth rates in the BRIC's, particularly in China and, to a lesser extent India. This dramatic

change is the evidence that BRICS countries have influenced international economic growth which over take EU, and USA. In this context financial crisis made apparent change in BRICS economies for less effective rather than the EU and USA. This was one of the reason BRICS is one of the largest credential factor of global economy.

Figure 3
Percentage share of Global GDP at PPP in USD 2011



Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook, October, 2011.

In this group China is the leading player and according to Magnus, China claims on being a global super power based on the following factors (World Economic Outlook, 2011).

- 1) It is the world's largest creditor nation.
- 2) Its economy is sufficiently large to have material impact on the global economy.
- 3) It is engaging consistently with global trade and capital markets.
- 4) It is a major consumer and participant in global energy market.

Moreover India and Russia are holding second position in this list. Brazil and South Africa are holding next position respectively on the above criteria. In this context China and India are given largest market access for Russian, Brazilian, and South African natural resources. These factors play a major factor to create strong solidarity and cooperation.

1) Trade Profile of BRICS

The trade is one of the growth parameters of any countries economic development. The free flow of goods and services (within the region) leads to strengthen their economic interdependence. The individual composition of exports reflects the diverse resource endowments present within BRICS (figure 4). This presents a significant opportunity for leveraging existing trade ties and cooperation while serving the economic growth and

development agenda, a necessary precursor to faster socio-economic convergence with advanced economies (Saran, and Singh, 2013).


Trade in goods and services provide opportunities in multiple sectors for cooperation among the BRICS countries, which can be mutually beneficial (figure 4). Brazil is currently a major producer of bio-fuels and may eventually be a major energy provider to the Chinese and Indian economies, which have significant energy demands. Brazil also dominates the export of agrochemical products, which feature prominently in the import baskets of Russia, India and China. Russia's vast natural gas and oil reserves can help sustain the energy demands of the other BRICS economies. India's robust service sector growth gives it a competitive advantage. China's export of manufactured goods, machinery and textile products feeds the global consumer markets. South Africa holds vast mineral deposits essential for industrial development in other countries, and its growing service sector makes it an increasingly investment-friendly destination.

The share of BRICS in global trade has increased significantly over the last two decades. In 1990, BRICS accounted for only 3 percent of global trade. This share doubled by the turn of the century in 2011, BRICS accounted for 19 percent of global exports and 16 percent global imports of goods and services in 2013 (Mathur and Gupta, 2013 pp.80-85).

The year –on – year double digit growth in merchandise trade made China the largest exporter and second largest importer of merchandise goods in 2011. Russia and India have also entered into the list of top 20 world merchandise exporters and importers. In merchandise export trade, Brazil falls in the top 20 list. China, Russia and Brazil have surplus on merchandise trade balance; India and South Africa have deficits.

On the trade related to service, all the BRICS economies including South Africa have recorded robust double digits growth in exports and imports. China and India are in top ten rankings for trade in services, while India has a trade surplus in services. It is not enough to offset its merchandise trade deficit; other BRICS economies have a deficit in the trade balances in services. The trade balance (merchandise) of the BRICS has been mapped in figure 4. China and Russia has the sizable trade surplus, in excess of 200 Billion USD. On the other hand, India is running a trade deficit of same magnitude (Mathur and Gupta, 2013, pp.80-85). South Africa balanced trade balance among this group in 2014.

Figure 4
Trade Balance (Billion USD)



Source: Based on World Bank and IMF web sites, <http://data.worldbank.org>

2) BRICS's Engagement in Global Environment

The first meeting of the BRICS grouping took place between leaders from Brazil, Russia, India and China, in Yekaterinburg, Russia on 16 June 2009. At the first meeting, the BRIC (not included South Africa) countries discussed the situation of the global economy and other pressing issues of global development, and also prospects for further strengthening the BRIC group.

The first meeting took place in the context of emerging global financial crisis, and in the first summit communiqué released after the summit the BRIC leaders stressed the central role played by the G20 summits in dealing with financial crisis. In doing they emphasized that financial crisis had brought about a recognition that global economy could no longer be managed by the G8⁴ alone, but that a wider grouping of states, including the BRIC countries was now critical to co-managing the global economy, and especially the global financial system.⁵

The second meeting of the BRICS leaders was held in Brasilia on 15 April 2010. The summit communiqué released after this summit said that the leaders had met to discuss major issues on the international agenda as well as to take concrete steps to improve cooperation and coordination within the BRICS group.⁶ In this statement the BRICS countries underlined their support for a “multi-polar, equitable and democratic world order, based on international law, equality, mutual respects, cooperation, coordinated action, and collective decision making of all states.”

The third summit took place in Sanya, China on 14 April 2011, and at this meeting the Republic of South Africa joined this group and it was renamed the BRICS group.

The Sanya declaration joint statement stated that “... the world is undergoing far reaching, complex and profound changes, marked by the strengthening of multi-polarity, economic globalization and increasing and interdependence”. While facing the evolving global environment and a multitude of global threats and challenges, the international community should join hands to strengthen cooperation for common development. Based on universally recognized norms of international law and in a spirit of mutual respect and collective decision making, global economic governance should be strengthened, democracy in international relations should be promoted, and the voice of emerging and developing countries in international affairs should be enhanced.⁷

The fourth summit of the BRICS countries took place in the capital of India, New Delhi; on 29 March 2012. The fourth summit communiqué further articulated the BRICS visions as: “...of a future marked by global peace, economic and social progress and enlightened scientific temper. We stand ready to work with others, developed and developing countries together, on the basis of universally recognized norms of International law and multilateral decision making, to deal with the challenges and the opportunities before the world today. Strengthened representation of emerging and developing countries in the institutions of global governance will enhance their effectiveness in achieving these objectives”.⁸ The above statement gave a clear picture about BRICS concerns and interests arising out of a multilateral system. This statement gave the meaning of BRICS protecting and promoting developing countries concerns and interests.

Moreover this reflected a gradual shift in the focus of the BRICS, away from its origin as an aspiring group that had in common an alternative vision for the future, to a group that was more present in current international affairs, and that actively cooperated to pursue common interests in a broad range of international forums in multilateral system.⁹

The fifth summit of BRICS leaders was held in Durban, South Africa on 27 March, 2013. The summit communiqué stated that the discussion at the fifth summit reflected the growing intra BRICS solidarity as well as its shared goal to contribute positively to global peace, stability, development and cooperation. Moreover the summit communiqué also stated the BRICS aim to develop itself progressively into a full -fledged mechanism of current and long term coordination on wide range key issues of the world economy and politics.¹⁰

The last summit (8th) held at Goa, they strongly condemn several terrorist attacks, against some BRICS countries, including that in India. They strongly condemned terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and stressed that there can be no justification whatsoever for any acts of terrorism, whether based upon ideological, religious, political, racial, ethnic or any other reasons. They agreed to strengthen cooperation in combating international terrorism both at the bilateral level and at international forums (8thBRICS Summit Reports, 2016, p. 12). To address the threat of chemical and biological terrorism, they supported and emphasised the need for launching multilateral negotiations on an international convention for the suppression of acts of chemical and biological terrorism, including at the Conference on Disarmament. In this context, they welcomed India's offer to host a Conference in 2018 aimed at strengthening international resolve in facing the challenge of the WMD-Terrorism nexus.¹¹ This will emancipate BRICS role in counter terrorism, which aimed to seek demoralizing terrorist activities in global arena.

They acknowledged the recent meeting of the BRICS High Representatives on National Security and, in this context, welcomed the setting up and organising the first meeting of the BRICS Joint Working Group on Counter-Terrorism on 14 September 2016 in New Delhi.¹² They believed that this will further promote dialogue and understanding among BRICS nations on issues of counter terrorism, as well as coordinate efforts to address the scourge of terrorism.¹³ This initiative provides substantial evidence of the BRICS action against terrorism for the creation of a peaceful global atmosphere.

To conclude that the communiqués released after first eight summits of the BRICS countries articulate an alternative vision for a new global order that is more democratic, just, fair, rule based, and which requires the collective decision making and co-management of all states, both when it comes to the specifics of international financial system and its institutions, but also more broadly as it pertains to international trade and the political system, including global institutions like the UN.¹⁴

With concepts like democracy, fairness and rule governed behaviour, the BRICS countries are signalling that they perceive that current global order to be undemocratic, unjust and arbitrarily manipulated by a dominant super power supported by an alliance of developed countries in the North. The BRICS hold that the existing global governance architecture is regulated by institutions that were developed to deal with a very different set of challenges and opportunities. As the global economy is being reshaped, the BRICS should explore new

models and approaches to global governance which strives for more equitable development and inclusive growth.¹⁵

3) Global Threats and Challenges: The Political Perspective of BRICS

BRICS has a political aim namely to redefine global inequality at the level of the International political economy. The BRICS vision for a new global order according to the communiqué released after the first summit states that BRIC countries should “underline our support for a more democratic and just multi-polar world order based on the rule of international law, equality, mutual respects, cooperation, coordinated action and collective decision making of all states. We reiterate our support for political and diplomatic efforts to resolving disputes in International Relations.”¹⁶

The BRICS leaders went on to express their strong commitment to multilateral diplomacy and they recognize the central role played by the UN in dealing with global challenges and threats. At the same time, they also affirm the need for a comprehensive reform of the UN with a view to making it more efficient. Two of the BRIC countries China and Russia, are permanent members of Security Council, and other two Brazil and India have been strong advocates for the reform of the Security Council, and have at times expressed an interest in serving on such a revised security Council. China and Russia, although in favour of Security Council reform, also have vested interest to maintain in their current privileged position. Explaining their views after the first summit, they mentioned that “we reiterate the importance we attach to the status of India and Brazil in international affairs and support their aspirations to play a greater role in UN.”¹⁷

The communiqué released after the second summit express the strong commitment of the BRICS countries to multilateral diplomacy, with the UN playing the central role in dealing with global challenges and threats.¹⁸ The BRICS countries again reaffirm their support for comprehensive reform of the UN, with view to making it more effective, efficient and representation.¹⁹

The reference to multilateral diplomacy and a central role the BRICS countries assign to the UN for managing conflicts reflects on a deep unease, what these countries view as unilateral action by west to resolve conflicts by either imposing its norms and values via manipulation of the UN, or by bypassing the UN altogether. The first two communiqués indicate that the

BRIC countries are especially critical of the action by the West that involves support for specific movements or political parties in non-western countries.

In the communiqué released after the third summit, the BRICS again expressed its strong commitment to multilateral diplomacy with UN playing the role in dealing with global challenges and threats.²⁰ The third summit communiqué again reaffirmed this need by mentioning about the Security Council. However, it does not mention anything specific on Security Council reform other than the present standards sentence within the existing permanent members of Security Council like China and Russia, acknowledged the important role of Brazil, India and South Africa and their aspirations to play a greater role in international affairs.

4) **BRICS and Post Financial Crisis**

In the communiqué released after the first summit it is stressed that BRICS countries are committed to advance reform of international financial institutions, so as to reflect changes in the world economy. The summit communiqué states that emerging and developing economies must have a greater voice and representation in international financial institutions, and that their heads and senior leadership should be appointed through an open, transparent and merit based selection process.²¹

In the communiqué the BRICS leaders call for a stable, predictable and more diversified international monetary system, and they go on to suggest a set of principles on which a reformed financial and economic architecture should be based, namely; democratic transparent decision making and implementation process in international financial institutions; a solid legal basis; compatibility of activities of effective national regulatory institutions and international standard setting bodies; and a strengthening of risk management and supervisory practice.

These principles were the first indication of collective BRICS vision for a new financial and economic order, namely one that is rule based, democratic and transparent. These are all things that reflect the desire to constrain the dominance of West in the international financial system and its institutions, and these concepts take on wider meaning and also apply to the political dimension of the BRICS vision for a new global order.

In the communiqué the BRICS countries also stress the important role that will be played by international trade and Foreign Direct Investment in the recovery of the world economy, and

the Chinese and Indian economies were regarded at the time as critical to recovery of the world economy. The BRICS leaders also use this opportunity to call for significant changes in the international environment by calling for a more stable multilateral trading system, and curbing of trade protectionism. They are thus once again signalling that they perceive the current system to be dominated and manipulated by the West, and that they want to see a new global order that is more stable, predictable and fair.²²

The communiqué released after the second summit again stresses the central role played by the G20 in combating the global financial crisis. The BRICS countries state that they welcome the fact that the G20 was confirmed as the premier forum for international economic coordination and cooperation of all its members' state. When they do so they are reflecting back on the previous decades, when the G8 dictated global financial and economic policies. The communiqué goes on to articulate clearly that compared to previous arrangements, the G20 is broader, more inclusive, diverse, representative and effective with regard of BRICS.

With regard to the reform of the global financial institutions, the BRICS countries regard the Breton Woods institutions, as currently managing the global financial system in its interest. The second BRICS summit communiqué goes further than the first one and states that the BRICS countries will strive to achieve an ambitious conclusion to the ongoing and long overdue reforms of the Breton Woods institutions. It states that the IMF and World Bank urgently need to address their legitimacy deficits, and goes on to make specific suggestions. For instance, the communiqué states that reforming these institutions governance structures requires a substantial shift in voting power in favour of emerging market economies and developing countries to bring their participation in decision making in line with their relative weight in the world economy.

The communiqué also says that the BRICS countries agree on need for an open and merit based selection method, irrespective of nationality, for leadership positions of the IMF and World Bank, and that the staff of these institutions also needs to reflect better the diversity of their membership.

The communiqué then states that the BRICS leaders have asked their finance ministers and central bank governors to look into regional monetary arrangements and to discuss modalities of cooperation between their countries in this area. The frustration the BRIC leaders have expressed with the slow reform of these global financial institutions has resulted in the

BRICS countries establishing their own intra-BRICS financial arrangements as well as an alternative development bank that is intended to serve the interest of the developing rather than the developed world. This decision at the second summit can thus be seen as the starting point of this development.²³

At the third and fourth summits the communiqués concluded that whilst the BRICS countries recovered relatively quickly from global crisis, growth prospects worldwide remain low due to market instability, especially in the Euro Zone. The communiqués make it clear that the BRICS countries blame the building sovereign debts and concern over medium to long term fiscal adjustment in advanced countries for creating uncertain environment for global growth. The BRICS state that it is critical for advanced economies to adopt responsible macro economic and financial policies, avoid creating excessive global liquidity and undertake structural reforms to lift growth that creates jobs.

The BRICS also express concern about the risk of large and volatile cross border capital flows being faced by emerging economies, and they call further international financial regulatory oversight and reform, strengthening policy coordination and financial recognition and supervision cooperation, and promoting the sound development of global financial markets and banking system.

In this context, the communiqués reaffirm the primary role of the G20 as the main forum of international economic cooperation, and argue that its role at this juncture is to facilitate enhanced macroeconomic policy coordination, to enable global economic recovery and secure financial stability, including through an improved international monetary and financial architecture. The BRICS communiqué also calls for more representative international financial architecture, with an increase in the voice and representation of developing countries and the establishment and development of a just international monetary system that can serve the interest of all countries and support the development of emerging and developing economies.

The summit communiqués again singled out the IMF for particular action and call on the urgent implementation of the 2010 governance and quota reform, as well as a comprehensive review of the quota formula better to reflect economic weights and enhance the voice and representation of emerging market and developing countries by January 2013.²⁴

Moreover the BRICS communiqué also argues that the nature of the World Bank should be that of an institution that efficiently mediates North-South cooperation to an institution that promotes equal partnership with all countries as a way to deal with development issues and overcome an outdated donor – recipient dichotomy.

At the fifth summit, the BRICS countries evaluated the policy actions of Europe, the US and Japan aimed at reducing risks in the world economy. The communiqué notes that some of these actions produced negative spill over effects in other economies, it argues that significant risks remain and that the performance of the global economy still falls behind the BRICS expectations. The BRICS also underscore the need for appropriate action to be taken by advanced economies in order to rebuild confidence, foster growth and secure a strong recovery.

The various BRICS summits also address the central role of energy in world economy, and its implications for the global climate. The summit communiqués say that the BRICS countries welcome a constructive dialogue on how to deal with climate change based on the principle of common but differential responsibility given the need to combine members to protect the climate with steps to fulfil the socio-economic development projects of the BRICS countries. In the field of energy and climate change the BRICS countries are thus signalling a vision for co-management of new global order that seeks to find a balance between the concern and interests of both the North and the South.

In the 8th BRICS summit held at Goa, during this summit they reaffirmed their commitment to a strong, quota based and adequately resourced IMF (borrowed resources by the IMF should be on a temporary allotment). They strongly committed to support the coordinated effort by the emerging economies to ensure that the Fifteenth General Review of Quotas, including the new quota formula, will be finalised within the agreed timelines so as to ensure that the increased voice of the dynamic emerging and developing economies reflects their relative contributions to the world economy, while protecting the voices of least developed countries (LDCs), poor countries and regions.²⁵ Moreover they welcomed the inclusion of the RMB into the Special Drawing Rights (SDR) currency basket on 10 October 2016.²⁶

The summit of WTO, BRICS reiterated their support for the multilateral trading system and the centrality of the WTO as the cornerstone of a rule based, open, transparent, non-discriminatory and inclusive multilateral trading system with development for their core agenda. They noted the increasing number of bilateral, regional, and multilateral trade

agreements, and reiterate that these should be complementary to the multilateral trading system and encourage the parties there on to align their work in consolidating the multilateral trading system under the WTO in accordance with the principles of transparency, inclusiveness, and compatibility with the WTO rules.²⁷ They appreciated the progress in the implementation of the Strategy for BRICS Economic Partnership and emphasise the importance of the BRICS Roadmap for Trade, Economic and Investment Cooperation until 2020.²⁸ They believed close cooperation between the sectoral cooperation mechanisms, BRICS Contact Group on Economic and Trade Issues, the BRICS Business Council, New Development Bank and the BRICS Interbank cooperation mechanism is crucial in strengthening the BRICS economic partnership.²⁹ They welcomed, in this context, the continued realisation of the major BRICS economic initiatives such as enhanced cooperation in e-commerce, “single window”, IPR cooperation, trade promotion and micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs). They recognised non-tariff measures (NTMs), services sector, and standardisation and conformity assessments as possible areas of future cooperation. They noted the meeting of BRICS Trade Ministers in New Delhi on 13 October 2016 and welcome its substantive outcomes.³⁰ These economic initiatives are the evidence of their inclusiveness in this group through promoting synergies and complementarities among this group, which lead to institutional integration process.

They welcomed India's initiative to host the first BRICS Trade Fair in New Delhi. This is an important step towards the implementation of Strategy for BRICS Economic Partnership. They believed that this will further consolidate trade and commercial partnership among BRICS countries. The BRICS trade fair will help in future through promoting start up projects and increasing capabilities among the young skilled population within the BRICS. This trade fair help to promote people to people contact within the BRICS countries,

The BRICS leaders are agreed that Medium-Small Scale Market Enterprises (MSMEs), which provide major employment opportunities, at comparatively lower capital cost, and create self-employment opportunities in rural and underdeveloped areas. MSMEs thus help assure equitable wealth distribution nationally and globally.³¹ They commend organisation of BRICS second round-table on MSMEs by India with a focus on technical and business alliances in MSMEs Sector. They agreed to work for greater integration of MSMEs in Regional and Global Value Chains.³² This initiative will attract foreign direct investment on Medium and small scale industries in BRICS countries which make strong economic growth

in grass roots level of economy. This would be reducing poverty eradication in rural and urban areas of BRICS countries through given mass employment opportunities.

Moreover they stressed the importance to foster an innovative, invigorated, interconnected and inclusive world economy. They enhanced their consultations and coordination on the G20 agenda, especially on issues of mutual interest to the BRICS countries, and promote issues of importance for the Emerging Market and Developing Economies (EMDEs). They will continue to work closely with all G20 members to strengthen macroeconomic cooperation, promote innovation, as well as robust and sustainable trade and investment to propel global growth, improve global economic governance, enhance the role of developing countries, strengthen international financial architecture, support for industrialisation in Africa and least developed countries and enhance cooperation on energy access and efficiency. They stressed the need for enhanced international cooperation to address illicit cross-border financial flows, tax evasion and trade mis-invoicing.³³ They considered that G20 is a good platform for protecting developing countries concerns and interests, capable to change international order. This platform will enhance South –North cooperation in global affairs like on international issues terrorism, refugees' issues, and environmental and sustainable development issues.

In addition they strongly emphasised the importance of enhancing intra-BRICS cooperation in the industrial sector, including through the BRICS Industry Ministers Meetings, in order to contribute to the accelerated and sustainable economic growth, the strengthening of comprehensive industrial ties, the promotion of innovation as well as job creation, and improvement of the quality of life of people in BRICS countries.³⁴ These made the peculiar initiative for job seekers and fulfil their dreams within the BRICS countries through industrial cooperation between themselves.

They commended during the Goa summit that their Customs administrations on the establishment of the Customs Cooperation Committee of BRICS and on exploring means of further enhancing collaboration in the future, including those aimed at creating legal basis for customs cooperation and facilitating procedures of customs control.³⁵ They noted the signing of the Regulations on Customs Cooperation Committee of the BRICS in line with the undertaking in the Strategy for BRICS Economic Partnership to strengthen interaction among Customs Administrations.³⁶ These initiatives are enhanced simplifying customs rules and

regulations related with trade which leads to reduce tariff and non- tariff issues between BRICS member states.

With an evaluation of the above given facts, it can be said that the macroeconomic, financial, energy, climate change and development policies of the BRICs countries, as reflected in the outcomes of the eight summits held between 2009 and 2016, thus clearly reflects a strategy aimed at bringing about a world order that will reflect a new system that is no longer central around serving the interests of the Western developed world, but instead seeks to find a balance between North and South. The vision of BRICS for economic, financial and development dimensions towards a new global order are thus closely aligned with the goals it seek to achieve.

Conclusion

To conclude that the economic growth of BRICS is unquestionably the stepping stone to its development, which is going to benefit around 43 percent of world population dwelling in the five member countries. One of the major objectives of the group is the development of a multilateral system which supports developing countries interests and concern in global level. It can be seen that regarding certain issues, the BRICS act as coalition block within a multilateral system on issues related to IPR, antidumping, environment, food subsidies and IMF quota reform. Another important power orientation of BRICS is that the memberships of countries like Russia and China had veto power (permanent members) and rest of the countries as non-permanent members in the United Nation Security Council, having a say on global security issues. This is the one of the aspect BRICS should promote shared democratic values in multilaterals institutions. Moreover the BRICS nations are members of major international institution like WTO, IMF, World Bank, G20, and UN which also influence the group on having the power to determine and negotiate on matters of international importance. The continental accessibility of countries such as like in Latin America, Africa, South Asia, Asia, and Eurasia enhances the increased role BRICS's in a global trade system and global politics. Moreover the authoritarian, totalitarian, democratic and federal interests working towards common concerns and interest makes it a unique group. In this context BRICS's intra-regional trade relations have made it possible to achieve trust and cooperation among the member states especially through the promotion of economic interdependence. As well defined institutional mechanism needs to be build in order to better evaluate and manage strong economic ties among the member states.

The geographical and political supremacy of the constituent countries in their own region should be used to further assert the role of BRICS, thereby giving it a strong voice in global politics. The BRICS Summits could be effectively used as a platform to promote bilateral discussions among other regional or non-regional groupings to which the constituent countries are part of. The new trend which can be noticed in the last few BRICS summits is the inclusion of neighbouring states of the member countries as partial stakeholders. These relations are visible in various summits held on Fortaleza (Mercosur countries), Durban (African countries), Goa (South Asian countries), and Ufa (Shanghai Cooperation members). This will further enhance the possibility of cooperation through bilateral and multilateral engagements and can be used to reinstate the BRICS identity in a complex and highly interdependent global arena. The BRICS association will become more transparent and division of powers within the institution will be ensured with by constituent bodies such as like New Development Bank, Contingent Reserve Arrangements, Business Forum, and Trade Union. It will help foster greater intra-regional trade among BRICS countries and in the setting up of a strong institutional architecture. This will help BRICS to solve and effectively negotiate political tensions among member states, thereby giving it legitimacy and a strong voice in a multilateral world order.

The BRICS's evolution on multilateral trade system is that it protects developing countries interests in multilateral forums like UN, IMF, WTO and G20 summits. The BRICS act as a bargaining coalition bloc for various causes like IPR, environmental issues, anti-dumping issues, labour standardization, and tariff issues. It aims at protecting developing countries interests and concerns against Western dominations in above mentioned multilateral forums. The countries like India and Brazil alone can't influence multilateral forums for which this organisation gives them a reasonable negotiating space in a multilateral system. So that major international institutions are like IMF, WTO is compelled to admit BRICS suggestions in their negotiations. The BRICS nations act as a bargaining coalition bloc in IMF meetings with regard of quota reforms. The next example is in the matter of Intellectual Property Rights issue (IPR), the BRICS nations considers it as a common issue which generated developing countries interests and concerns in IPR issues. At the first meeting itself, the BRIC countries discussed the situation of the global economy and other pressing issues of global development, and strengthening collaboration within the BRIC group. This results in BRICS synergies and complements with each other in terms of their economic cooperation. The concludes of the various communiqués released after first five summits of the BRICS

countries articulate an alternative vision for a new global order that is more democratic, just, fair, rule based, and which requires the collective decision making and co-management of all states, both when it comes to the specifics of international financial system and its institutions, but also more broadly as it pertains to international trade and the political system, including global institutions like the UN. The macroeconomic, financial, energy, climate change and development policies of the BRICS countries as reflected in the outcomes of the eight summits held between 2009 and 2016 clearly reflect a strategy aimed at bringing about a world order that will reflect a new political economy that is no longer central around serving the interests of the Western developed world, but instead seeks to find a balance between North and South in global politics. The vision of BRICS for economic, financial and development dimensions of a new global order are thus closely aligned with their vision for the political dimension. In this context BRICS summits and released communiqués are referred as integral part of their integration not in terms of economic dimension but in terms of political dimension. While considering the overall economic dimension of BRICS, its economic growth that is the stepping stone of its development. It gives the organisation a power over multilateral power which supported developing countries interests and concern at global level.

Another evolution factor is that the BRICS Business council coordinates multinational companies from BRICS countries for the adherence of deep integration among the group. Countries like India, Brazil and South Africa might give a good platform for receiving strong investment from China and Russia. The linkages between multinational companies and BRICS countries help in reducing tension and fostering deep cooperation among them.

For India, BRICS initiatives help in resolving bilateral issues with China in terms of border conflicts. The Chinese initiatives like One Belt One Road (OBOR) programme helps to resolve border conflict with India and supports India –China economic relationship. China is willing to start student exchange programmes with India which will take the sophisticated Sino-Indian relationship to a new dimension. The Sino-Indian relationship should be viewed more in economic rather than military and social terms. Here economic relationship becoming mutually benefiting for each other reduces conflict and finally leads to synergetic cooperation with two rich civilizations.

The Sikkim border between China and India has been a source of diplomatic and military tensions in bilateral relations since decades but India and China has grabbed international

attention lately, as tensions escalated over Doklam border issue. Growing tension between these emerging powers is a threat to the entire region and might have negative implications on the global economy since it is highly interdependent. By evaluating the occurrence of events in the current scenario, it can be said that the BRICS is the most effective forum for discussing and negotiating this issue. On the backdrop of accumulated tension between both countries, it is the responsibility of BRICS, as a political and economic alliance to retain its legitimacy and safeguard its member's interests.

The Chinese President Xi Jinping during the Seventh meeting of BRICS senior representatives on security issues in Beijing called for more cooperation among the BRICS countries on economics, finance and security. The security heads of the five-nation grouping, including India's national security adviser AjitDoval, was present there. With a military standoff on the Sino-India border, such bilateral negotiating forums can be opened up only through an organization like BRICS. Discussions were also made on this occasion between National Security Advisor AjitDoval and his Chinese counterpart Yang Jiechi to discuss a way forward in resolving the dispute between two countries and promoting peace. It is to be noted that even during previous BRICS meetings, the host country encourages the heads of the delegations to hold bilateral meetings in which they exchange views on bilateral relations, BRICS cooperation and multilateral affairs. Hence the BRICS meetings should be strategically seen as a platform to discuss political and security cooperation among nations, especially India and China.

The 9th BRICS Annual Summit will be taking place at China, Xiamen on September 2017. Considering the changing dynamics of international relations, the summit has adopted a global approach this time and invited five non-member states. However it will be a challenge for the group to safeguard the multilateral trade system and oppose protectionist policies that will have an adverse effect on developing economies. It is under these circumstances that the BRICS group becomes important in the current global scenario. In order to safeguard the interests of developing countries, the members should be able to resolve bilateral issues within the framework of the group and stand united in the forefront against various international issues. The withdrawal of troops by China and India prior to the 9th BRICS Summit gives green signal to this trend, providing a temporary resolution to Doklam issue.

The Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) is another milestone initiative from BRICS summit which emphasized financial stability among the member states. Under this initiative

trade transaction is calculated through their own currencies, for example India can import from BRICS countries using Indian currency which makes appreciation tendency of Indian currency. Moreover India can import largely manufacturing products from China using Indian currency which satisfy our large domestic demand. Same way India can largely import crude oil from Russia to satisfy our domestic consumption through the medium of Indian currency. In other way India can import Brazilian minerals and metals to reduce raw material scarcity in our industrial sector using Indian currency. The same way India can largely import South African gold for maintaining financial stability using Indian currency. The CRA helps BRICS member states to reduce the use of US dollar in their trade transaction, which is good for their economy to reduce financial and macroeconomic instability. The CRA is a positive influential factor in BRICS intra-regional trade. It is these facts that make the CRA an integral part of regional integration in BRICS group which promote economic regionalism. This is a new dimension of regional integration in international political economy which does not emphasise geographical proximity. The BRICS is on an ongoing process of new dimension of regional integration, becoming possible through mutual interests and concerns. The BRICS intra-regional trade facilitates the member countries national interests into mutual interest. These factors play a vital role in BRICS regional integration process in the backdrop of the concept of economic regionalism. Moreover CRA becomes an important trade creation factor of BRICS regarding intra-regional trade, which results in member states becoming further economically interdependent.

The next major initiative from BRICS is an export credit arrangement which gives a favourable platform for trade to take place. For a country like India with balance of payments not favourable, this initiative greatly benefits exports growth and reduces the burden of trade deficit. The world trade depends on dollar terms trade, so that we can access anything from BRICS through credit bases. It is also an influential factor in India's foreign trade with regard to BRICS. This may favourer in the initiation of trade relations for BRICS member like Brazil, South Africa, and India along with Russia and China. This initiative will facilitate by reducing the trade gap between India and China, Brazil and China, South Africa and China, India and Russia, Brazil and Russia, and South Africa and Russia.

To conclude, the BRICS countries are home to 42 per cent of the world's population. Their total share in the global economy has risen from 12 per cent to 23 per cent in the past decade, while contributing to more than half of global growth with strong international voice on

power politics and that is good for the countries of the BRICS in the international political economy.

End Notes

¹www.risingpowersinitiative.org

²The gravity model of international trade in international economics, similar to other gravity models in social science, predicts bilateral trade flows based on the economic sizes (often using GDP measurements) and distance between two units.

³Accessed data from <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2001/01/>.

⁴G8 became G7 in March 2014 when Russia was excluded due to its annexation of Crimea.

⁵De Coning, Mandrup, and Odgaard (ed.). op. cit., p. 30.

⁶Joint statement of BRIC Countries' Leaders. (15, April, 2010).
<http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/524/print>.

⁷Joint Statement by the BRICS Countries leaders. (14 April 2011). Sanya: Hainan, China. Paragraph 7.

⁸Joint statement by the BRICS Countries leaders. (29 March 2012). New Delhi: India. Paragraph 4.

⁹De Coning, Mandrup, and Odgaard. (ed.). op. cit., p.29.

¹⁰Ibid., p.30.

¹¹8th BRICS Summit reports.op.cit.

¹²Ibid.,

¹³Ibid.,

¹⁴Ibid., p.29.

¹⁵8th BRICS Summit reports. op. cit

¹⁶Joint statement by the BRICS Countries leaders. (16 June 2009). Yekaterinburg: Russia. Paragraph 12.

¹⁷Ibid., Paragraph 14.

¹⁸Ibid.,

¹⁹Ibid.,

²⁰Joint statement by the BRICS Countries leaders. Yekaterinburg.op.cit., Paragraph 14.

²¹De Coning, Mandrup, and Odgaard. (ed.). op. cit., p.38.

²²Ibid., p.38.

²³Ibid., p. 39.

²⁴Ibid., pp. 39-40.

²⁵8th BRICS Summit reports.op.cit., p.7.

²⁶Ibid., pp.7-8.

²⁷Ibid.,

²⁸Ibid., p.8.

²⁹Ibid.,

³⁰Ibid., P.8.

³¹Ibid.,

³²Ibid.,

³³Ibid.,

³⁴Ibid., pp.10-11.

³⁵Ibid., p.10.

³⁶Ibid., p. 9.

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Simultaneous Elections: A Sure Recipe for Democratic Disaster

Sumit Howladar

Abstract

The journey of India's democracy has been an exciting and remarkable one. It has traversed *several unchartered and difficult paths. Elections have been one of the core components and drivers behind this project of democratic expansion and consolidation. With changing times both the scale and mode of conducting elections have also changed drastically. While in the earlier years simultaneous elections of both the Lok Sabha and the State Assemblies took place, in the last fifty years this system became defunct. But recently the present incumbent government has pushed for renewing this system of conducting simultaneous elections. This paper argues that with the changed socio-political scenario revival of this system is not in the best interest of the nation's democratic fabric. It highlights that the arguments put forward behind the desirability and feasibility of the said proposal largely based on faulty assumptions and lack sound argumentative base. Delving into the various layers of the issue, the paper underlines the core point that though on a technocratic level conducting simultaneous elections might seem highly appealing, but from a perspective of democratic fructification, this system is bound to prove regressive and counter-productive.*

Keywords: Simultaneous, Elections, Democracy, Constitution, Policy, Federal, Government

1. Introduction

The idea of conducting simultaneous elections, interestingly, is not a new idea and was also a promise in Bharatiya Janata Party's (hereafter BJP) party manifesto for the Lok Sabha elections held in 2014. The basic argument presented behind this idea is to save precious time which gets wasted in the process of repeated elections and instead devote it to actual developmental work. Earlier also this idea was floated by the veteran BJP leader Mr. LK Advani. Interestingly, the Model Code of Conduct (hereafter MCC) has been cited as a major hindrance in carrying out

developmental work and has been used as a justification for the implementation of the said proposal.

2. What is this idea of Simultaneous Elections?

The idea of Simultaneous Elections to the Lok Sabha and State Assemblies is not something new both in theory and practice. This practice has been in force in the country till the late 1960s where after it got disrupted. The first general elections to the Lok Sabha and all State Legislative Assemblies were held together in 1951-52. However, with the premature dissolution of some state assemblies in 1968 and 1969, this cycle was disrupted. In 1970, the Lok Sabha itself was dissolved early and fresh elections were held in 1971. The term of the 5th Lok Sabha was extended till 1977 under article 352 of the Constitution (emergency). The 8th, 10th, 14th and 15th Lok Sabha could complete their full five-year terms while the 6th, 7th, 9th, 11th, 12th and 13th Lok Sabha was dissolved prematurely. As a result of premature dissolutions and extension of terms of both the Lok Sabha and various state legislative assemblies, there have been separate elections to Lok Sabha and state legislative assemblies and the cycle of simultaneous elections has been disturbed in the last 48 years. The Niti Aayog in its paper has talked in details regarding the technicalities. Simultaneous elections do not mean that voting across the country for Lok Sabha and State Assemblies needs to happen on a single day. This can be conducted in a phase-wise manner as per the existing practice provided voters in a particular constituency vote for both State Assembly and Lok Sabha the same day (Debroy and Desai, 2016).

3. Recommendations by government bodies in favor of Simultaneous Elections

Several bodies of the government have recommended in favor of conducting simultaneous elections. Some prominent among them have opined in the following manner.

A- Law Commission of India 170th Report on Reform of Electoral Laws (1999): In the year 1999, the Law Commission of India headed by Hon'ble Justice B.P. Jeevan Reddy in its One Hundred Seventieth Report on Reform of Electoral Laws recommended simultaneous elections to Lok Sabha and State Legislative Assemblies while examining measures for improving the electoral system in the country.

B-79th Report of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Personnel, Public Grievances, Law and Justice: The Standing Committee on Personnel, Public Grievances, Law and Justice (Chairperson: Dr. E.M. Sudarsana Natchiappan) submitted its report on the Feasibility of Holding Simultaneous Elections to House of People (Lok Sabha) and State Legislative Assemblies on December 17, 2015. The Committee supported the idea of simultaneous elections and said that it would reduce expenditure, help in countering policy paralysis due to the imposition of Model Code of Conduct, improve delivery of essential services, etc.

C-Election Commission of India: Six months after a parliamentary standing committee recommended it, the Election Commission of India (hereafter EC) told the law ministry that it supports the idea of simultaneous elections to the Lok Sabha and Legislative Assemblies.

D- The NitiAayog's Discussion paper on Simultaneous elections: In a discussion paper titled, 'Analysis of Simultaneous Elections: The "What", "Why" and "How"', authored by Bibek Debroy and Kishore Desai, the Niti Aayog has argued that simultaneous election system is good for the Indian polity as it will improve governance and initiate electoral reforms.


4. Arguments surrounding the idea of simultaneous elections

Since the re-inception of this idea of conducting simultaneous elections, there has been a volley of arguments both in its favor and opposition presented by the various stakeholders and the general public.

Arguments in favor of simultaneous elections

- A. **Reduces massive expenditure:** The government has argued that simultaneous elections will heavily reduce massive expenditure incurred in conducting separate elections as is the present norm. In this context, the NitiAayog has presented an analysis of the Election expenditure incurred in the previous years.

Figure: Election expenditure (Provisional) by Government of India towards Lok Sabha Elections (Figures along Y-axis are in INR Crores)



Source: Figure 8.1, Election Commission of India Pocket book 2015-16

As evident from the figure, there has been a stiff rise in election expenditure. The Niti Aayog paper has further emphasized that compared to the cost incurred for conducting 2009 Lok Sabha elections at about Rs. 1115 crores, the same for the year 2014 more than tripled to about Rs. 3870 crores.

- B. Checks the policy paralysis caused by MCC:** The 79th Report of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on 'Personnel, Public Grievances, Law and Justice' talks about the problems faced due to the imposition of MCC at regular intervals. The Committee states that this puts on hold the entire development programme and activities of the Union and State Governments in the poll-bound State. Frequent elections lead to the imposition of MCC over prolonged periods of time. This often leads to policy paralysis and governance deficit (Debroy and Desai, 2016).
- C. Solves the problem of crucial manpower deployment:** The introduction of simultaneous elections will help the effective deployment of crucial security personnel who otherwise get tied up for prolonged periods because of the periodic conduct of elections. Even in the 16th Lok Sabha elections, the EC had to avail the services of 10 million personnel to conduct the election, which included the deployment of 1349 Companies of Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF). With the introduction of simultaneous elections, this manpower problem will be solved.
- D. Checks corruption and use of black money:** With the prevalence of the system of frequent elections, the political parties are tied up in the efforts of ensuring inflow of funds and contributions which act as the key drivers of corruption and circulation of

black money. The introduction of simultaneous elections will help to check this vicious circle and will promote a clean economy and polity.

- E. **Helps in the ushering of better governance and policy-making:** The immediacy of electoral gains forces the political class to compromise on the idea of good governance. Frequent elections act as a blockade in taking up difficult structural reform programs and encourage populist measures. Simultaneous elections will help make policy-making more focused, consistent and bold, thus leading to better governance.

Arguments in opposition to simultaneous elections

- A. **Risk of misuse of the Constitution:** There is a risk of the misuse of the Constitution whereby the Parliament and State assemblies might be dissolved prematurely for specific political gains. This will also violate Articles 83(2) and 172(1) of the Constitution which provides for a set term for the Lok Sabha and the Assemblies respectively.
- B. **There is a risk that it will benefit the party in power:** In a scenario where the dominance and deployment of national issues are on the rise, the implementation of simultaneous elections has the potential of affecting the voting behavior of the voters whereby the important and specific state-level issues might get sidelined. The voter might end up voting for the same both at the Centre and the State. In this connection, IDFC institute has published a study where by it has argued that there is a 77% possibility of the voter voting for the same party at both the Centre and the State if simultaneous elections take place. The authors analyzed electoral data for four rounds of Lok Sabha elections- 1999, 2004, 2009 and 2014 and they chose states where the state elections coincided with the Lok Sabha elections. Interestingly, this fear is not totally unfounded as proved by India's electoral history itself. A look at the electoral scenario back in the 1960s (particularly the 1962 Lok Sabha elections) when simultaneous elections were in vogue, proves that it is the incumbent government which benefits the most.
- C. **It will be an operational nightmare:** Implementation of simultaneous election can be an operational nightmare for the Election Commission and more importantly holds the potential of severely undermining democratic fundamentals. Even after the conducting of phased election coupled with Election Commission's enormous efforts, there have been allegations of nepotism, highhandedness, and use of corrupt means in the elections. In

such a scenario the obvious question which arises is whether it is feasible for the Election Commission to conduct simultaneous elections whose scale will be massive from the perspective of logistics, security, and manpower.

Though in its reply to the Law Ministry in May, 2016 the EC has supported the government proposal of simultaneous elections but it has cautioned the government of the enormous expenditure to execute this idea. There are two major issues involved in this process. First, there is a requirement of purchasing on a massive scale of Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs) and Voter Verifiable Audit Trail (VVPAT) machines. This according to the estimates of the EC would require a massive amount of 9,284.15 crores. In addition to this, there will be an additional cost to be incurred on replacing these EVMs after every 15 years. There will also be warehousing cost to store these machines. The second problem is regarding the availability of adequate manpower and security personnel for the effective conduct of the elections. That this is highly improbable and can lead to ineffective monitoring can be gauged from a simple fact. According to the Election Commission of India in the 2014 Lok Sabha elections, it required 10 million personnel as polling officials across 9,30,000 polling stations. Apart from this, it required the help of 1349 Companies of Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs). This gives us a fair idea of the mammoth arrangement required to conduct simultaneous elections and raises severe questions regarding its feasibility.

D. Misuse of Article 356: There is a fear of the misuse of President's Rule by the Union Government. As seen in the judgment by the Constitutional Bench of Supreme Court of India in *S.R. Bommai v. Union of India*, the dissolution of State Legislative Assembly by the President of India is subject to the approval of both houses of Parliament. In a scenario where a particular political party has a majority in both the houses of Parliament, Article 356 can be grossly misused and it might act as a centrally sponsored toppling operation.

E. Further Discourages politicians from being accountable: Accountability of political representatives has been a major issue in Indian politics. Periodic elections somehow acted as a meeting point for the represented and the representatives which ensured some

accountability. With the introduction of simultaneous elections, even this minimum accountability will get affected.

- F. Challenges the 'Basic Structure' of the Constitution:** The system of simultaneous elections will act detrimental to the 'basic structure' of the Constitution as it involves certain exercises which encroach upon the established federal principles defining the relationship between the center and the states. If this system is applied today then there is a risk of many features under the rubric of 'basic structure' getting violated, some primary among them being: the principle of separation of power, Federalism (including financial liberty of the states), etc. The fundamental right of the citizen to choose the government will also be tampered with by the dissolving of the state assemblies for the sake of maintaining consistency and reducing the expenses.

5. Major loopholes in the arguments of the Government

- A. The 79th report of the Parliamentary Standing Committee is based on assumptions and gives rise to dangerous precedents:**

The Standing Committee on Personnel, Public Grievances, Law, and Justice in its 79th report observed that of the 16 (sixteen) Lok Sabhas that have been constituted so far, seven were dissolved pre-maturely due to the coalition governments but of late the legislatures have been completing their full term. There are severe problems in this sort of observations which lack a solid argumentative base and are largely hinged on pure speculation. Though, factually true, but this observation or inference has two major problematic areas: **(a)** Portraying coalition governments (which is a democratic development) in a bad light and blaming it for pre-mature dissolution of Lok Sabha somewhere reflects the urge towards a notion of majoritarian government and, **(b)** It is in no way equipped to guarantee the course of future political developments.

In order to maintain the stability of the Lok Sabha and the State Assemblies, the Parliamentary Standing Committee has given some suggestions. Some of them are:

The committee suggested that the Lok Sabha would commence and expire on a particular date and the election to constitute the new House has to be conducted in such a way that the Lok Sabha and assemblies could commence their term on a predetermined date. To avoid any pre-mature dissolution the committee suggested primarily four broad steps:

- Any ‘no-confidence motion’ against the government has to be accompanied by a further ‘confidence motion’ in favour of a government to be headed by a named individual as the future Prime Minister and voting should take place for the two motions together. This also applies to the Legislative Assemblies.
- In spite of this if a situation arises, where dissolution of Lok Sabha cannot be avoided, then the following options can be considered: **(a)** If the remainder of the term of the Lok Sabha is not long, there could be a provision where the President can carry out the administration, on the aid and advice of his Council of Ministers to be appointed by him, until the time the next House is constituted, **(b)** If the remainder of the term is long, then fresh election may be held and the term of the House in such case should be for the rest of what would have been the original term.
- If following a general election, none of the political parties is able to form a government and another general election becomes necessary, the term of the House in such case after the election should be only for the remainder of what would have been the original term.
- As far as the issue of bye-elections is concerned, two windows of one-and-a-half months each may be fixed for holding them that become due in a particular year.

On examining the suggestions of the Parliamentary Standing Committee which it claims to promote stability, there are some serious questions which certainly arise. They are:

- First, on the suggestion of placing a parallel confidence motion, the basic question is whether this arrangement is in tandem with the Constitutional ethos where the power to choose the government lies solely with the people. The political representatives are constitutionally equipped to represent in matters of governance and administration only and not to form governments on people’s behalf. The amendment to Rule 198 of the Lok Sabha thereby introducing the system of a parallel confidence motion is in direct contrast to the cardinal principle of democracy that is a government formed by the people through periodic elections. It will also lead to distortion of Article 75(3) of the Constitution as the council of ministers who will be collectively responsible to the House are technically

appointed through the backdoor mechanism and will not necessarily enjoy the support of the people.

- Second, this practice of forming alternative governments will further encourage defections on a large scale and resultantly massive corruption and use of black money.
- Third, the proposal that the President can carry out the functions of the Lok Sabha by appointing a council of ministers is a blatant misuse of the powers of the President. The concept of President's rule can in no way be an alternative to a democratically elected government by the people.
- Fourth, the suggestion that if the House gets dissolved and fresh elections are held to form a new House, then the tenure of the particular House will be of only for the remainder of the days of the previously dissolved House will be a sheer wastage of money, time and manpower. Interestingly, these were the very factors which the simultaneous elections tried to deal with in the first place.

If disruptions happen more than expected keeping in mind the multifarious nature of politics in the country how does the government intend to defend the imposition of MCC and the expenditure which are bound to happen?

B. Anti-Defection Law has little bearing on the term of the legislature:

The claim by the 'The Standing Committee on Personnel, Public Grievances, Law and Justice' in its 79th report that the introduction of the Anti Defection Act,1985 has prevented political defection in the ruling party and that this has had a direct bearing on the term of the legislature is factually wrong. The reality is that though the 1985 law was to make politics cleaner this has instead taken a toll on our legislative and political systems. It originally made it illegal for individual legislators to take voting decisions without the permission of their whip. Though this was supposed to minimize corruption what it actually did was that it transferred the process of government formation to the level of party high commands away from public scrutiny.

C. Simultaneous elections will have little or no bearing on the use and circulation of black money in the electoral process: The argument of the government that the re-introduction of simultaneous election will help combat corruption and use of black

money does not hold much ground and there are specific reasons for that. Even if the system of simultaneous elections is reintroduced, there is no guarantee that the use of black money in the elections process will be stopped. This argument makes more sense after the drastic changes made by the government in the Representation of the People Act, 1951, the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 and the Income Tax Act, 1961. With the amendment in Subsection (3) of Section 29C of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 cash donation to political parties has been slashed from Rs. 20,000 to Rs. 2000. But this in no way stops the misuse of the law by political parties who can still tame the system by enhancing simply the number of receipts for the donations they receive. In addition to this the Finance Bill, 2017 also made amendments in the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 and the Income Tax Act, 1961 whereby political parties have now been exempted from disclosing the identity of individuals and companies who make donations through electoral bonds bought from the commercial banks. Moreover, the RBI and the Income Tax department now have practically no means to probe the funding of political parties. In addition to this, a political party's treasure and where it spends the money is still beyond the reach of the RTI Act. If transparency is to be brought about in the real sense that it demands the revising of the government's affidavit in the Supreme Court- which upholds the Central Information Commission's full bench decision in 2013 to consider the six national political parties public authorities under the RTI Act. In this scenario of anonymous corporate funding and policy of anonymity, the introduction of the simultaneous election will have no impact on the use of black money in the elections process.

D. Government's take on simultaneous elections that it is a do-able proposition betrays the facts on the ground: The government's position that simultaneous elections can be conducted seems impractical keeping the ground realities in mind. After the debacle in the Srinagar Lok Sabha by-poll elections, the EC had asked the Home Ministry to deploy 750 companies (75,000 central forces) of central forces for the Lok Sabha by-poll in Anantnag, rescheduled for 25th May, 2017. In a situation where logistics are still such a huge problem, claiming that conducting simultaneous elections is feasible does not seem to hold much ground. In addition to this keeping in view, the fact that tenure of the

Jammu and Kashmir assembly is of six years, how the government plans to bring it under the synchronized arrangement is anybody's guess.

6. Some Constitutional questions

There are some serious Constitutional questions which need to be answered before the implementation of simultaneous elections. Some broad questions include:

- To implement the idea, the tenure of some of the State Assemblies needs to be curtailed. How to do it, when the government of the day enjoys the legitimate confidence of the legislature?
- How to maintain simultaneity especially in the event of a no-confidence? Will the amendment to Rule 198 of the Lok Sabha to introduce a parallel confidence motion be in tandem with the democratic principles?
- How far can be the idea of 'collective responsibility of the council of ministers to the House' stretched for the maintenance of stability under the scheme of simultaneous elections? Will it not be a distortion of Article 75(3) of the Constitution?
- How can the system of simultaneous elections work without changes being brought to Article 83(2) and Article 172(1) of the Constitution which presently only talks about the existence of Lok Sabha and state legislatures respectively for five years from the date of its first meeting unless dissolved earlier and not guarantee fixed terms for them? Simultaneous elections are not possible without fixed terms.

7. What will be at stake?

There are some fundamental issues which will be at stake if simultaneous elections are introduced.

- A. The fundamental ethos of the Constitutional provision of elections:** The fundamental ethos of the Constitutional provision of elections in a democracy is the rule of the people and a proper representation of their wishes and demands. The basic ethos behind this

exercise of elections is the primacy of people's mandate over any other technocratic preferences. What this simultaneous election scheme does is to undermine or rather challenge this very central Constitutional ethos and tries to subsume it under the spurious argument of economic benefit and administrative efficiency.

- B. Plurality of Indian Democracy:** Post-independence and especially after the discontinuation of simultaneous elections, the socio-political scenario of the country has gone fundamental and drastic changes. Reintroducing simultaneous elections in the present times will hit at the concept of plural democracy which has evolved over-time and has now entrenched in the political system of the country. With this system in place, there is a high risk of the dominance of a single political force.
- C. The fairness of the election process:** For democracy to be really meaningful and profound, the implementation aspect is as important as the concept itself. As far as the logistical aspect of conducting elections, simultaneous elections will increase the risk of use of corrupt practices as the monitoring capacity of the EC will get severely limited. This is going to have a profound impact on the democratic credentials of the system of electing political representatives.
- D. Democratic accountability of the representatives:** Reintroduction of simultaneous elections will further shrink the already paltry democratic space when the electorate and the representatives can meet and have to some extent a fair discussion. With elections taking place in one go, the representatives will not have to face the electorate at regular intervals. This has the potential of having a negative impact on the sense of accountability of the representatives.
- E. The federal structure of the polity:** In a country like India, especially whose formation has witnessed the amalgamation of diverse socio-cultural groups and identities', maintaining the federal structure of the polity is important. The basic idea of maintaining uniformity and in the process compromising on the tenure of state assemblies (which represent regional aspirations) goes against the federal structure of the polity and even crosses the quasi-federal mechanism on which there has been some agreement.

8. Conclusion

The proponents of this idea of simultaneous elections seem to undermine the fact that elections are a blend of both subjective and objective conditions and are not merely a sanctified legal-constitutional exercise. The fundamental question is whether the concept of technocracy can be privileged over the idea of democracy. Utmost care needs to be taken that the federal structure and the diversity of the country are not compromised for the sake of bringing technical uniformity. Having structural reforms is not a bad thing in itself but one needs to be confident that it will have the desired effect as proclaimed. But at the present stage, the arguments presented by the government seem to be based more on assumptions and hope rather any concrete logic. One need not forget the effects of demonetization which was also pitched as a great structural reform but has not yielded any significant results till now as interestingly evident from continuously emerging government reports itself. If the government is sincere about good governance and particularly curbing election expenditure, then it should seriously look for alternative ways such as reforms in the expenditure of political parties, issue of funding of political parties, etc. The solution lies in cleaning up the political system and enhancing the legitimacy of political parties and not in technocratic solutions like simultaneous elections.

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Government Policies for Development of Floriculture and its Impact in Sikkim: A Socio-Economic Study

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Abstract

The Government of a State takes policies as initiatives to develop socio-economic condition of its people by supporting them in doing special types of economic activities. In the state, there may be some professions practiced by its people which are unique and the government takes initiatives to encourage and flourish those professions. Floriculture is such a unique profession practiced by several ethnic communities in Sikkim. They are cultivating different kinds of flowers in a large quantity for commercial purposes that may be not possible without the assistance by the Sikkim government. This paper tries to explore how far the policies of the Sikkim Government are responsible for the growing interest among people of Sikkim in cultivation of flowers; consequently in developing floriculture as a commercial venture.

Keywords: Ethnicity, Floriculture, Biodiversity, Green House, Poly House, Flower Growers, Government Policies, Technology Mission.

1. Introduction

Sikkim is a biodiversity hotspot blessed with abundance flora and fauna. The climatic condition of Sikkim also has played an important role in blessing this Himalayan State with immense greenery and beautiful varieties of flowers. Sikkim has its own attraction for its beautifully grown varieties of flowers in almost every part of the state. The people of Sikkim are emotionally attached with the nature and as nature lovers they are fond of cultivating different kinds of ornamental plants (non-flowering plants that are kept inside house) and varieties of beautiful flowers. The fresh look of Rhododendrons, the scented pansies and premolars and the richness of wild orchids enhance the beauty of this small state of Sikkim. Nearly about 4500 species of flowering plants are found in Sikkim (Sikkim, India: Sanctuary to Horticulture Estate 2008, p.5). Therefore exports of flowers and the passion of growing flowers seem to have been alive among the people of Sikkim from the time immemorial. However, one cannot claim with authenticity the reasons behind the growing of flowers and the reasons behind the sudden

interest of the people who have taken this to a commercial level because there is a dearth of literature in this area.

2. British Patronage for Floriculture in Sikkim: A Preview

Flowers hold an important role and are part of rituals or festivals among different ethnic communities of Sikkim. As culture and ritual are imbibed among the people of Sikkim, flower also plays a significant role in keeping the same intact. Flowers also hold a symbol in itself and it speaks for itself. Growing flowers was hobby which later, with the growing values of flowers must have developed as a means to earn. John Claude White (1909) who came as the first Political Officer in the then small Himalayan Kingdom of Sikkim has written in his book titled '*Sikkim and Bhutan: Twenty-one years on the North East Frontier 1887-1908*' that Lepcha people who are said to have entered Sikkim from the east along the foot hills from the direction of Assam and Burma had the knowledge of the plants and flowers. And the climatic condition of Sikkim is also a boon for growing flowers that also must have acted as an enthusiasm for the people to gradually take interest in growing flowers at their home and gardens. J.C. White also mentioned that the first work to be done in this kingdom was building a house that was then called Residency presently known as Raj Bhawan. He had narrated beautifully about the garden surrounding the Residency in which flowers like Daffodils, Primroses, Polyanthus, Daisies, Pansies, etc. were grown in different seasons. He also mentions about importing some of the flowers from France. He was a nature lover and when he came to Sikkim he bought along with him different flowering and non-flowering plants so it can be said that probably that is how these flowers must have reached Sikkim. The growing of flowers eventually may have caught the interest of the people living in Sikkim because of the beauty that flowers could present. Later, people may have realized the commercial value of flowers when sold and this must then have led the people to pursue cultivation of flower on a commercial level. Chandra Nursery (Pradhan K.C 2008) named on Chandrabir Newar, who was honoured by the British for being a man of an example in the society, located at Rhenok is one of the oldest nurseries in Sikkim. The nursery was started by his two sons namely Ratna Bhadur and Durga Shamsher at Rhenock, East of Sikkim at 1910. Chandra Nursery reached its height as it had a contact and a good rapport with the British Political Officers therefore several guests from Britain visited Sikkim frequently. The nursery reached its peak during the 1930s. Traces have been found that the Chandra Nursery is

one such Nursery in Sikkim which have been exporting flowers and were involved in the trading of flowers all over the world. Therefore, one can say that Chandra Nursery has definitely made its name in the history of Sikkim in terms of flower production and flower trading.

3. Objectives of the Study

The present study has the following objectives:

- (i) To study the policies undertaken by the Sikkim Government in developing floriculture as a commercial venture in the state.
- (ii) To look at the impact of those policies on the socio-economic status of the flower growers in Sikkim.

4. Methodology of the Study

In order to understand the present study both primary and secondary data have been used. In order to collect primary data, semi-structured interview schedule which included both close and open ended questions for collection of quantitative and qualitative data respectively have been used to collect the needed information from the respondents who are flower growers in a face to face situation. Government data also have been collected as primary data. This study tries to highlight the policies of the Sikkim Government in order to develop floriculture¹ as a means to develop the economy of the state and also to analyze the impact of these policies on the socio-economic status of the flower growers in Sikkim. Whereas secondary data have been collected from periodicals, journals and magazines, published research papers in order to highlight the achievements and overall progress of floriculture in Sikkim.

4.1. Study Area and Selection of Respondents

Flower cultivation in Sikkim is spread in different areas of east, west and south Sikkim. Total 90 (ninety) flower growers/farmers, 30 flower growers from each of the three districts, are selected as respondents for collection of data by using stratified random sampling technique. These farmers are chosen from the districts of East Sikkim, South Sikkim, and West Sikkim owing to

¹The term is used for the cultivation of flowers and other ornamental plant materials scientifically and commercially, and production of their by-products such as oils, scents and medicines etc. Floriculture characteristically comes under the aesthetic branch of horticulture (Roychowdhury & Mishra 2001, p.3). Growth of ornamental plants, plants breeding (to produce off springs) for the development of flowers and floristry (the production, commerce and trade of flowers) are by and large involved in floriculture.

the fact that flower growers from these districts are ahead in floriculture. The selected areas for this study are Gurpesay, Kamrang, Tinzir from the South Sikkim, Daramdin in the West Sikkim and Kartok, Assam linzey and Basilakha in East Sikkim.

5. Government Policies for Development of Floriculture in Sikkim

The Sikkim Government has taken up several policies and programmes so far to encourage the farmers who are engaged in floriculture. The Floriculture Section under the then Agriculture Department of Sikkim was established during 1985-1986. This indeed acted as the blessing for the flower growers as gradually they took up cultivation of flowers not only as a hobby but as a means of earning a livelihood. Some of the colossal steps taken by the government of Sikkim have proved to be a backbone to these farmers who now are involved in floriculture. The establishment of Model Floriculture Centre, National Research Centre, two Joint Venture Companies, Tissue Culture Laboratories, Wholesale-cum-Retail Outlet in Delhi etc. all accelerated the pace of floriculture in Sikkim and changed the mindset of the flower growers in Sikkim.

After its establishment, the Horticulture Department under Floriculture Section held many mega programs. One of those programmes was the flower festival during 1990's which served as a huge occasion for Sikkim and at the same time it encouraged people to grow flowers and plants. Another major step was taken by the Sikkim government to establish the Model Floriculture Centre in the state in 1992-1993 with the financial assistance of the Government of India. The establishment of the National Research Centre for Orchid in the year 1997-98 and two Joint Venture Companies along with the establishment of Tissue Culture Laboratories under Public-Private-Partnership (PPP) during 2005-06, and also the opening of Wholesale-cum-Retail Outlet in Delhi heighten the expansion of floriculture in Sikkim.

The Government of Sikkim has taken several steps to provide training for the flower cultivators so that the flower growers are aware of the climatic condition and soil of Sikkim and also to get the right method to be used in order to grow a particular flower with a particular setting under the various programs of capacity building. They are also exposed outside Sikkim to the places like Pune, Karnataka, and Delhi etc. in order to gather more experience in terms of flower cultivation. Government of Sikkim has also been providing with saplings to the families who are engaged in floriculture. Along with the saplings the Department of Horticulture also provides them with the

organic spray like Rich Field, Kelbrick which are eco-friendly. Therefore, with such proactive government as a backbone for the flower growers, floriculture is definitely paving its way.

Sikkim Government has adopted several policies in the recent years for the development of floriculture in the state. The government is taking initiatives for developing more clusters and improving and strengthening the existing clusters through new and modern technology and the support of inputs. Particularly, the Department of Horticulture and Cash Crops under the Government of Sikkim has taken up a number of plans and programs to spread out floriculture in the state. The concept of 'Protected Cultivation' has proved to be one of the successful measures for cultivation of flowers in Sikkim. The government has taken initiative to establish and supply the Green Houses² to those who are interested in flower cultivation. The green house of low cost which is designed to fit the hilly landscape like Sikkim has become very popular among the flower growers. So far, 10,360 numbers of low cost Poly Houses³ have been constructed. Presently, capacity building is another important aspect by which farmers are trained within the state, in the country and also send to foreign countries like Netherland, Australia for more exposure.

Several infrastructure facilities have also been provided by the state government in Sikkim by making available the following facilities:

- i. Cymbidium Development Centre
- ii. Model Floriculture Centre
- iii. Tissue Culture Laboratories
- iv. Integrated Pack House
- v. Cold Storage Facilities
- vi. Rose Demonstration Unit

As discussed above, the major objective of this infrastructure development is to promote floriculture up to the level of industry. Varietal screening, technology validation, imparting

²A building or room, usually made up of glass in which the temperature, humidity, light and carbon dioxide concentration in air is maintained within a desired range, used for cultivating tender plants or growing plants out of season.

³Some of the green houses are made of plastic and bamboo which is a low cost green house often found in common use for growing flowers.

training and skill development of flower cultivators are also met. Model floriculture centers have been established with the aim of improving coordination of floriculture activities particularly in the South and West district of Sikkim. Tissue culture laboratories have been set up to generate Cymbidium clones. In addition, cold storage facilities are provided to the flower growers for keeping the freshness and also to maintain the quality of the cut flowers⁴ for export as well as marketing outside the state. So, many infrastructure developments such as model floriculture centre, cymbidium development centre, tissue culture laboratories, integrated pack house, and cold storage facilities have been provided in the state to promote floriculture up to the level of industries(Ibid, p.30).

An Integrated Rose Demo Unit covering 5000 sq. meters area has been set up at the Rose Valley in Daramdin, West Sikkim, for imparting training and coordinates activities to the flower growers related to quality Rose production and marketing. Two export units, one for Cymbidium and other for Anthurium have been established at Assam Linzey and Mazhitar respectively under the joint venture program. Indian Council for Agricultural Research (ICAR) has funded the establishment of the National Research Centre for Orchids at Pakyong near Gangtok for conducting research on orchids. East Sikkim has been declared as Agri Export Zone (AEZ) for cultivating Cymbidium hybrids commercially for supply in other countries. Cymbidium orchids are the ones found in the cooler areas of the world and it is one of the strength for floriculture as these are found in Sikkim. Model floriculture centers have been constructed at Namli in the East District and at Maniram in the South for the production of Rose, Gerbera, and Lilium etc.

To promote Sikkim as an AgriExport Zone for floriculture, two Joint Venture Companies (JVCs) have been established by Sikkim Government in PPP (Public-Private-Partnership) model.

- i. Sikkim Himalayan Orchid Ltd (SHOL)
- ii. Sikkim Flora Ltd (SFL)

Sikkim Himalayan Orchid Ltd was launched during 2003-2004 through an agreement between M/s Natsyn Flora of Chennai and Government of Sikkim. Its main aim is to produce Cymbidium cut flowers for domestic and export markets. The total area for Cymbidium cultivation in Sikkim

⁴Flowers which are cut from the main plants and is loosely made into bundles, generally use for decoration mostly sold and counted in numbers.

at present is 28 hectare which is highest in India, Sikkim Flora Ltd has been started on during 2004-2005 by a contract of partnership between Government of Sikkim and M/s Flora of Bangalore for production and marketing of Anthurium, Lilium, and Gerbera.

The Government of Sikkim also organizes an international flower show in every five years to put an encouragement among the flower growers. It also holds an annual flower exhibition at White Hall in Sikkim. In these events prizes are often given to the best growers so that their hard work and effort are recognized. Recently held event Sikkim Organic Festival 2016 by the Department was a huge event where in Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi inaugurated the event. He had nothing but praises for Sikkim. He went on to say that he had heard a lot about organic farming and was overwhelmed to see the orchids and the beautiful and colorful flowers. He also said that Sikkim can be an exemplary state. The event was a great success in itself therefore this reflects that the Department of Floriculture with the support of Government of Sikkim is trying to take commercial floriculture to a different level all together. The impact of these innovative ideas are not only paving its way and encouraging people here but it is also helping them to gain an international exposure. Flower cultivation and the farmers of Sikkim are also being promoted outside through the international events like these flower shows.

6. Flower Growers of Sikkim: A Brief Discussion

The farmers of Sikkim have considered cultivation of flowers as a means to earn income and have however shifted from the traditional practices of growing of crops to that of the growing of flowers. The reasons are simple and clear as it gives them high economic return from per sq. meter of land which becomes a good source of income as compared to the vegetables and crops. Consequently, the farmers of Sikkim have also been encouraged to grow flowers at a large scale and take cultivation of flowers for commercial purpose. Some of them found this as a better opportunity to earn money and be self-employed. With the growth of educated youths in Sikkim every year and the level of competition increasing day by day in service sector some of the youths have also chosen to dedicate their time and effort in growing flowers. This makes them self-employed. It is amazing to note here that about 5,000 families in Sikkim are engaged in floricultural activities like cultivation, packaging, marketing etc. (Joint Director, FHCCD, and Government of Sikkim). Thus, floriculture has created a way of self-employment in Sikkim. Flowers in Sikkim are grown in an area of about 150sq meters to that of 1000sq meters. The

farmers earn Rs.10, 000 to Rs.60,000 sum of money in an area of 150sq km and the money earned, goes up to 4 to 5 Lakh per annum with the area of cultivation being as large as 1000sq meters(Joint Director, FHCCD Govt. of Sikkim). Some of them take up cultivation of flowers as a job after retirement giving a feeling of re-employment as well as providing them with supplementary income. Therefore flower growers of Sikkim have chosen floriculture for several reasons.

7. Data Analysis and Interpretation

The existing research work has generated some interesting findings. The collected primary data has been statistically analyzed and shown through tabular representations. The Government of Sikkim has extended its helping hand by different ways and means to the flower growers. The analysis of data which have been collected through field survey confirms the availability of infrastructural facilities provided by the Sikkim government to the flower growers also highlights the impact of government policies on their social and economic lives.

Table 1
Supply of Green House

District	Yes (%)	No (%)
East Sikkim	29 (96.6)	1(3.33)
West Sikkim	30 (100.0)	-
South Sikkim	30 (100.0)	-
Total	89 (98.9)	1 (1.1)

(Source: Field Survey)

Table 1 show that green-houses have been supplied to a vast majority (98.9%) of the flower cultivators by the Horticultural Department under Floriculture Section of the State Government. Only 1.1% of the respondents mentioned that the green house was not given to them. This has been due to some errors in the beneficiary list.

Table 2
Supply of Bulbs

District	Yes (%)	No (%)
East Sikkim	30 (100.0)	-
West Sikkim	30 (100.0)	-
South Sikkim	30 (100.0)	-
Total	90 (100.0)	-

(Source: Field Survey)

Data in the Table 2 show that all the selected flower growers have got bulb supplied by the government.

Table 3
Training if any by the Government

District	Yes (%)	No (%)
East Sikkim	30 (100)	-
West Sikkim	28 (93.3)	2 (6.7)
South Sikkim	24 (80.0)	6 (20.0)
Total	82 (91.1)	8(8.9)

(Source: Field Survey)

Data in Table 3 show that in general 91.1% of the selected flower growers has under gone training which has been provided by the government. District wise, it can be observed that 100.0% of the selected flower growers in the district of East Sikkim have taken the training.

Table 4
Collection of Fertilizers

District	Market	Horticulture Office
East Sikkim	-	22 (73.3)
West Sikkim	-	22 (73.3)
South Sikkim	-	25(83.3)
Total	-	69(76.7)

(Source: Field Survey)

The given data in Table 4 show that 76.7% samples/respondents in general collect fertilizers from Horticulture Department of Sikkim government. Also it is to be noted that the state has

been declared as Organic so the fertilizers provided by the government are also organic. Some of the flower cultivators also use the manually made fertilizers like cow dung and urine of cow, vermin compose etc.

Table 5
Table Sex wise distribution of the Respondents

District	Male (%)	Female (%)
East Sikkim	24 (80.0)	6 (20.0)
West Sikkim	23 (76.7)	7 (23.3)
South Sikkim	20 (66.7)	10 (33.3)
Total	67 (74.4)	23 (25.6)

(Source Primary Survey)

Table 5 shows that most (74.4%) of the selected flower growers are males and 25.6% are female. So, it is evident that this profession is dominated by the males.

Table 6
Annual Income of Flower Cultivators through all sources

District	10001-15000	15001-20000	20001-25000	25001-30000	Above 30000
East Sikkim	2 (6.7)	6 (20.0)	1 (3.3)	2 (6.7)	19 (63.3)
West Sikkim	1 (3.3)	-	4 (13.3)	-	25 (83.3)
South Sikkim	1 (3.3)	1 (3.3)	1 (3.3)	3 (10.0)	24 (80.0)
Total	4 (4.4)	7 (7.8)	6 (6.7)	5 (5.5)	68 (75.6)

(Source: Field Survey)

Table 6 shows the yearly income of the flower growers/respondents. It is evident from the data in the table that 75.6% of the selected flower growers have an annual income more than Rs.30000, 12.2% of the respondents' annual income ranges between Rs.20001 to Rs.30000 whereas 12.2% respondents have annual income between Rs. 10001 to Rs.20000. It is important to understand the variation in terms of the scale of flower cultivation as some have taken flower cultivation at a small scale. Also flowers are seasonal and the cost varies according to season and off season. It

has also been found that some of the respondents have taken up this profession as their primary occupation whereas others have taken it as their secondary occupation.

Table 7
Availing of Loan

District	Loan
East Sikkim	6 (20.0)
West Sikkim	3 (10.0)
South Sikkim	1 (3.3)
Total	10 (11.1)

(Source: Primary Survey)

Data in Table 7 show that only 11.1% of the selected flower growers have taken loan from the government funding agencies.

Table 8
Form of Housing

District	Kachha	Pucca	Half Pucca
East Sikkim	1 (3.3)	24 (80.0)	5 (16.7)
West Sikkim	4 (13.3)	26 (86.7)	-
South Sikkim	5 (16.7)	15 (50.0)	10 (33.3)
Total	10 (11.1)	65 (72.2)	15 (16.7)

(Source: Field Survey)

Table 8 illustrates that majority (72.2%) of the respondents have pucca house, 16.7% have half pucca house which indicates that they are living in good housing conditions.

Table 9
Management of Daily Expenditures

District	Men	Women	Both	Head of the family
East Sikkim	10 (33.3)	3 (10.0)	14 (46.7)	3 (10.0)
West Sikkim	20 (66.7)	4 (13.3)	4 (13.3)	2 (6.7)
South Sikkim	17 (56.7)	8 (26.6)	3 (10.0)	2 (6.7)
Total	47 (52.2)	15 (16.7)	21 (23.3)	7 (7.8)

(Source: Field Survey)

Data in Table 9 show that male respondents are in majority (52.2%) to manage their daily family expenditures whereas 16.7% of the respondents are the females who control the management of the family expenditures.

8. Discussion and Concluding Remarks

In this study we found that the practice of floriculture is made easier in the state due to the policies of the government that encourage the flower growers every now and then providing infrastructural facilities and by recognizing the efforts by prizes given during mega flower festivals held on several occasions. Farmers in Sikkim are all set to take up floriculture at a different level with energy and the hard work all put together. Also there has been an encouragement from the government to accelerate the pace. The flower growers of Sikkim, majority of them are males along with few women have found a new source of earning at present. They have shifted from growing crops to growing of flowers. This is simply because there is a high economic return. Cultivation of flowers at one point of time was seen as a laborious and time consuming work and people were not keen to take up cultivation of flowers as a profession. But, with times the very notion of farming flowers has changed. People grow flowers not only for home gardens but to export outside and sell them off. It also has been observed that most of the financial transactions are done by the male flower growers. Along with the enthusiastic and hard-working farmers, the Department of Floriculture under the Government of Sikkim has taken keen initiatives for the development of flower cultivation. The idea of protected cultivation has been playing an effective role for cultivation of flowers. The farmers are also getting training so that they can use their practical knowledge for cultivation of

flowers. They get training not only within the state but at many times they also are sent to other states even to other countries to get better knowledge for cultivation of flowers. Tissue culture laboratories, integrated package house along with cold storage facilities has also been provided in various regions of the state. The farmers also get infrastructural facilities for exporting flowers outside the state of Sikkim as flowers are perishable and needs to be handled with care. Flower cultivation has opened new rays of hope to the flower cultivators in different regions/districts in Sikkim.

It has also been found through this study that there is a gap in coordination among the cultivators and the floriculture department which makes the existence of floriculture as a large scale industry little difficult. Along with that, also the maintenance of green house is a major problem that most of the farmers face as the cost of it is high therefore once a green house is destroyed due to any reason then it becomes difficult for the farmer/s to bring it back to use because of its high cost. It is also realized that in some of the areas flower cultivators to some extent lack the dedication and patience which is very much needed for growing of flowers. So, it can be concluded that the infrastructural and other facilities exist for the flower growers but how much of it is availed by them is a fact to be found out. If incase they are not using the opportunity and the facility then what could be the reason, is an interesting fact to be figured out. However reasons like lack of awareness among the farmers about the trainings, the distance of the place, minimum market place within state are some of the reasons to be known. Also declaration of Sikkim as an organic state has to some extent discouraged the flower growers for growing flowers. According to them it is difficult to protect flowers without the use of insecticides and pesticides. Also the flower growers are of the opinion that it becomes difficult to treat those plants and save them with the organic fertilizers and pesticides which has already been treated with non-organic pesticides and fertilizers. For a large scale flower growers to make use of the facilities like cold storage, packaging etc. becomes a little difficult because of the distance to where these facilities are provided. Hence, it is important to understand the various visible and invisible difficulties faced by these flower growers of Sikkim and act accordingly to solve their problems.

9. Recommendations

It has been realized during the field survey that the flower growers in Sikkim are facing a major problem in marketing their flowers. The flower growers either have to send flowers to Gangtokor

Namchifor sell. It is a long distance to cover for many of the flower growers. Particularly for those farmers who are engaged in small scale farming this distance becomes a problem. They have to pay for the transport. Many times, they have to pay the middle man also. Sikkim State Co-operative Supply and Marketing Federation Ltd (SIMFED) should intervene to solve these issues by arranging pick-up vans which will collect cut flowers from different pick-up points close to the flower farming areas so that flowers can be sent to the market.

Flower cultivators are also of the opinion that Government should take initiative to improve the packaging, storage and export of flowers and also to provide training to them. This could be done by giving them training every month by the departmental experts. More of practical training could be given by taking them to the places where the packaging is done so that they get well acquainted with the idea of packaging.

It is also recommended that government should find a way out to remove the middle man when it comes to marketing so that the flower cultivators can get the genuine price of the flowers. This could be either done by the Floriculture Department or Sikkim State Co- operative Supply and Marketing Federation Ltd (SIMFED) by collecting or by purchasing flowers directly from the flower growers.

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Book Review

Massimo Modonesi, *Subalternity, Antagonism, Autonomy: Constructing the Political Subject*, New York: Pluto Press, 2014, pp. 208.

The contemporary scholarship in social science in India is debating on the possible configuralities of subaltern politics, whether it has run its course, therefore exhausted its radical scope or whether the emergent differential paradigms of governmentality have created its own coercive hegemony to constitute new domains of exclusion and subalternization. There is this hunch that all seminal tools of progressive anti-imperial politics have completely given in to bourgeois democratic passivity that only encourages politics of identities and sectarian interest within the fold of governmentality apparatuses. So the discourse of politics within India is now imagined along two serialities of organized/bounded, state-centric protests by range of parliamentarian parties and non-party organisations and the unbounded affiliational politics devoid of prefigured leadership and ideology, that petition before the State to persuade and demand rights and entitlements. Significantly, the entire spectrum of politics that emerges between these two axial poles is averse to ideals of ideology politics that calls for radical and transformative change. Within this widespread perception of pessimism/defeatism that has been further bolstered by the corporate-driven media houses and the extremely depoliticised civil society, this new book, *Subalternity, Antagonism, Autonomy: Constructing the Political Subject* written by Massimo Modonesi and translated by Adriana V. Rendon Garrido and Philip Roberts comes as a refreshing and timely contribution to restore some radicalism to the idea of political. The book in nutshell opens up new vistas for antagonistic and progressive politics, especially in the aftermath of the Zapatista uprising, the French strikes and the anti-globalization protests in Seattle. One can add the Occupy Wall Street, London Riot and closer home, the India Against Corruption (IAC) movement in that league of dissents across the globe. If these resistant multitudes are taken into consideration, something that this book intends to argue about, a new panorama of political based on fundamental demands of social justice and emancipation can be glimpsed unfolding. This theoretical engagement by Modonesi, one who is a known name within the Latin American critical scholarship, is directed after finding new ideological and epistemological coordinates that can refashion the radical politics in countries where the enchantment of constitutional democracy with the hegemonic working of capital have completely snuffed out all possibilities of alternative politics. What are the constituents/modalities of this neo-subaltern politics that can resist this absolute hegemony of the finance capital? How can the neo-subaltern counteract the tremendous amnesia regarding question of

equality and justice among the upwardly mobile classes that has blocked all alternatives and dialectics?

Modonesi takes up this cudgel to define a possible trajectory of ideology politics as he explains, *Subalternity, antagonism and autonomy are born then as 'precepts', instruments of struggle, conceptual tools that, to the extent they seek to understand the processes of political subjectivation* (p.133). Modonesi views these three discrete analytical tools, working both diachronically and synchronically, as constituting the neo-radical subjectivity in the contemporary world. He in a way burrowed through the critical reservoirs of neo-Marxian thinkers like, Antonio Gramsci (whom he refers to as an exemplar of 'intelligence of pessimism'), Antonio Negri (whom he calls 'Toni' and then applauds as 'intelligence of optimism'), Cornelius Castoriadis and Claude Lefort, as three prime interpreters of radical subjectivity, and John Holloway (who has incidentally written the foreword), Rosa Luxemburg, E.P. Thompson, Henry Lefebvre, Harry Cleaver, Ernst Bloch and others in passing to argue his central thesis: Subalternity, Antagonism, and Autonomy are three connecting principles that can give birth to a radical subjectivity in this age of *Empire*. All these three critical coordinates are detached from the original idea of proletariat in the Marxian lexicon to mean how in a non-working class set-up, politics can organize around ideals of emancipation and autonomy. In fact, the whole pattern of capitalism, the nature of industrial labor and the potential collective imaginaries have undergone huge tectonic shifts in the post-industrial societies. This book measures these changes and shows how resistant movements across France, Italy, Hungary, Denmark and Latin America are throwing up newer coordinates and language of dissents.

The book has four chapters excluding a much focused introduction which foreshadows the central argument of the book and an explanatory afterword, which is added in the English translation. If the first chapter deals with the Gramscian idea of Subalternity, the succeeding two chapters are premised on Negri's works to theorise the agency of the antagonist subject and the idea of autonomy in works of Castoriadis and Lefort respectively. The fourth chapter is a kind of summation of the points to show how each of these ideas anticipate the other to re-radicalize politics with a coherent logic. So, if the idea of being the subaltern in Gramsci means a specific type of subjectivity formed within a structure of domination with moments of subordination and insubordination, the word antagonism, as Negri has pointed out, refers to a recurrent mode of politics of struggle and confrontation. Negrian antagonistic subject is born in a condition of subordination and hence is saddled with the political expediency of confronting and struggling with the prospective futuristic dream of emancipation. The idea of 'autonomy' in Castoriadis and Lefort is aimed after that prospect for rejection and emancipation. The idea is to reject the productive chain of the Capitalist economy to then create a space of beyond the capital or post-capital. For them, the 'autonomy' is simultaneously the means and the end

of politics to give birth to agential subjectivities. However, according to Modonesi, Lefort is more prolific than Castoriadis in reposing faith in the discourse of autonomy (p.104-110). Lefortian hypothesis shares a close proximity with the Luxemburgian mass line of opposing the party centrality. Therefore, autonomy in Lefortian schema of things is predicated around an antagonistic space of protest of the mass.

In words of Modonesi, all these discrete forms, which he calls *homologous categories*, share the same origination in the *Marxian roots* (p.135). But the difference that they all share lies in their emphasis on political subjectivation. Modonesi with quotes from *The Communist Manifesto*, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* proves that how instrumentally these notions figure in the whole Marxian dialectic. Autonomy and antagonism were postulated as two stages in establishing the class independence in the impending communist society. However, both Negri in works such as *Empire*, *Multitude*, *Labor of Dionysus*, *Marx Beyond Marx*, and Castoriadis in his essays in the magazine *Socialism or Barbarism* see antagonism and autonomy respectively as constituting the radical subjectivity which then reconstructs the structure. There are several overlaps between autonomy and antagonism in the Marxian literature. However, antagonism is seen by Modonesi as the most important axiom to form the constituent singular subjectivities. These constituent subjectivities then lead to Negrian *multitude*. *Multitude* both sustains and contests the *Empire* which is deterritorialised and dispersed. Modonesi counts this multitude of singular subjectivities as the most essential political subjectivity that in place of the subalternity kicks off the process of insubordination and liberation (p.128). In fact, by drawing upon Spinozian notion of power over/power against/power to, Modonesi draws his conclusion that subalternity, antagonism, autonomy performs these three acts of power-over, where by the power is exerted over the subaltern, power-against, whereby the hegemonic power is challenged and confronted, and the power-to, whereby the power is acquired to establish the autonomy. In fact, Modonesi also detects an instability in the notion of autonomy as it also means a poetic temporal frame of 'not yet', a futural possibility of exploring relative autonomous conditions.

There are several subtle differences between these analytical categories that Modonesi carefully deals with in constituting this linkage between three concepts that were born of three distinct backgrounds. If the Gramsci's radical, worker-based politics and the subsequent imprisonment inspired his idea of hegemony and the subaltern, for Negri the immediate context was the Workerist movement in Italy in 1970-80. Castoriadis derived his notion from the French *autogestion movements* in the aftermath of the 1968's student agitation which gradually involved factory workers and formed autonomous groups. The entire *Socialism or Barbarism* group in Italy also worked as inspiration for Lefort and Castoriadis to experiment with the political imaginary. These contexts provide us an insight into the connectivity between material uprisings and the theoretical

abstractions. In fact this book poses an important challenge before the social scientists in India that whether after similar uprisings in Haripur, Nandigram, Kalinganagar, Srikakulam, Polavaram, Kudankulan, Kandhamal, a new politico-theoretic paradigm can be identified, to imagine a constituent antagonistic politics in Indian realities. The book ends with references to the recent political developments in Latin America and how the three Gramscian ideas of *passive revolution*, *transformismo*, and *Caesarism* are playing out in the Latin American left politics, which again helps us to assess similar developments back home. Be it in the context of the emergence of Aam Admi Party or the National Advisory Council along with the rise of Civil Society movements in cities like Kolkata, Mumbai and Delhi, such Gramscian coordinates can facilitate newer analysis and understanding.

At the end, this theoretical engagement by Modonesi is undoubtedly providing a much-needed manual on how to revalidate some of the precepts of radical politics in an increasingly post-political milieu. But, having said this, there is no gainsaying of the fact that the book is not liberated from the Euro-centricism and its vantage. Even though it brings in the Latin American political scenario almost at the fag-end, the thesis of the book tends to be grand in scope so that it can correspond to all conditions of subjugation and subordination. The book rightly criticized the Subaltern Studies Group in India in confusing the difference between spontaneity and consciousness in the Gramscian thinking, but falls short of realizing how the non-European social structures/political practices can unravel many out-of-the-beaten-track coordinates of dissident politics. One can cite the notion of *world of the third* or *margin of margin* as two such analytical categories that in many ways mark definite departures from the European understanding of the political.

**Knowledge and Power: A Discourse for Transformation
(2014); by Braj Ranjan Mani; Manohar publishers;
New Delhi; pp424**

Sana Salim

Keywords: Knowledge, Power, Transformation, Debrahmanization.

Knowledge is an asset to every individual and society. Both knowledge and power are much contested domains. The one who scrutinize knowledge also has power to confer in the lively matters. On the other hand those who seize power can exercise knowledge according to it. Braj Ranjan Mani in his book *Knowledge and Power*, tries to locate the established notion of knowledge and power, how it is being used from different perspective by different people. This book has its own uniqueness in terms of its content and discussion. Emphasis has been made to put forth the light upon the root cause of prevalent lacuna and marginalization of historically oppressed group in social, economic, cultural and political life. An effort has been made to see the world from an enlarged and emancipated perspective, so that change can transpire in the current nature of knowledge and power. For that, a massive reconstruction of established structures of oppression was advocated and a firm appeal to challenge the constructed ideas and prejudices for the self-criticism and self-struggle was recommended. The author is a staunch critique of socially constructed hierarchy and brahmanical order of 'Varna' system. His earlier work '*Debrahmanising History*' (2005) is also moved around these issues like caste and its consequences. He wanted to make knowledge available to everyone, so that everybody will be empowered and power will be equally distributed among the society members, then only a true democratic order can be setup. He tried to find out the alternatives for more ethical and liberal society. For that one has to start seeing with new eye or perspective to understand the knowledge, power and politics, so that right questions can be asked and hunt attempt is made to find out the answers beyond the failed frameworks.

He describes how a small section of minority in numbers is transforming the entire prevalent socio-economic, cultural and political arena according to their need and desire in which injustices and inequality is inherited. He further talks about how in a democratic order injustices and authoritarianism of few is maintained. He tries to probe the formation of world with a million millionaires and a billion hungry people and ask what went wrong. The structure of brahmanical order is being questioned and discussed that how it holds knowledge and power which is used as a derogatory and to suppress other lower strata. The author inquired the continuation of large scale injustices and

confinement of knowledge and power in hand of few which is contrasted with the high-tech and democratized formation of the society. 'Knowledge is no longer widely felt as an ideal; it is seen as an instrument' (p.172). He says that there are forces in society that do not allow resources and power to be distributed fairly. Further he made a point that democracy does not work good because of active involvement of people but due to the competition among elites for power. It is created and accepted in the society that there will always be winners and losers and life prefers talented few to be wealthy who will redeem the poor. These are justified on the name of nature that God has created others to serve the few who have the ability to hold the power and knowledge. Dominant hegemonic conditions are created which makes the oppressed accept that they are born degraded and subject to oppression. Domination of the majority by one group brutalizes over all. People are compelled to live a poor life but authority refuses to take any notice of such waste of human resources. He captured the hunger and food crises and explains how it works and how affluent people are becoming ignorant and arrogant towards these issues. The structures of school and university carry a hidden curriculum in pedagogical practices feeding the myths that reinforce the establish order. Those who suffer discrimination are thus diverted from locating the cause of their subordination in society. The people are made to invest more faith in the system then the system has in itself. The myth of merit and social mobility hide the truth that without equality of condition and opportunity, right to equality amounts to nothing. Old and obnoxious socio-religious fundamentals have subtly morphed into modern and secular scientific avatars. For elite knowledge has for long been a great source of power. As in 16th century Francis Bacon said 'knowledge itself is power' without love and justice knowledge and power would produce misery and strife not happiness and harmony. In his work he put emphasis upon 'Debrahmanization' so that 'lower caste' people can live an equal life and enjoy dignity and opportunity.

In the first chapter the author tries to understand the fundamentals like justice, liberty and equality. How despite these beautiful ideas dominant class has taken full advantage of democratic deficit to valorize the other marginalized groups and made them suppressed and dependent upon the mercy of the dominant few. Despite both the national and international norms of justice and equality people are marginalized under the mask of democracy, this is a clear abuse of knowledge and power. Even the scholarly works are based upon individual interests. 'Identity or location of the scholar (in terms of caste, class, gender, age, nationality) influence, if not determine, the orientation or emphasis of their work' (p. 66). In the second chapter Hobbes' notion of state of nature is discussed as an incomplete impression of the people, though there was fear and cohesion at that period of time, but also there was a feeling of commonness before the emergence of strong forms of government such as democracy, monarchy, etc. but the modern world order is more pathetic than the Hobbesian

state of nature, there power is accumulated in the hands of a few. Though things have changed from pre-modern era but the prevalent injustices are forwarded together with new forms and means into the modern world. The traditional religious order was countered by the people like Muhammad, Buddha and Jesus, but their emancipation and contributions were hijacked by the affluent and shaped into self serving interests with the color of modern secular world order. In the third chapter he discusses how media, publicity and pop culture is being used as a tool to promote elitist interest rather than its actual duty of creating awareness and acting as a check upon the state power. The concentration is shifted from empowering the masses to selling their half-truth with semi-empirical statistics as a custodian of commercial culture. In the next chapter understanding of the politics of knowledge is described at length. It is believed that the modern notion of power is not wealth but knowledge, as it is heard that 'not weapons, is the currency of power today, but that is knowledge, as Ernest Gellner made the point that 'at the base of modern social order stands not the executioner but the professor' (p. 172). In this section the author have discussed the scholarly work and argued that each and every scholar produces their own knowledge as the only reality. Ashish Nandy, Amartya Sen, are somewhere 'remain enthralled by the philosophical grandeur of brahmanic Hinduism' (p. 208). He says that these scholars are not immune from the brahmanic-Gandhian humbug. In the last chapter the author questioned the silence of the oppressed and argued that it is 'because their mind is submerged in the oppressor's language and education' (p. 261). Further he quoted Uday Prakash that 'the dead do not think and do not speak: when people do not think and speak, they are dead' (p. 261). Education is seen as the most important tool for the emancipation of mind. He said that now no Buddha, Jesus and Muhammad will come to struggle for the deprived, they themselves have to unite and start questioning the prevalent social, cultural, economic and political dominance of few. Only then the true democracy can be established and its fruits of justice, equality and liberty can be equally shared by all the people.

After going through this book my limited understanding of knowledge and power has widened. We had heard about the causes and consequences of poverty, hunger, dehumanization, suppression, etc. But the way the author has explained these things and its causes and consequences are very practical and authentic. He has challenged the present context of origin of poverty and hunger, brahmanization and dehumanization. He has taken a different position on such issues and challenges the different scholars and their given theories. He mentions that the other scholars are considering more the consequences of dominant elitism or culturalism prevailing in India rather than the practical reality of the subject. A huge source of other literary work is used to strengthen his arguments. The only thing which I found not so convincing is, his work is a complete reflection of marginalized perspective, despite his arguments which are valid

enough to map out the situation of the oppressed people, the others or dominant perspective is completely missing. Above all, I found this book worth reading.

Book Review

Dr. Nandini Basistha, Politics of Separatism, New Delhi, Vaibhav Publications, 2017, pp xiv + 296

TrivikramTiwari

The book under review, '*Politics of Separatism*' is an anthology, which explores a much-neglected theme in South Asian history and politics, namely, the politics for separate '*statehood*'. This is also a kind of '*separatism*', which generates continuous disturbance in everyday life. The author tries to make a holistic study of this '*problem*' with two case studies – viz. Rajbanshi-led movement and Gorkha-led movement. Thus this Study tries to theorize the evolution of identity politics leading to separatist mentalities in India. This is the first comparative study of this kind, where two separate but parallel ethnic movements are discussed in detail with their cause, magnitude and fall-outs.

In different chapters how the author has elaborately discussed the issue of intermingling self-interest with separatist mentality is really appreciable. The writer has done a commendable task of bringing together primary sources and secondary sources with overlapping data and contradictory view-points.

With a bias-free manner, this Study revolves around hundred years' (1910-2010) history of movement of two most prominent groups of identity seekers of Northern part of West Bengal – viz. Gorkhas and Rajbanshis. The Study elaborates how it took various forms with changing scenario & circumstances, and submerged with favourable governmental approaches. But every time phoenix-rise of their movement can be seen. Thus, in different chapters, the author tried to analyse the actual condition of the '*activism*' and tries to validate the question of '*marginality*'.

Chapter 1 basically theorise the scope and eruption of politics for statehood in the India's federalist structure and how Indian Government tries to cope up with these separatist mentalities with federal policies. With different case studies in the Indian scenario, this Chapter tries to point out the challenging nature of India's nation-building process and gravity of the situation.

Chapter 2 tries to establish a co-relation between multiculturalism and justice in Indian perspective and hiccups in creating a '*just society*'. Elaborating the debate between '*pluralism*' vis-à-vis '*multiculturalism*', here the uniqueness of Indian circumstances is located.

Chapter 3 is about historical separate identity, economic backwardness and changing demographic set up of North Bengal that can be supportive to understand the notion of relative deprivation of this region and marginalization of minorities with the influx of Bengalese in every sphere.

Inhabited by a vast variety of tribes and nationalities, North Bengal is a place with a great variety as well as versatility. One may question on its integrity as a '*region*'. But the author describes its uniqueness. North Bengal is a term used for the northern parts of Bangladesh and West Bengal. However, this Study deals with only the Northern part of West Bengal, comprising six districts – viz. Darjeeling, Jalpaiguri, Cooch Behar, Malda, Uttar (North)

Dinajpur and Dakshin (South) Dinajpur. The landscape, history and cultures of each district have a distinguished character. The geographical area of North Bengal is 21855 square kilometers, which is 1/4th of West Bengal. This region attracts importance in both national and international sphere for its strategic location. It is bounded by three states (viz. Assam, Bihar and Sikkim), three countries (viz. Bangladesh, Bhutan, and Nepal) and it is the only connecting link between Northeast India and the rest of India. How different socio-political and ethnic movements are becoming a threat to national security has also been discussed.

Chapter 4 illustrates why and how Rajbangshis got united on casteist line and ultimately took the path of separatist politics. Caste in West Bengal has been notoriously understudied for at least three reasons. Firstly, the political culture of postcolonial West Bengal has tended to make all talk of 'caste' a taboo. Secondly, West Bengal, unlike many other regions in India, has not experienced major caste-based social movements since 1947. Thirdly, the ruling elites of this eastern Indian region, the *bhadralok*, though internally differentiated along many axes, have exercised a virtually uncontested social dominance that is rather unique even in a country where the reproduction of power relations is anything but uncommon. In this Study, the author address each of these intellectual and political concerns by taking an interdisciplinary perspective that draws on cutting-edge scholarship in the fields of history, anthropology, sociology, and cultural studies. She not only interrogates why caste continues to be neglected in the politics of and scholarship on West Bengal, but also discusses how caste relations have, in fact, permeated the politics of the region in the colonial and postcolonial eras. In fact, caste in West Bengal has overt and covert aspects. On the one hand, there is the obvious issue of upper-caste dominance in the domain of formal politics despite the sway of communism for more than three decades. On the other hand, there are hidden, even insidious, ways in which a modern caste society has flourished since colonial times and shaped academic, journalistic, and popular understandings of Bengali society, culture, history, and politics. This Chapter, instead, sustains an intellectual conversation that is both timely and relevant for those interested in understanding the nature of politics in contemporary South Asia.

This Chapter explores, in an interdisciplinary way, the making and maintenance of a modern caste society that has implications well beyond the case of West Bengal. It is divided into three sections, which correspond to the key arguments we wish to make. The first examines caste formations and organised resistance to these in colonial Bengal. Hidden histories of caste come into conversation here with fine-grained studies of caste-based movements. The second probes the extent to which partition in 1947 served as a political watershed moment in the transformation of caste society in West Bengal. This section seeks causal connections between decolonisation, the physical displacement of populations, and *bhadralok* dominance in postcolonial West Bengal. The third and final section focuses on communist and post-communist political trajectories of the region. We see here how the ethnographic present is shaped by the many parts of a caste-ridden society, albeit in ways that are neither obvious nor pre-determined.

Chapter 5 underlines different identity of Rajbangshi/ Kamtapuri language and importance of inclusion of this language in the education policy of West Bengal. Here the whole controversy regarding the Rajbangshi/ Kamtapuri language and politicization of the matter have been discussed.

Chapter 6 focuses three major problems of Rajbanshi-led democratic movements – viz. overlapping territorial demands of statehood, confusion over ethnic origin and linguistic status of Rajbanshis, and conflict between leaders.

Chapter 7 underlined the Genesis of the Gorkhaland Movement where the Study explored different reasons for movement and also underlines how upliftment of leaders (viz. Subhash Ghising and Bimal Gurung) in socio-economic sphere diverted their mentality against the main spirit of the Gorkhaland movement and subsequently new personalities took leadership.

Thus, this collection of co-related essays can become a benchmark for the future as well as spur new research agendas and projects that will put the region into a much-needed conversation on the politics of separatism with the rest of India.